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Abstract
Healthy pluralism requires space for all religious adherents to 
worship and construct places of worship in accordance with 
their convictions. The state should protect this right as an 
essential matter. Despite this normative ideal, there is still much 
controversy surrounding the construction of places of worship 
in Indonesia. In the last few years, the planned construction 
of a number of places of worship has been disputed, although 
others have been able to overcome these problems by relying on 
different strategies. 
This research seeks to examine the factors that play a role in 
initiating and resolving conflict over places of worship. Places of 
worship are specifically limited in this study to Catholic churches 
and Protestant churches that are members of the Communion of 
Churches in Indonesia (Persekutuan Gereja-gereja di Indonesia, 
PGI). The methods used were participant observation and in-
depth interviews of churches representing one of four categories: 
(1) undisputed churches; (2) disputed churches that have since 
resolved the dispute; (3) originally undisputed churches that 
have since become disputed; and (4) churches that have never 
been able to resolve the dispute. 
Based on thirteen case studies, the research on which this 
report is based confirms the influential role of state regulation 
and social factors. The cases show that the obstacles some 
churches experience are generally related to weak government 
agencies due to political, social or ideological reasons. In terms 
of social factors, demographic factors were not found to have 
an influence. Resistance to churches was more often caused 
by a lack of communication, or provocation or intimidation 
by specific groups. After describing and analysing the thirteen 
cases selected, this monograph closes with conclusions and 
recommendations.***
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Preface
Introduction to the Monograph Series
on the Practice of Pluralism
There is always some ambiguity when how diversity is to be 
managed is discussed in Indonesia. During the New Order, there 
appeared to be harmony between groups that differed in terms 
of their customs (adat), culture, religion, languages or their status 
as migrants or natives, among other things. The government 
intentionally managed this diversity to ensure the law and order 
and harmony that would allow for economic development. In 
reality, there were many issues inherent in this strict control of 
harmony, particularly the popular SARA issue. An acronym for 
Suku, Agama, Ras dan Antargolongan (Ethnicity, Religion, Race 
and Inter-group relations), SARA referred to the dictum that 
ethnicity, religion, race and inter-group relations – the most 
prominent sources of difference – were sensitive issues and had 
to be treated carefully. They could not be dealt with in a way 
that angered any particular group, and as such any discourse 
on these issues was limited. 
Channels through which citizens could participate in discus-
sion of these issues were restricted to officially provided. For 
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religious issues, the channel was religious councils, believed 
to represent religious communities. There were also official as-
sociations to represent cultural or customary issues and, even 
within schools (as discussed in one monograph in this series) 
there were facilities for student participation, including the OSIS 
(Intra-School Student Organisation). This had two functions: to 
provide a space for student activities and to limit those activities 
and the involvement of particular groups. Under New Order 
corporatism, participation was no different to mobilisation. 
Another icon of the New Order was the Beautiful Indonesia 
Miniature Park (Taman Mini Indonesia Indah) in Jakarta. It recog-
nises the immense diversity of Indonesia but at the same time 
limits that recognition. It displays different traditional houses and 
places of worship but the number of different traditional houses 
or places of worship is set, finite. As this display has it, culture, 
customs (adat) and religion seem to be unchanging, singular, like 
museums. There are at least two problems with this represen-
tation. First, diversity is not limited to the number of displays 
on show, or to any set number. Second, it leaves no room for 
the incredible diversity that occurs within each of these depic-
tions, or the fact that each culture, custom, or religion is not an 
inanimate object, but continues to move, change and struggle for 
recognition of its aspirations. It is not enough to just “preserve” 
these cultures, customs or religions. Their vitality also needs to 
be recognised. The Taman Mini Indonesia Indah model also denies 
inter-linkages between tribes, races, cultures, customs and even 
religions. It is as if each diverse form is separate, stands alone, 
and has no convergence beyond the fact that each is on display 
in the Indonesian “park”.
Interestingly, after the collapse of the New Order, triggered by 
the popular calls for Reformasi, or ‘reformation’, there was little 
change to this paradigm. There was greater space for diversity 
but clear boundaries remained. The number of “officially recog-
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nised religions” increased by one, and the number of provinces 
also increased as old provinces were divided differently under 
the decentralisation policy, but all this occurred within certain 
boundaries. 
Under the New Order, the harmony paradigm was questioned 
but Indonesians also took pride in Indonesia as a unitary state 
that was home to diverse regions, islands, customs, cultures, 
religions and languages. This image was threatened after the 
Reformation, when diversity seemed to try to break free from 
the confines of the old regime in a disorganised and, at times, 
anarchic manner, coloured by violence on both small and large 
scale. Indonesians became anxious, thinking that the harmony of 
the past of which we had been so proud was fading, along with 
the image of Indonesia as a modern, moderate and democratic 
state. We asked with increasing intensity: ‘what is wrong?’
While the New Order was marked by authoritarianism and 
corporatism, the democratic movement that grew out of the 
Reformation had two key characteristics. First, there was far 
greater room for freedom of expression; and second, it ushered 
in decentralisation, which decreased the power of the central 
government and gave greater recognition to regional authorities. 
Most contemporary issues concerning diversity originate from 
these two main characteristics. Greater room for expression al-
lowed new groups, including those repressed during the New 
Order, to emerge unimpeded, and we saw the strengthening of 
religious and cultural identity. Combined with the weakening 
of law enforcement, these groups’ strong aspirations often led to 
violence that was not dealt with appropriately. Greater regional 
authority as a result of decentralisation did, in some regions, in-
crease welfare and social justice. But along with decentralisation 
and extensive corruption, however, there were also cases where 
the discriminatory aspirations of certain groups found their way 
into local governance. 
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In other words, many of the issues we face today in relation 
to the management of diversity are part and parcel of democra-
tisation and these two characteristics. As a result, whatever we 
might think about resolving current issues of diversity, it will be 
no good to return to a situation similar to that which prevailed 
before the Reformation. We must accept the consequences of 
democratisation, positive or negative, and then work on fixing 
the issues that arise. 
It is this issue that has prompted us to undertake research and 
publish the results in this series of monographs and an additional 
book on pluralisme kewargaan (civic pluralism). While the book 
contains a more theoretical discussion and views the issue on a 
wider scale, the monograph series focuses on local cases, limited 
to certain regions. 
The book and the monograph series examine civic pluralism, 
emphasising issues that relate to religious diversity, although 
often it is difficult to clearly distinguish between the religious 
sector and other social sectors. The term “pluralism” generally 
refers to the effort to respond to issues of diversity in society. 
The adjective “civic” further defines our discussion. First, the 
adjective “civic” is used to differentiate this discourse from that 
on pluralism which in Indonesia is often understood to be a 
theological or philosophical claim to truth or salvation within the 
different religions. These monographs and the book do seek to 
enter this discourse. In addition, the qualification “civic” refers 
to issues of diversity that identify individuals and their com-
munities as Indonesian citizens. 
This discussion is strongly rooted in the political, not theo-
logical realm, although theology is discussed at certain points, 
as religious discussion also plays a role within social groups. As 
a political issue, one of the primary issues in the management 
of diversity is how to maintain the public realm as a facility for 
social participation in a democratic state. As strict separation 
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between the private and public realms is increasingly difficult 
to justify and does not accord with the socio-political realities 
in almost all democratic states today, recognition of religious 
diversity and all its aspirations is increasingly important and 
must be managed appropriately. 
Management of diversity is not the same as religious regula-
tion. Regulation is necessary for several reasons, and is a duty 
shared by the government, the legislature and wider society. 
Outside the law, however, there must be an ethos within society - 
a good neighbourly ethos between citizens - that is not restricted 
simply to tolerance for the sake of maintaining order but extends 
also to the desire to help one another resolve issues, or even learn 
from one another. If not, management of diversity will remain 
merely a legal matter.  
In terms of individual religious communities, an open political 
realm that allows participation in order to discover ideas of com-
mon good and collective resolution of problems also demands 
that religion shows a constructive and civilised face. In doing 
so, religious groups become part of civil society, which holds a 
central position in democratic countries. The primary duty of 
the state is to maintain the public realm and, even when neutral-
ity is absent or is not desirable, the state still needs to provide 
facilities, particularly to marginalised groups, to participate in 
the public realm. 
Although such an idea is not problematic normatively, sev-
eral potential issues could emerge in relation to the recognition 
and diverse representation of civil groups in the political arena. 
Separate from the debate over the ways to manage diversity 
(such as liberalism, multiculturalism and so on) another impor-
tant matter is the opening up, and maintenance of, spaces for 
inter- and intra-community dialogue, rather than establishing 
explicit standards (some of which may be considered “univer-
sal”) to determine which citizens may participate. In this context, 
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Indonesia’s normative foundations, such as Pancasila or the idea 
of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity), would be more pro-
ductive if used as a framework for participation of citizens that 
is always open to reinterpretation, rather than as an exclusive 
ideological formulation. 
The final point of “civic pluralism” is the connection that 
recognition and representation has with redistribution, namely 
efforts to provide social welfare that is inclusive and targets all 
social groups, no matter what their geographical background, 
culture, adat or religion. Here, recognition and representation, 
or efforts to manage diversity more generally, are instruments 
through which to achieve social justice and equality for all citi-
zens.  This issue is discussed further in the book, Civic Pluralism. 
In the monograph series – particularly in the first seven 
monographs – our research colleagues have selected several top-
ics through which to view the practice of pluralism in various 
regions in Indonesia. These topics are varied, and range from 
middle school institutes to churches, the attempt to introduce 
local regulations inspired by religious values and the interac-
tion between religion and local cultures, or even “unofficial 
religions”. Each research project is focused on a specific and 
limited geographical area, so we can understand pluralism, or 
the practice of living together in a diverse environment, from a 
close-up and focused perspective, and not just as a large abstract 
idea about the management of diversity. Our ambition is not to 
find a single general pattern behind the practice of pluralism in 
Indonesia but to rather examine each particular topic in greater 
depth, in order to further illuminate and help explore the issue 
of “civic pluralism”. 
It is important to note that we started discussing the idea of 
“civic pluralism” at the end of 2008 but in a much less specific, 
more general form. Ideally, we would have had a clear picture 
from the beginning, which would have guided all the research 
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undertaken. In reality, however, our initial idea, which was 
perhaps premature in some aspects, was explored collectively 
and concurrently by the directing team who edited this series 
and our partners undertaking field research in several regions 
throughout Indonesia.  
About this Monograph: Dissection of Issues
Concerning the Construction of Churches
Issues over the construction of churches have long disturbed 
harmonious relations between religious communities in Indo-
nesia. various government regimes have come to power, yet 
problems with the construction of churches have always existed, 
and at times have led to social tension and even violent conflict. 
Available data shows that more than 1000 cases have occurred 
from the middle of 1969 to 2006, with the majority occurring 
under the New Order regime, which – ironically – placed great 
emphasis on harmony. 
After the regime collapsed and there was greater space for 
the expression of freedom and diversity, the construction of 
churches continued to be a crucial issue of religious freedom. 
This is evident from the annual reports on religious freedom 
produced by the Wahid Institute, Setara Institute, Paramadina 
Foundation and MPRK UGM, the Moderate Muslim Society and 
CRCS UGM. These reports show that the tension surrounding 
the construction of churches is still high, particularly over the 
last five years. 
The government has indeed made several efforts to address 
the issue. In 2006, the government issued the Joint Regulations 
of the Minister for Religious Affairs and the Minister for Internal 
Affairs (PBM) Nos. 9 and 8 to replace Joint Decree (SKB) No. 1/
Ber/MDN-MAG/1969, which had been deemed discriminatory. 
Legally, the Joint Regulations give greater legal certainty than the 
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Joint Decree. In addition, the government established the Inter-
Religious Harmony Forum (Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama, 
FKUB) through the Joint Regulations, which the government 
expected to play a constructive role in maintaining harmony. 
These efforts were, however, unable to resolve the issues sur-
rounding the construction of places of worship. 
A research team from Paramadina Foundation, the Masters 
of Peace and Conflict Resolution program of Gadjah Mada 
University (MPRK UGM) and the Indonesian Conference on 
Religion and Peace (ICRP), set out to study the issue by con-
ducting research into the controversies behind the construction 
of churches in Jakarta and the surrounding areas. Although this 
study is only a preliminary analysis and the sample of churches 
studied was limited (only 13 churches, seven Catholic and six 
Protestant), several of the conclusions provide valuable lessons 
about the need to enforce “civic pluralism”. 
“Civic pluralism” requires an initiative by citizens to build 
a network of friendships and mutually negotiate differences so 
they can develop a rulebook that collectively benefits all groups. 
Cases involving the construction of churches rarely pay much 
attention to this aspect. People often focus attention on formal 
rules or state regulations. Our research in Jakarta and the sur-
rounding areas shows that informal friendship networks are, in 
fact, an effective tool through which to resolve issues that arise 
during the construction of churches. 
The case of St Mikael’s Church in Kranji, for example, provides 
an important lesson on the value of informal relations. Until 
2005, when Father yosef was sent to St Mikael, the relationship 
between this church’s congregants and the local community 
was coloured by suspicion. This was evident from the fact that 
barely any local residents were willing to enter, or walk within, 
the vast Strada complex. The complex was separated from the 
local community by a small door that had never been opened, 
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and locals had been cautioned against opening it. The area near 
the door became a rubbish dump and the door became a symbol 
of the separation between the two communities. Working with 
the heads of the local neighbourhood and community associa-
tion units and religious leaders, the door was eventually opened. 
Father yosef prayed that the opening of the door would signify 
the start of improved communications between the church com-
munity and local residents. 
This story may also be a symbol of the need for attention to 
“civic pluralism”, especially in relation to the construction of 
churches. Often in public discourse issues over the construction 
of churches are viewed and discussed solely as human rights 
issues, which should not be contested and should be upheld by 
the government. This research in Jakarta and the surrounding 
areas provides a portrait, however, that is much more complex 
and nuanced. In many aspects, problems with the construction 
of churches reflect deeply-rooted suspicions between religious 
communities. It requires people like Father yosef and other advo-
cates of pluralism—whose stories can be found in this report—to 
have the courage to “cross boundaries” and build friendships 
in order to remove suspicions and open bridges of dialogue so 
that debate can be negotiated and, eventually, a better and more 
civilised way of life can be built together. 
Of course, this does not reduce the government’s responsibili-
ty. Citizens will not make efforts to build mutual understanding if 
the government does not provide room for negotiations, crucial to 
the development of “civic pluralism”. The government can play 
an important role here by ensuring that room for negotiations 
remains open to all parties, that they are not monopolised by any 
one party, and that they proceed without threats or violence.*** 
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Preface to the English Edition
From the Director of the Paramadina Foundation 
This small book is based on research by the Paramadina Founda-
tion’s Research Team into controversies concerning the construc-
tion of churches in Jakarta and the surrounding areas. This is not 
a new theme in the advocacy of religious freedom in Indonesia. 
Several institutes, such as the Center for Religious and Cross-
Cultural Studies (CRCS, UGM) and the Wahid Institute, have 
recorded instances of church closures in Indonesia in their annual 
reports on religious freedom in Indonesia. Unlike these reports, 
however, this research seeks to further examine the dynamics of 
this issue and to discover what can be learnt from the cases where 
disputes over the construction of churches have been resolved. 
The Indonesian edition of this book has already been released 
and commented on by Sidney Jones (International Crisis Group, 
Indonesia), Jeirry Sumampow (Communion of Churches in Indo-
nesia, PGI), Rudy Pratikno (Archdiocese of Jakarta), and Syafi’i 
Mufid (Inter-Religious Harmony Forum, Jakarta). We have also 
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received similar comments from Firliana Purwanti (Hivos, In-
donesia) and Zainal Abidin Bagir (CRCS, UGM). The English 
edition of the book contains a few alterations based on these 
comments. 
We express our deepest thanks to all those mentioned above 
for their suggestions. We would especially like to thank CRCS, 
UGM and the Pluralism Knowledge Program (PKP) Team, who 
initiated this research and then published the Indonesian lan-
guage version. 
Finally, we give our many thanks to Professor Tim Lindsey, Dr 
Melissa Crouch and Rebecca Lunnon from the Asian Law Centre, 
the University of Melbourne, for their willingness to support the 
translation and publication of this book in English.*** 
Jakarta, May 2011 
Ihsan Ali-Fauzi 
From the Asian Law Centre
In 2011, three major incidents at churches raised fears that large-
scale communal violence between Muslims and Christians may 
break out again in Indonesia. The first occurred in February 2011 
after a crowd of hardline (garis keras) Muslims, dissatisfied with 
the perceived light sentence of a Christian convicted for blas-
pheming Islam, burnt down several churches in Temanggung, 
Central Java (Arnaz, 2011). The second occurred in September 
2011 when communal violence broke out between Muslims and 
Christians in Ambon, Maluku, leaving 7,000 people displaced 
(ICG, 2011). Shortly after this, a third incident occurred when a 
Muslim suicide bomber severely injured several Christians when 
he detonated a bomb inside a church in Solo, Central Java. This 
level of violence between Muslims and Christians has not been 
seen in Indonesia since early 2000s. 
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Despite these incidents and the intensity of the violence they 
involved, protracted disputes over permits are an equally press-
ing and daily concern for many churches. One example is the 
yasmin Protestant church in Bogor, which had its permit formally 
recognised by the Administrative Court in 2010 but is still not 
built, due to the refusal of the local mayor to enforce the court de-
cision.1 Such disputes continue to raise ongoing questions about 
the permit application process, and the role that law and enforce-
ment agencies play in facilitating or exacerbating these disputes.
While many Indonesian non-government organisations now 
report these incidents as statistics in bulletins or annual reports 
on religious freedom, there is a lack of in-depth, qualitative re-
search that explores these tensions in their context. This report 
seeks to fill this gap by analysing in detail how and why ten-
sions and disputes over churches occur, based on a large number 
of interviews at 14 different locations in and around Jakarta. I 
wish to congratulate the Paramadina Foundation research team, 
led by Pak Ihsan Ali-Fauzi, for a very detailed and thorough 
piece of research. Crucially, this research on Muslim-Christian 
relations was conducted by Indonesian Muslims, which means 
that the perspective they bring to this report gives the reader an 
insight into the daily, lived realities of inter-religious relations 
in Indonesia.
The report makes several key findings, of which I will high-
light just a few. First, it finds that disputes over applications for 
church permits often arise because of fears (real or perceived) that 
Christians will attempt to proselytise or convert Muslims, activi-
ties referred to in Indonesia as ‘Kristenisasi’ or Christianisation 
(p 80).2 It also demonstrates that there are a significant number of 
‘non-religious’ factors at play in these disputes. One is the socio-
1 For discussion of cases in the Administrative Courts involving church 
permits, see Crouch, 2010.
2  This is similar to the findings in my own research, see Crouch, 2011.
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economic context. The report finds that churches can negotiate 
solutions to such disputes if they are able to find a tangible way 
of contributing to, or empowering, the local community with-
out that being perceived as ‘Christianisation’. For example, if a 
church offered to employ local residents as parking attendants, 
then it was more likely that the local community would feel the 
construction of a church could offer positive benefits to the com-
munity, and might therefore consent to the construction (p 37).
Another important issue is the role of the bureaucracy, includ-
ing the local government and the police. The report highlights the 
way in which local governments have bowed to the pressure cre-
ated by campaigns led by hardline Islamic religious leaders and 
groups. It suggests that the positions taken by local government 
leaders regarding church disputes directly affect the response of 
the police, often contributing to tensions rather than helping to 
resolve them. If an agreement is eventually made between the 
parties, it often comes at a high price to the church involved. For 
example, one church paid Rp 50 million for ‘coordination fees’ 
to the police. There is clearly an urgent need for reform of the 
police force to ensure that it is truly a public service rather than 
a rent-seeking institution.
On a more positive note, the report finds that there are encour-
aging efforts being made by some local leaders at the grassroots 
level to promote inter-religious relations in Indonesia. The report 
suggests that it is local community leaders, often the head of the 
local neighbourhood unit (RW or RT), who are the most powerful 
determinants in the outcome of a dispute over a church. It also 
highlights the importance of personal relationships between the 
church members and the wider local community (p 89). It dem-
onstrates the many ways church leaders actively try to connect 
with local community leaders at a personal level, taking the time 
to engage in dialogue and find creative ways to allay fears or to 
provide benefits to leaders and the local community.
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This research also reflects on the implementation of the new 
Joint Ministerial Regulations in 2006 and the establishment of the 
Inter-religious Harmony Forum, a council of religious leaders 
with the official role of facilitating the process for issuing permits 
for places of worship. Despite its promising name, this report 
finds that the Forum has at times hindered, rather than facilitated, 
applications for church permits and has yet to play a significant 
role in mediating church disputes (p 80). This clearly requires 
government attention if the concept of kerukunan umat beragama 
(inter-religious harmony) is to be more than empty rhetoric.
Finally, the findings of this report are relevant not only for 
Indonesian institutions and organisations, but also for other gov-
ernments and international organisations that seek to understand 
inter-religious relations in Indonesia. The report also has broader 
application to the incidents of violent conflict mentioned above, 
particularly as regards the need to address the complicity of local 
governments and enforcement agencies in exacerbating violence, 
and the need to support respected community leaders at the 
grassroots level who can play a significant role in mediating 
tensions.***
Melbourne, September 2011
Melissa Crouch
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Glossary
AD : Angkatan Darat, Army
Amdal : Analisis Dampak Lingkungan, Environmental 
Impact Analysis
Dandim : Komandan Dinas Militer, District Military 
Commander
Danramil : Komandan Rayon Militer, Sub-district Military 
Commander
Depkau :  Departemen Keuangan, Department of Finance
DGI : Dewan Gereja-gereja di Indonesia, Indonesian 
Council of Churches
DPP : Dewan Pastorial Paroki, Parish Pastoral 
Council
FBR :  Forum Betawi Rempug, Betawi Brotherhood 
Forum
FKUI :  Forum Komunikasi Umat Islam, The Muslim 
Communication Forum
Forkami :  Forum Komunitas Muslim Indonesia, The 
Indonesian Muslim Communication Forum
FPI :  Front Pembela Islam, The Islamic Defenders 
Front
FUI :  Forum Umat Islam, The Muslim Forum
GKI :  Gereja Kristen Indonesia, Indonesian Christian 
Church
GPI : Gereja Protestan Indonesia, Indonesian 
Protestant Church
GSG :  Gedung Serba Guna, Multi-purpose building
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HKBP :  Huria Kristen Batak Protestan, Huria Christian 
Batak Protestant Church
IMB :  Izin Mendirikan Bangunan, Building Permit
Inpres :  Instruksi Presiden, Presidential Instruction
IPPT :  Izin Peruntukan Penggunaan Tanah, Land 
Usage and Management Permit
KAJ :  Keuskupan Agung Jakarta, The Jakarta 
Archdiocese 
Kapolres :  Kepala Kepolisian Resort, District Police Chief
Kapolsek :  Kepala Kepolisian Sektor, Sub-district Police 
Chief
Kesbang :  Kesatuan Bangsa, National Unity
Kepag :  Kementerian Agama, Ministry of Religious 
Affairs
Komnas HAM :  Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia, National 
Commission on Human Rights
KWI :  Konferensi Waligereja Indonesia, Bishop’s 
Conference of Indonesia
Laksusda :  Pelaksana Khusus Daerah, Special Territorial 
Administrator
LMS :  London Missionary Society
LSI :  Lembaga Survei Indonesia, Indonesian Survey 
Institute
MAWI :  Majelis Agung Waligereja Indonesia, The 
Indonesian Council of Bishops
MUI :  Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Indonesian Ulama 
Council 
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Introduction: The Genealogy of
Disputes over Sacred Places
Research Scope:
Controversy over the Construction of Churches 
The right to worship and construct places of worship is an in-
tegral part of the religious freedoms guaranteed by the Unitary 
State of the Republic of Indonesia. As a result, the state is obliged 
to guarantee the implementation of this right. In practice, how-
ever, there are many obstacles that make it difficult for religious 
minorities to construct their own places of worship. 
This research examines the polemic surrounding the con-
struction of churches in Jakarta and the surrounding areas. 
Christian churches were chosen in particular, because in a num-
ber of reports on religious freedom the most controversial cases 
concerning places of worship in Jakarta and the surrounding 
areas often involved churches. In addition, as Mujiburrahman 
(2006) and Ropi (1998) note, there is an interesting dynamic be-
tween Christians and Muslims (the majority) in Indonesia. This 
dynamic sometimes takes the form of cooperation but is more 
often marked by competition and conflict. The construction of 
churches is subject to all these dynamics. 
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For example, according to the Paramadina Foundation and 
the Gadjah Mada University Masters of Peace and Conflict Reso-
lution (MPRK) Team (2009a), in 2008 there were 15 violations in-
volving places of worship. The Moderate Muslim Society [MMS] 
(2009) recorded 12 violations relating to places of worship in 
2009, ranging from extortion to intimidation and vandalism. In 
addition these reports noted government mismanagement, in 
the form the cancellation of church permits due to social pres-
sure. Similar cases have been reported by both the CRCS (2009) 
and the Wahid Institute (2009). The number of reports has also 
increased, with 50 such cases in 2005 and more than 1000 cases 
from 1969-2006 (Crouch 2007). Although these reports provide 
a valuable picture of the issues involved, one thing is clear: 
there is a lack of understanding of how to interpret the polemic. 
The majority of these reports only present data of vandalism or 
violations without explaining why the incidences occurred. In 
addition, they focus narrowly on damage caused to churches, 
neglecting the fact that there are also churches that have never 
experienced any problems. 
This research therefore seeks to build on prior research to 
examine the factors that play a role in disputes over the construc-
tion of places of worship. This study by no means negates the 
importance of the reports on religious freedom that have been 
released. On the contrary, the research undertaken here would 
be impossible without these data on vandalism and violations of 
places of worship. Rather, this study probes the factors behind 
the figures presented in these reports.  
More specifically, this research elaborates the factors that give 
rise to particularly complex cases involving the construction of 
churches in Jakarta and the surrounding areas, including the 
negotiation process between churches and the various parties 
that dispute their construction. There are indeed churches that 
have never been disputed. There are some that were initially un-
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disputed but are now being challenged. There are also churches 
that were once disputed but which have since resolved their 
issues, and some others that remain unresolved. 
Disputes over the construction of churches are always interre-
lated with social issues in the local region. Here we examine the 
roles of the government and social elements, such as the Inter-
Religious Harmony Forum (Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama, 
FKUB), which mediates between the government, society and 
the church. We also examine the dynamics between the church 
and the socio-economic life of the local community, including 
inappropriate actions and solution-based dialogue for conflicts 
over the construction of churches. Equally important is the 
politicisation of conflicts, often involving an “uninvited guest” 
taking advantage of the situation for the sake of ideological or 
pragmatic aims. 
In order to provide a more complete picture, the Research 
Team devised four categories for disputes over the construc-
tion of churches. As suggested above, the first group consists 
of churches that have not faced any significant issues. The sec-
ond group consists of churches that were initially disputed but 
have since been resolved. The third group incorporates churches 
that were initially undisputed but are now disputed. Finally, the 
fourth group consists of churches that have always been dis-
puted. 
For each of these four groups we took three cases from Ja-
karta and the surrounding areas, so in total we had twelve cases. 
The data from each case was analysed and compared. Data was 
collected using several methods. First, through observation, we 
made field trips in order to develop a real understanding of the 
areas that were experiencing issues with the construction of 
churches. During these observations, further data was gathered 
from secondary sources such as the media and research reports 
from other organisations. Second, we held in-depth interviews 
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with related parties in order to obtain a firsthand perspective 
from the actors involved in each case. This method was chosen 
in order to obtain information on the unique factors that differ-
entiate each case from the others. 
This research defines ‘church’ fairly specifically. The defini-
tion used includes Catholic churches that are members of the 
Indonesian Bishops Council (Kantor Waligerja Indonesia, KWI) 
and Protestant churches that are members of the Communion of 
Churches in Indonesia (Persekutuan Gereja-gereja di Indonesia, 
PGI). Our decision to limit the definition to these churches, and 
not include several important cases that involved non-KWI or 
PGI churches, no doubt has consequences. On the other hand, 
this definition allowed the Research Team to focus in greater 
detail on individual cases. In terms of public policy, the limited 
definition we have used strengthens the capacity of the research 
results to be used for advocacy purposes, because KWI and PGI 
are the two national organisations that represent the Catholic and 
Protestant communities respectively in Indonesia. It is logical to 
assume that if the “official representatives” of the government-
recognised religions experience conflict, then other religions 
must also experience conflict. 
In addition to membership with either KWI or PGI, the crite-
ria for inclusion of churches in this research also involved social 
perceptions. For churches that had not yet been built, the criteria 
applied required that land had been bought specifically for the 
construction of a church, and/or that an application for a permit 
to build the church had been submitted. The aim here was to 
ensure that the community had known of, and understood, the 
planned construction of a church in their area. 
For churches that had already been constructed, the Research 
Team concentrated on how the local community knew about 
the church, not just through its religious activities, but from its 
property and promotion campaigns, such as use of signage, a 
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website, a board displaying sermon times, the sign of the cross, 
or through publications. This was intended to ensure that the 
congregants of the church and the general public held the same 
perception of the building as the church—even though the build-
ing itself might be used for other activities or might not have 
permission to be used as a place of worship. 
This rather specific criterion inevitably eliminated the phe-
nomena of “churches in malls” or the use of private homes as 
places of worship. Without denying the importance of these two 
phenomena, this research views them as products of the diffi-
culties surrounding the construction of places of worship. Con-
sidering that the focus of this research is the controversy over 
the construction of churches, the researchers have tried not to 
confuse causes with effects. 
The definition of ‘disputed churches’ was broad, and includ-
ed places of worship that faced obstacles stemming from national 
regulations and social factors. Problems with state regulations 
arose when churches were unable to fulfil the requirements of a 
place of worship or other bureaucratic obstacles. Social obstacles 
included rejection by certain parties or groups. This definition 
did not specifically require disputes to stem only from these two 
sources, leaving open the possibility of other sources of dispute 
should they have arisen. 
Why Controversial?
State Regulations and Social Factors 
One important aspect of researching religious freedom (includ-
ing the right to construct a place of worship) is the need for clear 
definitions and standards by which to measure it. In this report, 
religious freedom is examined using the standard applied by the 
Center for Religious Freedom (CRF) in Religious Freedom in the 
World (2008). The CRF’s original standard uses three measures, 
namely: (1) the presence/absence of government regulations that 
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restrict religious freedom; (2) whether the government favours 
a particular religion; and (3) where there are social dynamics or 
conventions that restrict religious freedom. 
This study uses the CRF’s standard to review the problems 
with the construction of churches in Jakarta and the surround-
ing areas. Disputes stemming from state regulations fall into 
the first two of the CRF measures, which are used to determine 
how far the state has gone to resolve, cause or permit problems 
concerning church permits.
State regulations encompass formal regulations such as the 
Joint Ministerial Regulations (PBM) No. 8 and No. 9 of 2006 in 
replacement of SKB 1/Ber/MDN-MAG/1969, and government 
institutions and agencies.1 Institutions such as the police force, 
the government-established FKUB,2 and local agencies such as 
the subdistrict and district governments are also included. On 
the other hand, social factors include issues located outside state 
institutions. Discrimination or vandalism by community organ-
isations, local residents, religious leaders and other community 
leaders are all included. Although legally they do not possess 
legitimacy and authority on the same scale as the state, social 
1  Joint Ministerial Regulations No. 8 and No. 9 were issued by the Indonesian 
Ministers of Religious Affairs and Home Affairs to address “Implementation 
of the Duty of Local Government Heads in Maintaining Interreligious 
Harmony” and “Empowerment of the Interreligious Harmony Forum 
and Construction of Places of Worship”. They were a revision to the Joint 
Decree issued in 1969 to control the construction of places of worship and 
religious practices after an increase in violence against churches. The revised 
regulations require that places of worship obtain and provide authorities 
with a list of the names of 90 members of the congregation; signatures from 
60 local community members of a different faith; a written recommendation 
from the regional or municipal Office of Religious Affairs; a written 
recommendation from the local Forum of Religious Harmony (FKUB); and 
approval from the subdistrict head.
2  The FKUB consists of leaders from the six officially recognised religious 
organisations and has the responsibility to facilitate the permit application 
process for places of worship.
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influences are an important element, for example, because the 
state often bows to social pressure in times of conflict, as was 
seen during the Poso conflict (see Karnavian 2008). 
Besides state regulations and social factors, another impor-
tant issue is the relationship between religious majority and mi-
norities, which is clearly connected with state regulations. As 
is well-known, an important concept that underlies democracy 
is “majority rules, minority rights”. The majority does indeed 
possess greater capacity to influence legislation. Behind the pri-
macy of the majority, however, is the precondition that minority 
rights must always be preserved and protected. It is only on this 
condition that a healthy majority-minority relationship can be 
maintained. 
In reality, this ideal is not achieved easily. Majority-minority 
relations, and even relations between different groups in general, 
are always coloured by suspicion. The majority feels threatened 
by the existence of minorities, especially those that have differ-
ent values, while minorities feel pressured and unjustly treated. 
This kind of inter-group tension is common. It is not appropriate, 
however, when it leads to intolerant attitudes and behaviour. 
Democracy does not require each member group to love all other 
groups, but it does require that they be tolerant of one another. 
Intolerance can be viewed as a restriction on an individual, 
or of the collective rights of a group (see Marcus et. al. 1982). 
Intolerance is caused by many things, including individual 
predisposition, the level of individual support for democratic 
values, or the complexity of understanding of an issue. What is 
interesting is that intolerance is also influenced by contemporary 
information. For example, information that one particular group 
may be threatening another can push the latter group to act in 
an intolerant manner.  
In the context of the construction of churches, the relation-
ship between Islam and Christianity is also influenced by these 
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issues: the majority-minority context and dynamics, suspicion, 
misunderstanding and a lack of information. All these relations 
and dynamics fall under the category of social factors and are 
theoretically very influential in disputes over the construction 
of churches. As a result, social factors are an important aspect 
of this research
It is also necessary to examine the role of the state. The state 
has an important part to play in protecting religious freedom, 
including guaranteeing the right to build places of worship. The 
state has the authority to create regulations and enforce them 
firmly through legal processes. There are three important aspects 
of the role of the state. The first concerns the capacity of the state 
to perform its duties. According to Chernov-Hwang (2009), state 
capacity can be measured by its ability to enforce law and order 
on society and guarantee security. A state with strong security is 
able to ensure social movements remain peaceful. By contrast, a 
state with a weak capacity to maintain order increases incentives 
for anarchism. A state with the ability to enforce civil order is 
also able to prevent social groups from taking unilateral action. 
In the context of church disputes in Jakarta, the inability of the 
government to protect the rights of Christians, a minority group, 
to worship could spark discontent in areas with Christian ma-
jorities. This is undesirable and only complicates matters. The 
state’s willingness and ability to act as a fair intermediary plays 
a significant role in preventing such occurrences. 
The second matter, according to Chernov-Hwang (2009), is 
the provision of democratic institutions. A state with healthy 
democratic institutions allows its citizens to voice their discon-
tent peacefully. This is also closely related to the capability of the 
state to enforce law and order. A strong democracy and govern-
ment is able to “manage” social tension to ensure it does not 
result in conflict. By contrast, a weak democracy and government 
only encourages violence in society. 
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The third aspect is related to this issue of democratic systems 
and effective governance, and to the fact that religious conflict 
and violence in Indonesia occurred more frequently during the 
transition period (1998-2004) than during the New Order (1966-
1998) or the new democracy (2004-2008) (Ali-Fauzi, Alam & 
Panggabean 2009b). This can be explained by the assumption 
that during the transition period state control was at its weak-
est. In addition, the democratic system was not yet established, 
although politics were dynamic. Given these perspectives, it is 
only fitting that state regulations are a focus of this research. 
Research Context:
A History of Churches in Jakarta 
In the previous section, we have explained the scope of this re-
search and how, or through which lenses, we wish to examine 
church disputes in Jakarta. We will now provide a short back-
ground to the growth of churches in Jakarta and surrounding 
areas in the past, as well as a description of the current situation. 
At the end, we also explain several state regulations relevant to 
the construction of churches in Indonesia today. This is a neces-
sary foundation to understanding the research results presented 
in the following chapters. 
The history of church construction in Indonesia is closely 
related to the development of Christianity, which went hand-
in-hand with colonialism. Christianity first arrived with the 
Catholic Portuguese in Maluku at the beginning of the 16th cen-
tury (Aritonang 2004; Kruger 1959). The first Catholic church in 
Maluku was established in 1522, with Fransiskus Xaverius (1506-
1552) being one of the first missionaries. By the 1590s, there were 
50,000 to 60,000 Catholics in Maluku (Ricklefs 2008). 
The arrival of the Dutch East-India Company or the vOC 
(+1600-1799) in 1602 brought new developments. In addition to 
pursuing economic gain, the vOC had a mandate from the Dutch 
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Protestant Church to spread Christianity (Aritonang 2004). In 
1605, the De Protestantsche Kerk in Nederlandsch-Indie was es-
tablished (now the Communion of Churches in Indonesia, PGI). 
When the Governor General moved to Jakarta (then Batavia) in 
1619, the PGI headquarters also moved to Jakarta (PGI 2010). 
Under the vOC, Christianity was dominated by the Reformed 
Church, which took over the Portuguese Catholic churches (Shi-
hab 1998). 
For 200 years, the vOC forbade Catholics to practice their 
religion. From 1600-1800, vOC religious regulations were found 
mostly in colonial trade contracts with local powers, including, 
for example, bans against Catholic churches, eviction of Catho-
lics, or authorisation for Protestant weddings only. During this 
period there was a strong connection between religion and poli-
tics. The death sentence was handed down to “apostates” (Chris-
tians who converted to Islam) or those involved in forbidden 
sexual relationships (Steenbrink 1995). 
Although there were only a few, the vOC government issued 
a number of religious regulations, particularly in relation to the 
Muslim community. For instance, in 1661, the vOC banned the 
hajj or pilgrimage to Mecca (Suminto 1985). In 1754, the vOC is-
sued a regulation on the application of Islamic law to Muslims 
and civil law to Europeans, in addition to rules on inheritance, 
marriage and divorce. In 1776, the colonial government issued 
the New Statutes of Batavia, which forbade marriage across na-
tionalities (Steenbrink 1995). The vOC also maintained a strict 
distinction between Christians and non-Christians to ensure they 
did not mix. 
Over these 200 years, conflict concerning religious identity 
was largely political. In 1634, for instance, Muslim Hitus estab-
lished fortresses in the hinterland and looted Christian villages. 
During the political conflict in Java in the 17th century, Panem-
bahan Giri refused a request by the Mataram kingdom to help 
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the VOC because the Christian VOC was perceived as an infidel 
power (Ricklefs 2008). 
At the end of the 18th century, according to Kruger (1959), 
Christians primarily resided in the eastern parts of Indonesia 
(Makassar, Ambon, Banda, Ternate and Kupang), Java (Jakarta, 
Semarang and Surabaya) and Sumatera (Padang). Nevertheless, 
Christianity during the vOC era did not undergo any meaning-
ful growth by comparison how it fared under Portuguese rule. 
In 1727, there were only about 55,000 Christians in the Dutch 
East Indies (Kruger 1959). This was a result of the vOC policy 
that prevented Christianisation efforts to convert the indigenous 
people in order to maintain law and order (rust en orde) and 
guarantee continued commercial trade (Shihab 1998: 33). 
After the fall of the vOC in 1799, Christianity gradually be-
gan to spread in Jakarta, as a result of two factors: (1) liberal 
thinking developing in the West brought new nuances to the 
policies of the Governor Generals after the vOC era; and (2) 
private missionary institutes established in England (the Lon-
don Missionary Society or LMS, 1795) and the Netherlands (the 
Nederlands Zendeling Genootschap or NZG, 1797) were granted 
permission to work in Indonesia. 
The new government under Governor General Daendels 
(1808-1811) maintained a neutral attitude towards religion. This 
position allowed Christianity to develop freely. When the Dutch 
surrendered to the English, English Lieutenant Governor Raffles 
(1811-1815) continued the pro-Christian policy (Heuken SJ 2007). 
During Raffles’ rule in 1813, LMS initiated missionary activities 
in Java aimed at converting the indigenous people and estab-
lished the first English Baptist Church in Jakarta (Shihab 1998). 
Christianity was part of a Dutch government policy to coun-
teract a series of rebellions during the 19th century. These re-
bellions were usually led by the Muslim elite (Suminto 1985). 
The establishment of Muhammadiyah in 1912 was seen as an 
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attempt to stem the spread of ‘Christianisation’ (Shihab 1998). 
Despite this, there is no record of social conflict between Mus-
lims and Christians arising as a result of Christianisation. Snouck 
Hurgronje, who arrived in the Dutch East Indies in 1889 as an 
advisor at the Het Kantoor voor Inlandsche Zaken (Office of Indig-
enous Affairs), criticised the Christianisation policy. He chose to 
counter Islam through education (Suminto 1985). 
In the 19th century, Christianisation began to develop rap-
idly. In Java, Christianisation efforts began to produce results 
where they had previously failed. In East Java, an indigenous 
Christian community developed where Christianity was merged 
with Javanese mysticism. The movement was initiated by C.L. 
Coolen (c. 1773-1873). Its most famous leader was Kiai Sadrach 
Surapranata (c. 1835-1924) (Guillot 1985). By 1900, there were 
about 20,000 Christians in Central and East Java, increased only 
around 5,000 at the end of the 18th century. 
During the 19th century, churches in Jakarta started to grow in 
number. Their history can be described in three periods (Kruger 
1959). The first was one with almost no evangelists (+1800-1850). 
Before 1808, Catholicism in Jakarta experienced a period of dark-
ness but in 1808 a defining event occurred. Two priests sent by 
the Pope, Nelissen and Prinsen, arrived in Jakarta and celebrat-
ed Mass openly for the first time in the house of the surgeon, 
F.C.H. Assmuss. This became the precursor for the construction 
of the Jakarta Cathedral (officially, the Church of Our Lady of 
Assumption),3 which, after moving locations several times, was 
eventually built in 1900-01 where it still stands today (Heuken 
SJ 2007). 
When the Dutch returned to power (1815), the development 
of Christianity was still restricted, particularly because of the 
3  In Indonesia it is known as Gereja Santa Maria Pelindung Diangkat Ke 
Surga, which is taken from the Dutch, De Kerk van Onze Lieve Vrouwe ten 
Hemelopneming.
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Dutch East Indies Regulations of 1818 and 1854, which required 
Christian teachers, priests and missionaries to obtain special au-
thorisation before they could operate (Aritonang 2004; Shihab 
1998). Although the NZG sent its first missionaries in 1848, by 
1850 there were still no significant developments in Jakarta. 
The second period is marked by a variety of Christianisation 
activities (+1850-1900). It was during this period that planned 
evangelical activities emerged in Jakarta. A group of Christians 
who felt there was a lack of evangelicalism in Jakarta established 
the Association for Spreading the Message of the Gospel Within 
and Outside of the Church in 1851. Two well-known leaders of 
the Association were Anthing and Gan Kwee. 
Until about 1870, the Dutch East Indies issued formal per-
mits for evangelical activities in Jakarta and the surrounding 
areas—Tanah Pasundan and Banten. F.L. Anthing (+1820-1883), 
who worked in Jakarta as Deputy Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court, was the first to begin intensive and planned evangelical-
ism in Jakarta. 
In 1873, Anthing successfully obtained permission to run 
evangelical activities in Jakarta and the surrounding area. He 
educated and trained a number of children to be evangelists in 
his home. Anthing and his students then established a number 
of congregations around Jakarta, including Gunung Puteri, Pon-
dok Melati, Kampung Sawah, Cigelam, Pasirkaliki (Karawang), 
Tanah Tinggi (Tangerang), Ciater (Serpong), Cikuya (Banten) and 
Cakung (Aritonang 2004). 
The third period was one of consolidation and development 
(+1900-1950). During this period churches slowly continued to 
grow in Jakarta. At the beginning of the 20th century, Jakarta was 
developing and expanding. One church, the Jakarta Cathedral, 
could no longer accommodate its congregants. In 1908, a second 
church was thus established in Matraman. From what were ini-
tially only three groups—Dutch, Portuguese (which has since 
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almost disappeared) and Malay (in Depok and Tugu)—Christi-
anity expanded across ethnicities. In fact, as increasing numbers 
of Christians came to Jakarta, there were also many congrega-
tions established by Christian migrants outside Jakarta, for ex-
ample, the Toba Batak, Java, Timor, Sangir, Dayak and Toraja 
congregations. Chinese and Sundanese congregations were also 
developing (Kruger 1959). 
After the proclamation of independence in 1945, the church 
distanced itself from the Dutch and asked the Ministry of Reli-
gious Affairs to guarantee that missionaries would not be treated 
like the Dutch. When the colonial era was brought to an end by 
the transfer of sovereignty in 1949, the Catholic community in 
‘Jakarta’, the now-renamed capital, developed rapidly -  largely 
due to tolerant government attitudes towards religion. It is worth 
noting that the values of tolerance in the Pancasila were con-
sidered important in influencing government policies (Heuken 
SJ 2007). During the Revolution (1945-1949), social unrest had, 
however, led to a number of incidents where Christians became 
a target of violence. In Jakarta this kind of conflict occurred in 
Kampung Sawah and Bekasi. A similar incident occurred in Ta-
panuli (North Sumatera), where around 300 people were killed 
in a conflict between the Christian Toba Batak and the Muslim 
Karo Batak that was compounded by their different religious 
identities (Ricklefs 2008). 
By 1941, 22,072 Catholics were recorded in Jakarta, and 
this number increased to 29,833 in 1961, including 16 parishes 
(church administrative regions under the diocese) (Heuken SJ 
2007). In 1950, Protestant leaders formed the Indonesian Council 
of Churches (Dewan Gereja-Gereja Indonesia, DGI), which in 1984 
became the Communion of Churches in Indonesia (Persekutuan 
Gereja-Gereja di Indonesia, PGI). Meanwhile, in 1955, Catholic 
leaders formed the High Council of Indonesian Bishops (Majelis 
Agung Wali Gereja di Indonesia, MAWI) (Mujiburrahman 2006). In 
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1961, the Archdiocese was officially established. 
Towards the end of the Old Order (1945-1965), a book attack-
ing Christianity was published, largely written by Muhammadi-
yah leaders including Bisjron A. Wardy, Djarnawi Hadikusumo 
and Hasbullah Bakry (Boland 1985). It was written in response 
to a brochure supposedly detailing a plan to Christianise Java 
(Aritonang 2004: 361). 
In countering the Communist Party (prior to 1965), the Catho-
lic bishop proclaimed the Front Katholik Tanpa Lubang4 to signify 
that his community was united against Communism (Heuken 
SJ 2007). After the 1965 coup attempt and the mass killings that 
followed there was a wave of conversion to Christianity, espe-
cially in East and Central Java. People chose to adhere to a re-
ligion because they were afraid of being labelled atheist and 
thus Communist. This was confirmed by the 1971 consensus, 
which showed that the total Christian population in Indonesia 
had climbed to 7.5% (nearly 9 million people) from 2.8% (under 
2 million people) in 1933 (Ricklefs 2008). 
Fear over the spread of Christianity triggered tension be-
tween Islam and Christianity at the beginning of the New Order 
(1966-1998). In 1967, for instance, churches were vandalised in 
Makassar and Aceh. In 1967, a number of Muslims damaged a 
Christian school in Jakarta. In 1969, a similar incident occurred 
on the outskirts of Jakarta, where a Protestant church was van-
dalised by Muslims. The trend spread to West Jakarta and even 
to some cities in Central Java (Shihab 1998). 
After the New Order came to power, the relationship between 
Muslims and Christians in Indonesia changed. The number of 
Muslim-Christian conflicts rose sharply, especially in the form 
of the closure, vandalism or arson of churches. During the New 
Order, records state that at least 456 churches were damaged, 
4  The literal translation is ‘The Un-Holey Catholic Front’, although the 
intended meaning is ‘The Perfect Catholic Front’.
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closed or had their permits revoked (Santoso 2000 in Mulia 2010: 
46). Of this, about 21 cases took place in Jakarta. 
During the 1980s, the Christian community in Jakarta grew 
rapidly. In 1980, there were 159,040 Catholics and 406,280 Prot-
estants in Jakarta. By 2000, these figures increased to 282,869 
Catholics and 501,168 Protestants in Jakarta (Heuken SJ 2007). 
Data from the Ministry of Religious Affairs fnotes that there were 
41 Catholic churches and 913 Protestant churches in Jakarta in 
2008. 
During the Reformation era that began in 1998, and the dem-
ocratic transition that it triggered, incidents of church vandalism 
increased. Under Habibie’s government (1998-1999) 156 churches 
were affected; during Abdurrahman Wahid’s government (1999-
2001) 232 churches were affected; and during Megawati’s gov-
ernment (2001-2004) 68 churches were vandalised (Crouch 2007). 
PGI and KWI reports indicate that, there were 108 instances of 
closure, vandalism or attacks against churches from 2004-2007 
(Mulia 2009: 353). This includes 30 cases in 2004, 39 cases in 2005, 
17 cases in 2006 and 22 cases in 2007. Conflict over churches in 
Jakarta and the surrounding areas—Bekasi, Tangerang and Bo-
gor—amounted to 23 of these cases. The majority were caused 
by issues over authorisation, such as the need to obtain a con-
struction permit (IMB). 
Regulations for Places of Worship:
Then and Now 
State regulations on the construction of places of worship in In-
donesia can be found in two regulations. First, Joint Decree of 
the Minister for Religious Affairs and the Minister for Internal 
Affairs No. 01/BER/mdn-mag/1969 on Implementation of the 
Task of Government Officials to Ensure the Order and Undis-
turbed Implementation of Religious Development and Practices 
by Adherents. Second, Joint Regulations of the Minister for Re-
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ligious Affairs and the Minister for Internal Affairs Nos. 8 and 
9 of 2006 on Guidance for Implementation of the Duty of Local 
Government Heads in Maintaining Interreligious Harmony and 
Empowerment of the Interreligious Harmony Forum and Con-
struction of Places of Worship. 
The 1969 Joint Decree was enacted on 13 September of that 
year. At the time the Minister for Internal Affairs was Amir 
Machmud and the Minister for Religious Affairs was K.H.5 Mu-
hammad Dahlan. The regulation was created in response to the 
new challenges concerning interreligious relations that arose 
during the New Order. At the start of the new regime there was a 
high level of conflict between Muslims and Christians. Incidents 
usually took the form of vandalism, or the closure or burning 
of churches. 
The 1969 Joint Decree did not specifically focus on regula-
tion of construction of places of worship. Rather, it regulated the 
development and propagation of religion generally, and this, in 
principle, also covered the existence of places of worship. In the 
only article that did address the construction of places of wor-
ship, the 1969 Joint Decree stated that they must have permission 
from the local government head. Permission was to be granted 
by the local head if the applicant had obtained a recommenda-
tion from the chief representative of the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs and town planning officials, and providing there were 
no issues with the local community. Furthermore, the regulation 
stated that the local government head may, if necessary, seek 
advice from local religious organisations, such as ulama (Islamic 
religious scholars) or priests. 
The provisions that followed stated that if there was a dis-
pute, including over the construction of a place of worship, then 
its resolution is the responsibility of the local government head. 
5  K.H. is short for Kyai Haji, a title indicating that the person referred to is 
an Islamic scholar (kyai) and has completed the haj (haji). 
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If the dispute remained unresolved and resulted in a criminal 
offense, legal authorities were required to address it according 
to the applicable law. 
According to Rudy Pratikno,6 in practice local government 
heads only issued a permit if they already had a recommenda-
tion from the Special Territorial Administrator (Laksusda).7 Ap-
plications for permits to build places of worship were sent to 
Laksusda. The organisation held a monthly meeting to discuss 
several permits at a time. The usual approach taken emphasised 
social stability and law and order. After Laksusda granted per-
mission, the Governor, represented by the Deputy Governor for 
Human Welfare, could grant a permit for the construction of the 
place of worship. 
Although Laksusda was an extension of Soeharto’s security 
regime, a significant number of churches were nonetheless van-
dalised during the New Order. During the transitional era (after 
1998), perpetrators of vandalism often used the 1969 Joint Decree 
as justification to destroy and close down places of worship, 
particularly churches, that lacked the required permit. 
As a result, several elements within society called for the 1969 
Joint Decree be revoked. They argued that it was detrimental 
to minority groups. Instead of guaranteeing religious freedom 
as stipulated in the 1945 Constitution, the Joint Decree actually 
restricted religious freedom. Supporters of the 1969 Joint Decree 
responded by arguing for it to be upgraded in status to become a 
6  Interview with Rudy Pratikno, Tuesday, 8 June 2010, in the Pastoral Karya 
Building of the Jakarta Archdiocese. He is the Secretary of the Commission 
for Interfaith Relations of the Jakarta Archdiocese and head of the Jakarta 
FKUB Recommendations Department.
7  Laksusda (Pelaksana Khusus Daerah) was a security institute during the 
New Order under the Operational Command for Restoration of Security 
and Order (KOPKAMTIB). While the scope of Kopkamtib was national, 
Laksusda was Kopkamtib’s organ on the local scale and the position 
generally filled by members of the military.
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statute (undang-undang). In their eyes, the Joint Decree regulated 
inter-religious relations and prevented anarchy from breaking 
out due to conflict over places of worship. So long as places 
of worship were required to obtain permits, they argued, there 
would be no anarchy. 
In the midst of this debate, the Ministry of Religious Affairs 
held a meeting with the Minister for Internal Affairs, the Minister 
of Justice and Human Rights, the Attorney General and other 
relevant officials. They discussed revising the 1969 Joint Decree, 
particularly in relation to the construction of places of worship, 
and produced an initial draft for a new Bill on Interreligious 
Harmony which addressed the construction of places of worship, 
among other issues. 
Initially this draft received the same response as had the 
1969 Joint Decree. Those in support (such as MUI,8 PKS,9 FPI,10 
KOMPAK11) argued that the new regulation was appropriate 
because it set out how to maintain interreligious harmony, es-
pecially in relation to the construction of places of worship. On 
the other hand, those in opposition (including the Prosperous 
Peace Party,12 the Community Alliance for Freedom of Worship13 
of East Nusa Tenggara, and several Muslim communities in Bali 
and West Nusa Tenggara) argued that the new regulation would 
only worsen the situation. Not only would long-standing church-
es that did not have permits face difficulties but new churches 
would also find it difficult to meet conditions that required a 
minimum amount of support in the area (see below). 
8  Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Indonesian Ulama Council.
9  Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Prosperous Justice Party.
10  Front Pembela Islam, The Islamic Defenders Front.
11  Komite Aksi Penanggulangan Akibat Krisis The Crisis Management/
Prevention Committee.
12  Partai Damai Sejahtera, PDS.
13  Aliansi Masyarakat Peduli Kebebasan Beribadah.
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Nevertheless, this revised draft with all its limitations was 
considered the best middle path by representatives of the “of-
ficial” religions in Indonesia. These included KWI, PGI, MUI, 
PHDI,14 and Walubi.15 As a result, on 21 March 2006, the Minis-
ter for Religious Affairs, Maftuh Basyuni, and the Minister for 
Internal Affairs, Mohamad Ma’ruf, signed the Joint Regulations 
of 2006 on Guidance for Implementation of the Task of Local 
Government Heads in Maintaining Interreligious Harmony, Em-
powerment of the Interreligious Harmony Forum and Construc-
tion of Places of Worship (Colbran in Lindholm 2009). 
While the 1969 Joint Decree regulated inter-religious har-
mony in a general manner, the new Joint Regulations specifi-
cally addressed which organisations should have the authority 
to maintain inter-religious harmony; mechanisms behind the 
granting of permits for the construction of places of worship in 
Jakarta; and means for resolution of conflict should it occur. They 
consist of 30 articles divided into 10 chapters, namely (1) General 
provisions; (2) Duties of local government heads; (3) Duties and 
role of the Interreligious Harmony Forum (FKUB); (4) Construc-
tion of places of worship; (5) Temporary places of worship; (6) 
Temporary permits for use of a building; (7) Dispute resolution; 
(8) Monitoring and reporting; (9) FKUB’s source of funding; and 
(10) Transition and closure mechanisms. 
In the Joint Regulations, maintaining interreligious harmony 
is seen as the collective responsibility of the government and 
religious communities. The government is represented by the 
governor or regent/mayor at the regency/city level. On the other 
hand, the aspirations of religious communities are represented 
by religious leaders in the FKUB. There are 21 members of the 
FKUB at the provincial level and 17 at the regency or city level. 
14  Parisadhe Hindu Dharma Indonesia, The Hindu Dharma Council of 
Indonesia.
15  Perwalian Umat Buddha Indonesia, The Buddhist Council of Indonesia.
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The representation for each religion is based on the percentages 
of the number of adherents of each religion in each area, with a 
minimum of one person representing each religion. 
In addition to addressing the technical requirements for 
construction, the Joint Regulations also state that to construct 
a place of worship the following is required: (1) A list of names 
and National Identity Cards (KTP) of 90 people who will use 
the place of worship, confirmed by local government officials; 
(2) The National Identity Cards of 60 members of the local com-
munity, confirmed by the village or subdistrict head; (3) A writ-
ten recommendation from the regional officer of the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs; and (4) A recommendation from the regional 
FKUB. Recommendations must be based on consensus and not 
majority vote. 
The Joint Regulations also state that if support from the local 
community is not obtained, the government is obliged to find 
a new location for the place of worship. In the interim, other 
buildings can be used as temporary places of worship but a per-
mit must be obtained from the regional or city government. A 
permit is granted if the office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs 
and the FKUB issue a letter of recommendation. A permit for a 
temporary place of worship lasts two years. Disputes over the 
construction of places of worship are first resolved through con-
sensus with the local community. If consensus is not achieved, 
then the regency or city government is required to facilitate a fair 
and unbiased discussion. If government mediation is unsuccess-
ful, a resolution is sought through the courts. 
Broadly, the Joint Regulations are based on the government’s 
desire to guarantee the right of religious adherents to perform 
their religious activities. Over the four years the regulation has 
been in effect, it has, however, been shown to be full of loopholes 
for discrimination, especially in relation to the construction of 
places of worship. Opportunities for discrimination are evident 
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in the following areas, among others. 
First, politicisation of local government authority in issuing 
construction permits, for instance, authority to issue a permit 
may be exchanged for votes from certain groups in local elec-
tions. In several regions - Bogor, for example - there are indica-
tions that candidates for the position of local head have prom-
ised during their campaigns not to issue construction permits for 
certain religions. Other forms of politicisation occur when local 
executives come from Islamist parties. They use their position 
to implement Islamist agendas in their region and this includes 
preventing the growth of non-Muslim places of worship. The 
authority of the local government to provide recommendations, 
without tight monitoring by the legislature and civil society, 
makes local governments likely to issue discriminatory policies. 
The second issue is the membership of FKUB as a representa-
tive of the different religions in each region. Although it is stated 
in the Joint Regulations that decisions of the FKUB must be made 
on the basis of mutual consensus, in reality decisions are often 
made by voting. Making decisions based on a vote is naturally 
detrimental to religious minorities. Religious representation is 
also problematic because this does not provide any room for 
religious “denominations” within particular religions. MUI, for 
instance, does not accommodate Ahmadiyah (an Islamic sect), 
and within Christianity there are many churches that are not 
members of PGI or KWI and as such are not represented in the 
FKUB. The same concerns apply to religions or sects that are not 
recognised as “official” religions. 
It is important to note, however, that although they are not 
represented officially, non-PGI Protestant churches have been 
able to communicate and participate in the Jakarta FKUB when 
resolving issues they face. This has been noted by Rudy Pratikno, 
although he has also pointed out that no unofficial religion has 
ever brought issues to the FKUB. This suggests that although 
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formal regulations limit its role, membership of the FKUB is 
important. If the FKUB is made up of relatively open-minded 
people then can go about its role without being restricted by 
formalities, as indicated by the assistance given to non-PGI 
Protestant churches despite the fact that they have no official 
representation.  
Third, the requirement to obtain the support of the local 
community in the form of copies of 60 national ID cards cre-
ates opportunities for discrimination. According to findings by 
the Indonesian Survey Institute (Lembaga Survei Indonesia, LSI), 
Indonesian society in general is not tolerant of the construction 
of places of worship. As many as 64.9% of Muslims object to the 
construction of non-Muslim places of worship.16 In certain areas 
where the wider community is tolerant, this is not an issue but 
in less tolerant areas it can obstruct the construction of places 
of worship. 
Both PGI and the Catholic Church understand that churches 
have to be accepted by local communities. An indication of a 
community’s acceptance is the provision of signatures in accor-
dance with the requirements of the Joint Regulations. Accord-
ing to Gomar Gultom and Rudy Pratikno (of PGI), if there are 
hundreds of congregation members around a church but the 
church fails to obtain 60 signatures showing local support, then 
16  Survey by LSI and Lazuardi Birru, March 2010, prepared for the National 
Symposium on “Breaking the Chain of Radicalism and Terrorism,” Jakarta, 
27-28 July 2010. Similar results were found in a survey of Muslim religious 
teachers in Java by the Centre for the Study of Islam and Society (Pusat 
Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat, PPIM), Jakarta State Islamic University 
in 2008 and a survey of Muslim religious teachers and students in Jakarta 
and the surrounding areas by the Institute for Peace and Islamic Studies 
(Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Perdamaian, LAKIP) in 2010. See “Most Islamic 
Studies Teachers Oppose Pluralism, Survey Finds,” The Jakarta Post, 26 
November 2008; and “Separuh Pelajar Setuju Aksi Radikal Berlabel Agama,” 
Tempointeraktif.com, 26 April 2010, http://www.tempointeraktif.com/
hg/fokus/2011/04/26/fks,20110426-1855,id.html (accessed 16 May 2011).
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the church should not be established and must work harder in 
approaching the community. 
The problem then is that in several instances the requirement 
for community support becomes a means for particular groups 
to make money. That is, certain groups promise to obtain the 
support of the communities on behalf of churches if the con-
struction committees are willing to pay. If the money is not paid, 
construction is delayed and sometimes the support that has been 
obtained is withdrawn. For construction committees of places 
of worship that have surplus funds, the situation can be easily 
resolved. Not all construction committees for places of worship 
have significant financial resources, however. These are all po-
tential loopholes for misuse of the Joint Regulations. The manner 
in which these affect real cases is shown in the description of 
individual church cases below. 
In other words, state regulations may be rendered ineffective 
by social factors. According to Marshal (2007), social issues are 
one of the key factors that can obstruct religious freedom. By ex-
amining social issues we discover how far certain groups restrict 
the religious freedom of other groups. As the case of Indonesia 
suggests, social factors in fact often restrict religious freedom 
more rigorously than official government regulations. 
Social issues often arise from suspicion or lack of trust be-
tween religions. This is evident, among other things, by the per-
ception that the existence of a place of worship for one particu-
lar religion is an attempt to influence the local community to 
convert. On the basis of this kind of suspicion, groups of people 
may obstruct the construction of places of worship of other reli-
gions in their region. The issue of religious conversion (especially 
Christianisation) has become an effective mantra for groups of 
people who wish to stop the construction of, or to destroy, a 
place of worship. 
An important note concerning ‘Christianisation’ is that PGI 
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and KWI, the organisations regarded as representative of Protes-
tantism and Catholicism, deny that the practice occurs. Churches 
under these two organisations are forbidden to undertake con-
version activities by giving either material or non-material incen-
tives. If there are churches or Christian communities that engage 
in such activities, they are likely to be outside PGI and KWI. The 
leadership of both KWI and PGI were, for example, shocked and 
concerned to read the International Crisis Group report (2010) on 
Christianisation regarding the practises of several foundations 
and evangelical churches in Bekasi that were not members of 
either organisation. 
Social issues are not necessarily sporadic, spontaneous or un-
structured. In Jakarta and the surrounding areas it is suspected 
that there are Islamic organisations that specifically monitor the 
development of churches. In fact, these organisations do not just 
monitor the development of churches but also seek to obstruct 
them. Although confirmation and further research is needed to 
uncover the exact roles of these kinds of organisations, their in-
volvement in church disputes clearly complicates matters. 
Other social organisations that have the potential to obstruct 
the construction of places of worship include paramilitary organ-
isations. Although these kind claim to act in the interests of is 
the public good, they really take over the role of the police. The 
Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) is one such 
paramilitary organisation. It is often behind violent attacks and 
intolerance towards churches in Jakarta and the surrounding 
areas. 
Paramilitary organisations often act out of material motives. 
The fee to obtain a building permit for a place of worship accord-
ing to the regulations is not expensive. The cost to obtain a per-
mit becomes expensive, however, if it must be obtained through 
‘other avenues’. Often those acting in the name of paramilitary 
organisations offer their services to organise permits for places 
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of worship for a fee. 
Controversy over construction of places of worship is also 
sometimes related to commercial interests. This is often found 
to be behind disputes over places of worship that are to be con-
structed in strategic locations. Disputes over these places of wor-
ship allow businesspersons the opportunity to acquire the land 
and use it for their own business interests. 
Generally, these social forces are more influential when the 
state and law enforcement agencies are weak. During periods of 
transition, the police tend to be powerless in the face of brutality 
by the masses. This is a challenge to be overcome by the police, 
now and in the future. Together with religious leaders and other 
stakeholders they must act decisively. 
In summary, this chapter has explained the context and im-
portance of this research and how we view and understand con-
troversies over churches in Jakarta and the surrounding areas. 
We have also discussed several aspects of state regulations and 
social factors that perpetuate disputes over the construction of 
churches. In the following chapter we present our research find-
ings.***
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II
Contests over Church Buildings
As mentioned in the previous chapter, this research into the con-
struction of churches in Jakarta and the surrounding areas cat-
egorises church experiences in four groups: (1) churches which 
have faced no significant impediments; (2) churches which 
once experienced problems but no longer do so (resolved); (3) 
churches that were initially undisputed but have since become 
problematic (disputed); and (4) churches that have always been 
disputed. We use this classification to observe the variations in 
individual church experiences. 
This chapter discusses the experiences of churches belong-
ing to the four categories above. We discuss them sequentially, 
beginning with the first category. 
Undisputed Churches 
For this category, we obtained information about four churches 
that could potentially be examined, namely the St. Albertus 
Catholic Church in Harapan Indah; the Jakarta Cathedral; Ne-
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hemia Javanese Protestant Church (GKJ) in Lebak Bulus; and 
a church in Serpong. The church in Serpong was interesting, 
because information suggested that it had never been disputed 
as initial arrangements to obtain a permit had been entrusted 
to the [Muslim] paramilitary organisation Forum Betawi Rem-
pug (FBR). Further research into the church was not possible, 
however, because our informant was unable to provide another 
source who could confirm the information. 
As to the other three churches, we discovered after inter-
viewing the relevant parties that each had their own prob-
lems, and would be better placed in the second category. This 
is interesting because it indicates that even churches that are 
viewed positively by the community may well have been hin-
dered by either state regulations or social factors. Although it 
is difficult to find churches that have experienced no problems, 
the Research Team did succeed in finding one church that fits 
the criteria, namely the St. Aloysius Gonzaga Catholic Church 
in Cijantung, which was established under the initiative of the 
Centre for Catholic Spiritual Care of the Indonesian Army. 
Although we only examine one undisputed church, it should 
not be assumed that it is the only undisputed church in Jakarta 
and surrounding areas. Rather, time restrictions were the deter-
mining factor in examining only this one undisputed church. 
Our discussion should be viewed in the context of exploring 
the factors that play a role in maintaining a favourable environ-
ment for places of worship. In the future, the Research Team 
suggests that to obtain maximal results a survey of the overall 
church population should be conducted to discover how many 
churches do, in fact, fit this category. 
St. Aloysius Catholic Church and St. Valentino Chapel
The Catholic community in Cijantung was established along 
with the development in the 1960s of an Indonesian Army set-
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tlement. The relocation of army officers increased the number 
of Catholic soldiers in Cijantung. As a result, there was a greater 
demand for places of worship. 
The Catholic soldiers and local residents who lived in Ci-
jantung contacted the Centre for Catholic Spiritual Care of the 
Indonesian Army in Gunung Sahari for assistance locating a 
facility. They were given permission to hold services in the Ci-
jantung complex. In 1962, Pastor Widjajasuparto held the first 
Mass in the house of a local resident. From then on, the Catho-
lic community no longer needed to attend Mass in Cililitan or 
other parishes nearby. 
By 1964, the community had grown so large that it was no 
longer possible to hold sermons in the houses of local residents. 
Services were then held in a number of places, moving from the 
Persit KWK Cijantung II Primary School to the waiting room of 
the Kesdam v/Jaya Cijantung II Military Polyclinic, and then to 
the Special Forces canteen in Cijantung. 
At the same time, several Catholic leaders established the 
Gatot Subroto Junior High School with the support of the Spe-
cial Forces Commandant at the time, Col. Sarwo Edhi Wibowo. 
At the time there was no junior high school in Cijantung and 
children had to travel to Matraman for an education. One room 
in the new school was used for religious worship. Due to space 
restrictions, sermons were eventually moved again to a build-
ing owned by the Special Forces, the Chandraca Hall. Fortu-
nately for the community, the Special Forces Commandant built 
places of worship in the Special Forces complex for soldiers of 
all religions. For the Catholic community, the Special Forces 
built the St. yakobus Chapel (which recently changed its name 
to the St. valentino Chapel). 
The desire for their own church building led the Cijantung 
Catholic community to establish the Ignatius Slamet Riyadi 
Foundation, which recently established the Ignatius Slamet Ri-
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yadi Kindergarten, Primary School, Junior High School and Se-
nior High School. The community used the school hall to hold 
sermons, due to its greater seating capacity. There were at least 
300 congregants at the time. Sermons were led by alternating 
pastors, the majority of whom were military pastors. 
In 1974, Cijantung was overseen by the Robertus Bellarmi-
nus Parish of Cililitan. In the same year, the Cililitan Parish ap-
pointed Pastor Wiyana Haryadi, SJ., to oversee Cijantung. With 
a permanent pastor, the Centre for Catholic Spiritual Care of 
the Indonesian Army decreased the role it played. On 21 June 
1979, the Cijantung Parish officially became the 32nd parish of 
the Jakarta Archdiocese. One year later, on 17 February 1980, 
construction of the church started, and it was completed by 23 
November 1980. 
Today the Cijantung Parish has approximately 8,500 mem-
bers and two pastors. The church building can accommodate 
between 1,000–1,500 people. In terms of social status, the Ci-
jantung Catholic community tends to be middle-class and 
similar to other local residents in most respects. They work in 
various jobs, ranging from the military to the private sectors. 
The church uses the Slamet Riyadi school carpark for parking, 
which is managed by the church congregants themselves. 
The church has not faced too many difficulties from state 
regulations, though that is not to say that there have been 
none. The construction permit, according to Hieronimus Kas-
man, took a long time to obtain (more than a year) but that was 
caused more by Indonesia’s disorderly bureaucracy than any 
intentional effort to delay the process. There are more stories 
about how state agencies helped with the church construction 
than to the contrary. 
The key factor was the care and concern shown by the Spe-
cial Forces Commandant, who allowed the Cijantung commu-
nity to use the chapel facilities for services. In addition, even 
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today the church occupies land owned by the Army and not by 
the church or the diocese. When the committee sought funds 
for the construction of the church, the Armed Forces played a 
significant role. According to Hieronimus Kasman, the Jakarta 
Garrison helped provide money and materials. Some of the 
church pews, which are still in use today, were donated by the 
Jakarta Governor, others by the Bina Graha presidential build-
ing via the Secretary for Construction Management, Solihin GP, 
and the rest were provided by the church itself. 
To raise funds, the church also held a charity event in the 
Flores Room of Hotel Borobudur that was well-attended, in-
cluding by officials, entrepreneurs, dancers—from the Bagong 
Kusudiarjo art school—and several artists, including Kris Bian-
toro. This financial support enabled the church building to be 
completed in nine months. 
There were also few obstacles arising from social factors. 
First, when the church was established, the local community 
population was small. The land in front of the church was empty 
and there were few houses in the area, all built at some distance 
from one another. This decreased the potential for resistance. 
Second, the church was planned right from the beginning 
and soldiers who worked at the Centre for Catholic Spiritual 
Care of the Indonesian Army lived on land that borders the 
church. In addition to protecting the church, this also helped 
with obtaining a permit. Because of the small population at the 
time, when the church sought signatures in order to meet the 
requirements for a construction permit they necessarily asked 
Catholic soldiers and their families for their support. These 
families happily provided their signatures. 
Even today, the relationship between the church and the lo-
cal community is well-maintained. The church contributes fi-
nancially to the community by promoting local stalls and cafes, 
and engaging in other types of social service. This rapport is 
Disputed Churches in Jakarta32
also evident during large celebrations (Christmas and Easter), 
when the road becomes one-way and local residents obligingly 
take alternative routes. 
Based on interviews with the managers of the neighbour-
hood and community association units (RT and RW units), one 
factor that helps maintain good relationships is that Catholic 
residents are also active in community activities. During Leba-
ran (the time of celebration after the Ramadan month of fast-
ing), Protestants and Catholics visit Muslims to greet them, and 
vice versa. This mutual visiting on holy days is an initiative of 
local residents themselves and the Army rarely intervenes.
Although the Cijantung Parish claims to be an “undisputed” 
church, it continues to be supported by the army culture pres-
ent in the community. This clearly reveals the function of state 
accommodation and protection. Technically speaking, the Ci-
jantung Parish has two churches: the mother church and the 
church that was originally named the St yakobus Chapel and is 
located inside the Special Forces complex. Both these churches 
continue to be used today. 
After the fall of Soeharto’s regime, there were no acts of van-
dalism or disruption relating to this church – at least not openly. 
This is likely due to its close relationship with the community, 
in addition to the fact that it is surrounded by military bases 
(the Denzipur base is 50 metres from the church and the Kopas-
sus (Special Forces) Group v is one kilometre from the church). 
Disputed Churches Resolved 
Six churches are examined under this second category: the St. 
Mikael Catholic Church in Kranji; the Pasundan Seroja Protes-
tant Church in Seroja; the Terang Hidup Indonesian Protestant 
Church in Ketapang; the St. Albertus Catholic Church in Hara-
pan Indah; the Jakarta Cathedral; and the Jawa Nehemia Prot-
estant Church in Pondok Indah. The first three churches were 
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originally from this second category, while the latter three were 
complicated cases that were moved from our first category (un-
disputed churches). 
First, it is necessary to explain the inclusion of the Jakarta 
Cathedral. As mentioned, the Jakarta Cathedral was initially 
thought to be part of the first category (never disputed). After 
the interviews, it became evident, however, that the Jakarta 
Cathedral had experienced issues during Dutch colonialism. 
Instead of not using the church as an example because of the 
period in which the problems occurred (more than a century 
ago), the Research Team considered it to be a good example of 
the important role of the government or regime in power. We 
suggest that readers view the Cathedral case in the context of 
state regulations and social factors and not focus on the differ-
ent time period. 
St. Mikael Catholic Church
The St. Mikael Parish in Kranji was born out of the development 
of the St. Arnoldus Parish in Bekasi. Increasing numbers led the 
parish to split into two stations, the St. Bartolomeus Station in 
Taman Galaxi and the St. Mikael Station in Kranji. In 1991, the 
St. Mikael Station was officially declared a parish by the Jakarta 
Archdiocese. Sermons were held at the time in the multi-pur-
pose hall of the Strada school complex in Bekasi. Prior to 1991, 
before the hall was built, sermons were held in the school yard 
on the school terrace. The Strada school itself had been around 
well before Kranji and was built on more than a hectare of land 
owned by the Jakarta Archdiocese.  
In 2004, the church obtained its construction permit. It is cur-
rently approaching 10,000 members, with a building that can 
seat 1,500 people. In addition to the church, the Graha Mikael 
hall is often used for meetings or rented to the public. From 
about 2006 until the church building was completed, sermons 
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were held in the Graha Mikael hall. On 16 November 2008, 
the church was completed and inaugurated by Bekasi Mayor, 
Mochtar Mohamad. 
The St. Mikael congregation tends to be middle-class and 
from a variety of ethnic groups, including Javanese, Batak and 
others from Flores. The local residents in the area, however, 
are largely Betawi and Javanese, and are slightly below mid-
dle-class. To include the local community in the running of the 
church, the church’s security force consists largely of members 
of the Karang Taruna youth organisation and local residents. 
Parking is also managed by local residents. In fact, the church 
renovated one local resident’s house so it could be used to park 
motorbikes, with the income going to the local community. 
Today, the Kranji Parish has its own “child”, namely the St. 
Albertus Station in Harapan Indah. There are about 6,000 mem-
bers in Harapan Indah alone. Both St. Albertus and St. Mikael 
are led by the same three pastors (because as a station, St. Alber-
tus does not have its own pastor). 
Disputes over the church can be separated into two periods. 
The first covers the years before 2004 when the church obtained 
its construction permit. The second covers the years after 2004. 
Because the disputes were spread over a protracted period, the 
Research Team was unable to find any formal records of the 
incidents that occurred and had to rely on the memory of those 
interviewed. 
In the first period, problems were related to difficulties in 
obtaining a permit from the government. This was a result of 
high resistance among the community, compounded by inter-
nal differences within the church and its construction commit-
tee. According to Mulyadi, the head of the neighbourhood as-
sociation unit (RT) 07, one of the mistakes of the church at the 
time was to place too much trust in brokers in seeking a permit, 
rather than approaching the local community directly. As a re-
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sult, the community felt undervalued.  
The lack of understanding with local residents is apparent 
in a story told by Father Yosef, the parish pastor. He was first 
stationed at St. Mikael in 2005. At the time, he recalls, almost 
no nearby local residents wanted to walk in the vast Strada 
complex. “It was forbidden, haram,” Father yosef explained. He 
added that between the complex and residential area there was 
a small door only large enough for pedestrians. From the begin-
ning it had remained closed and local residents had even been 
warned against opening it. 
Another issue from the first period in the church’s construc-
tion was internal solidarity. After years of trying to obtain a con-
struction permit but failing, the congregation, the church con-
struction committee and the parish pastor began to despair. The 
construction committee had been replaced time and time again 
but continued to face the same problem: despair and distrust. 
This effected many things, from fundraising to leadership and 
building relationships with the local residents. 
During the second period, 2004-2008, St. Mikael had ob-
tained a permit but construction was impeded. Here, it was lo-
cal resistance that played the most important role. Some local 
residents who opposed the construction cited a variety of rea-
sons: noisy trucks that interfered with sleep, traffic jams caused 
by people attending sermons and the ‘exclusive nature’ of the 
Catholic community. 
During an interview with Basyuni, head of RT 03, one fac-
tor that was apparent in motivating local resistance was a ser-
mon given by Ustadz Abdullah (not his real name) in a nearby 
mosque. He encouraged local residents to oppose the church 
and to hate Christians. More recently, however, RT officials ad-
dressed this provocation and Ustadz Abdullah began to lose 
support. He then invited participation by outside parties, such 
as FPI and FBR. 
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A number of incidents increased tension between the church 
and those opposing it, such as when two truckloads of FPI 
members visited the construction site; when a Nuzulul Qur’an 
event1 was used to provoke local residents; and when local resi-
dents objected to construction trucks arriving at night.2 The fo-
cus of this case is on the resolution of these issues, and as such 
the analysis of national regulations and social factors centres 
on this second, post-2004, period. The most influential state ac-
tor in the St. Mikael case was the government (represented by 
the deputy Mayor of Bekasi at the time, H. Mochtar Mohamad) 
and the police force (represented by the Chief of Bekasi Police). 
After obtaining a permit the church continued to be questioned 
by several groups, and so the Bekasi Police Chief mediated a 
meeting between the government, the church and the opposing 
groups. According to Father yosef, at the meeting the Deputy 
Mayor said clearly, “I don’t want to say a lot, I just want to say 
that I’ll arrest anyone who becomes violent.” When it was the 
Police Chief’s turn to talk, he also said, “It is my duty to protect 
the government. The government has already spoken. I’ll ar-
rest anyone who becomes violent.” The firm and decisive na-
ture with which these two men spoke during the meeting suffi-
ciently intimidated the opposing groups and they retorted, “We 
think this is just a miscommunication. There isn’t any problem 
really. But this is what happens when we aren’t consulted.” 
The influence of the police was apparent when FPI members 
approached the construction site in trucks. The police on guard 
asked FPI to leave, even though they were clearly outnumbered. 
There was also an instance where local residents opposed the 
presence of construction trucks but the local police were able to 
1  Nuzulul Qur’an is a day commemorating the revelation of the Qur’an. In 
Indonesia, special Nuzulul Qur’an sermons are often held on the 17th day 
of the month of Ramadhan.
2  The construction could only take place at night because if it was done 
during the day it would cause traffic congestion. 
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resolve the issue. For all their work, the church claims to have 
paid no extra money to police other than “cigarette money”.  
FKUB, which was only established in 2006, played a strange 
role. FKUB approached the church and inquired about various 
permits. The forum also invited local residents and asked them 
if they had any complaints. During the meeting, the head of the 
community association unit (RW) emphasised that the church 
was fine and was not seen as detrimental by local residents. 
No one had any problems, especially those who knew nothing 
about the issue. The behaviour of the FKUB indicates that there 
is confusion and misunderstanding within FKUB about its re-
sponsibilities. There is no requirement that FKUB must check 
permits that have already been obtained by places of worship. 
Despite this unusual behaviour, FKUB was not completely 
useless in resolving the dispute. According to Krissantono, the 
role FKUB can play was evident in the effort by Bapak Imam, 
the Catholic representative of the Bekasi FKUB, to communi-
cate with Muslim youth. The communication between elite 
groups through the FKUB was quite effective in the case of the 
St. Albertus Station in Harapan Indah, and in calming tensions 
between St. Mikael and its opponents. Social factors were most 
prominent in the St. Mikael case, however. Local opposition 
was primarily based on fears of Christianisation and the per-
ception that the Catholic community was exclusive. One figure 
who was opposed to the church was Ustadz Abu (not his real 
name) from the West Bekasi Ustadz Forum, as well as Ustadz 
Abdullah who often gave sermons at the local mosque. The 
church’s strategy to overcome this was to build good relations 
with the community, beginning with the neighbourhood and 
community association units, and then similar organisations at 
the subdistrict and district levels. 
One of the defining moments in efforts to create good re-
lations with local residents was the decision to open the door, 
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mentioned earlier. The idea began with the RW head’s desire to 
create a clean and beautiful environment. Because the door had 
never been opened, local residents used the space as a rubbish 
dump. The area was generally dark and unsafe. The head of 
the RW wanted to improve the situation and spoke to Father 
yosef. Several local residents objected because opening the door 
would allow easier access to the church. 
To overcome this resistance, the head of the RW set out to 
convince local residents, with support from Father yosef who 
sat diligently at the door talking with people. Eventually, de-
spite resistance, the door was opened in an event that was at-
tended by religious leaders and officials from the RT and RW 
units. Father yosef himself blessed the door and prayed candid-
ly that the opening of the door would initiate a better dialogue 
between the church and the local community. 
The church’s approach to improving relations with the lo-
cal community was also influenced by the inclusion of the local 
community in the church construction. Mulyadi made a direct 
request that the church involve local residents, arguing that if 
there were any issues with the church, it would be local resi-
dents who would first asked for help. The church accommodat-
ed this request and hired several local residents as security of-
ficers. It was these officers who were, among other things, later 
to disperse a PKS crowd that sought to speak out against the 
church. It is necessary to note that Mulyadi now feels slightly 
distanced from the church because the new parish council does 
not relate as intimately with local residents as did the previous 
one. 
Another important insight that emerged from interviews 
with Father yosef and Krissantono was that in cases where 
churches face problems, the church too often reduces the issues 
in dispute to the idea that those in opposition only want mon-
ey. According to them, it is important that the church not only 
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gives money to these parties but also builds a relationship with 
the local community so they are not hesitant to speak frankly. 
In a meeting with the diocese, Krissantono suggested that if 
churches were aware that people were opposing the churches 
because they needed money, the church should not give out 
money but instead talk frankly with their opponents. Open-
ness, he argued, was important because people are only open 
with those who are not ‘foreign’. If local residents could be open 
with the church about their needs, then it meant that the church 
was no longer a foreign entity for them. 
In relation to money, Ustadz Abu’s case is an interesting 
example. Initially, Ustadz Abu was one of the most vocal op-
ponents. His position as one of the leaders of the West Beka-
si Ustadz Forum gave him respect and a strong base of mass 
support. The church attempted to visit him in his home. This 
proved to be an effective approach but what the church had 
not suspected was that a more effective approach would come 
through his grandchild. 
Ustadz Abu’s grandchild liked chicken nuggets, and Kris-
santono happened to work in a nugget company. When they 
eventually visited the Ustadz’ house, the church committee 
took nuggets to give to his grandchild. In addition to other per-
sonal approaches, this ‘nugget approach’ improved their rela-
tionship. The church committee often dropped by the mosque 
managed by Ustadz Abu. They visited so often that Ustadz Abu 
said, “Father, don’t come so often, or people will think I’m tak-
ing money from you.” 
There are four other stories in this case that highlight the 
importance of managing social issues by forming good relation-
ships. The first relates to a meeting between the church, local 
residents and the opponents of the church. The meeting was 
heated. The head of one RT, Mulyadi, a Muslim, stood up and 
shouted at the church’s opponents, “Pull down the Garuda 
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(Pancasila) then, if churches can’t be constructed in this coun-
try!” 
The second story concerns the arrival of the two FPI trucks 
at the church complex. The FPI crowd had been shouting from 
some distance away, “Burn it ... burn it!” They did so until they 
reached the complex, when the men on guard (led directly by 
the chief of the local police) firmly told the crowd to leave. The 
FPI crowd, possibly daunted by the uncompromising attitude of 
the security agencies, left after saying, “Sorry, we took a wrong 
turn.” Recently, Father yosef was told by local youth leaders 
that the Karang Taruna youth organisation was prepared to 
step in if FPI began vandalising the church. 
The third story relates to Ustadz Abu, and was told by Fa-
ther yosef. It was the beginning of Ramadhan and the church 
was not being constructed although the permit had been ob-
tained. Out of respect for local residents, the church erected 
the banner, “Have a happy fasting month-- St. Mikael Catho-
lic Church.” FPI and several other groups disliked the use of 
the word “church”, because the church building had not been 
constructed. They planned a mass protest. The church was not 
initially aware of this attitude, and it was Ustadz Abu who told 
the church about the discontented groups. On the basis of his 
information, the church replaced the banner before it became a 
significant issue. 
The fourth story started with monitoring by the RT and 
RW officials of mosques and small Islamic places of worship 
called mushollas. In order to maintain healthy relations with the 
church and maintain social harmony, the RT and RW officials 
selectively elected mosque preachers. Ustadz Abdullah was 
black-listed because he was considered to be spreading hatred. 
He taught his students to hate Christians, which the RT and RW 
officials thought was wrong. After being fired, Ustadz Abdul-
lah struggled financially and eventually divorced his wife.
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Although approaching the local community has proven ef-
fective, there are still some who are unhappy with the existence 
of the church. Dissent has come largely from the head of RT 01, 
a member of FPI. The church is surrounded by several RT units 
but only RT 01 has expressed dissatisfaction. The church itself 
has not worried about RT 01 as it believes that individuals have 
a right to oppose the church. From interviews with RT and RW 
officials, it is clear that on a personal level the head of RT 01 
does not actually have many complaints but his membership of 
FPI means he has been influenced by many parties who oppose 
the church and this has placed him in a difficult position. 
One important aspect of the firm stance of the police over St. 
Mikael is the close relationship between Father yosef and the 
police chief. The two became close immediately after their first 
meeting, to the extent that the police chief asked Father yosef 
to pray for his wife during labour and to suggest a name for 
his second child. Their relationship was also apparent when the 
police chief stood at the altar during Mass after FPI had visited 
the church. He took the opportunity to say that he would guar-
antee the church’s security and spoke about his personal life as 
a way of increasing the community’s trust in him. 
Another note about St. Mikael’s is more political. It concerns 
Mochtar Mohammad, successfully elected as Bekasi Mayor in 
2008, primarily as a result of solid support from the Protestant 
and Catholic communities. Initial information also suggested 
that before the local election he signed an agreement with rep-
resentatives from the Protestant-Catholic community that made 
two main points. First, if elected he would enforce religious 
freedom. Second, if elected he would speed up the processing 
of permits for the construction of churches in accordance with 
the law. 
Many parties dislike Mochtar Mohammad’s relationship 
with the Protestant-Catholic community. There are at least three 
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different explanations for why disputes over churches in Bekasi 
have not been resolved. The first is that government indifference 
to churches that are closed down is proof that Mochtar Moham-
mad only used the Protestant-Catholic community as a political 
commodity. The second, on the other hand, suggests that the 
Mayor’s close relationship with the churches places political 
pressure on him and, like it or not, he has to maintain some 
distance. Finally, the third explanation perceives the closure of 
churches as an effort by certain parties to delegitimise Mochtar 
Mohammad in the eyes of the Protestant-Catholic community 
and reduce the possibility of him securing a second term. This 
research has not been able to determine which among these ex-
planations are accurate. 
The political and ideological elements of the situation are 
also apparent from Basyuni’s defence of the church. He is a 
PDI-P (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) sympathiser 
who has a large photograph of Bung Karno (Sukarno, the first 
President of Indonesia) in his guest room. He is also head of an 
RT unit and supports the church for reasons of religious free-
dom and the Constitution. The church must be supported, he 
says, because Indonesia is not an Islamic state. Basyuni even 
debated with Ustadz Abdullah in a sermon at the mosque. This 
kind of ideology is important as an effort to counter opposition 
by ideologically (not economically or pragmatically) motivated 
opponents. 
The analysis above shows that in the case of St Mikael’s in 
Kranji effective state involvement was the most important fac-
tor in resolving objections to the church’s construction. The St 
Mikaels case also emphasises the role of good relationships 
with local residents. In fact, at least every fortnight the church 
reminds its congregation to wind down their car windows 
(which are usually tinted) when passing local houses before 
entering the church complex to greet local residents. Their in-
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timacy with the local community was apparent when the local 
Karang Taruna was willing to stand up against FPI in defence of 
the church. The role the RT and RW played was also very posi-
tive, not only in mediating between the church, local residents 
and the government but also in controlling the content of ser-
mons in mosques and preventing radical teachings from being 
disseminated to the local community. 
Seroja Pasundan Protestant Church
Seroja Pasundan Protestant Church or Seroja GKP is situated in 
the Seroja Soldiers’ complex. The complex is managed by the 
Dharmais Foundation and was established as a sign of Presi-
dent Soeharto’s appreciation for soldiers and volunteers in-
volved in Indonesian operations in East Timor. The East Timor 
invasion in 1975 was known as ‘Operation Seroja’, and those 
involved thus came to be known as the Seroja Soldiers. The Se-
roja complex, dedicated to these men and their families, was 
built from 1981to 1982. At almost the same time, the Protestant 
and Catholic communities began to hold religious activities in 
the houses of local residents living in the complex. 
In 1985, during a presidential visit, Soeharto saw that the 
Protestant and Catholic communities had no special place to 
worship. He ordered Dharmais to provide them with a special 
building. Dharmais authorised a building on Pisang Street to 
be used alternately for Protestant and Catholic religious activi-
ties. For the Protestants, the building was used by the Pasundan 
Protestant Church, while for the Catholic community it was 
used by the Johannes Pemandi Chapel. 
The two churches continue to share a single building even 
today. Their current building, now on Tomat Street, has been 
partitioned into two equal parts, one for the Protestants, the 
other for the Catholics. The Protestants can accommodate 
about 200-300 people. Their community is about 1600 members 
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strong, some of whom live in the complex. 
The church is led by Pastor Eric Egne, who has been at Seroja 
GKP since 1987. In 1992, the church purchased 850 m² of land 
outside the Seroja Complex in order to build a new church to 
accommodate their increasing numbers. Construction was de-
layed by a number of issues. As a result, after some objected to 
the proposed Seroja church were raised in 2006, it was unable to 
move to its own land and has had to continue using the Dhar-
mais building. 
In 2006, two retired Seroja soldiers disputed the existence of 
the church. Acting in the name of the Seroja Islamic Forum (Fo-
rum Umat Islam Seroja, FUIS), they argued that the church dis-
turbed the local community. At the time, conditions were less 
than favourable for the church as the large number of congre-
gants attending sermons caused traffic congestion that annoyed 
local residents living near the church. Fear of ‘Christianisation’ 
was not a reason for opposition in this case. 
The opponents did not protest or attack the church. They 
chose instead to intimidate its congregants, causing them dis-
comfort. Although there was no physical attack, the church felt 
uneasy and took the issue to the community association unit 
and the Dharmais Foundation.
The intimidation campaign began in May 2006 and the 
church immediately informed Dharmais of the development. 
Those opposing the church were former Seroja soldiers, and so 
the church focused its negotiations on this group. The Dhar-
mais Foundation was very helpful and within a month it had 
already offered a new location for the church on Tomat Street. 
The new building had previously been used for training work-
shops for East Timorese youth. After the 27th Indonesian prov-
ince (East Timor) separated from Indonesia, the building had 
been abandoned, so it was nowoffered to Seroja GKP and the 
Johannes Pemandi Chapel. 
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In October 2006, Seroja GKP moved to the new location. 
Dharmais owned the building and rented it out to the church 
under the condition that the structure remains unaltered. In ad-
dition, the church must annually renew its letter of agreement 
and rent arrangements with Dharmais. 
The Joint Regulations on places of worship did not play a 
major role in the resolution of the issues in 2006. The dominant 
actor was the Dharmais Foundation as owner and manager of 
the Seroja Complex. The state - more specifically President Soe-
harto - played a larger role in the early days of Seroja GKP by 
ordering that it be given a building for worship. There were 
other aspects of the resolution of the Seroja GKP dispute that 
involved other elements of the state. 
The first aspect related to the position of the church as a facil-
ity for worship for retired Seroja army soldiers. This meant the 
church was brought to the attention of the Indonesian Armed 
Forces (TNI), particularly the Department for Spiritual Guid-
ance and the Centre for Physical Rehabilitation of the TNI. This 
office indirectly “monitored” the relocation of the church. An-
other aspect related to the role of the local government. While 
the dispute was underway, the Deputy Mayor at the time, 
Mochtar Mohammad, visited the church and gathered subdis-
trict and district heads to discuss the dispute. The leader of the 
church, Pastor Eric Egne, explained that Mochtar Mohammad 
instructed the subdistrict and district heads to find a way for 
the community to continue worshipping, either in the old loca-
tion or a new one. 
Social issues in this case primarily related to the Dharmais 
Foundation and the RW unit head. The Dharmais Foundation 
was an appropriate mediator between the church and its oppo-
nents. The RW head, on the other hand, was committed to keep-
ing the Seroja issue an internal matter between local residents 
living in the complex. He cautioned those opposing the church 
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not to involve outside parties as that would create further con-
flict amongst local residents. Even meetings of local residents 
involved in the relocation of the church did not involve Pastor 
Eric because he did not live in the complex. 
Another interesting aspect, according to Martin, a Seroja 
veteran and member of Seroja GKP, was that the Seroja local 
residents and Dharmais controlled the content of sermons in 
nearby mosques. This helped prevent the church dispute from 
being blown out of proportion. 
The church has maintained good relationships with local 
residents, particularly as regards parking. Church parking is 
managed by local residents, and is charged at a relatively high 
rate. Cars pay IDR 5,000 (AUD 0.52) and motorbikes pay IDR 
3,000 (AUD 0.31). The parking lot is on empty land owned by 
Dharmais near the church and is therefore not in the way of lo-
cal residents. 
There are two issues with the Seroja GKP dispute that are 
important to examine. The first is the fact that while Seroja GKP 
had almost no problems relocating within the Seroja Complex, 
it faced difficulties trying to construct a church outside the com-
plex on the land it had already purchased. According to Pastor 
Eric, the church had already obtained signatures from local resi-
dents in accordance with the regulations (as the area is different 
from the Seroja area, new signatures had to be collected). 
The dispute concerned the reluctance of the local RT and RW 
heads to confirm the signatures. They were ambivalent, saying 
that if the Protestant community wanted to build a church they 
did not oppose the idea but they also would not express sup-
port for it. Further, when asked, Pastor Eric confirmed that the 
RT and RW heads were PKS sympathisers. 
The second aspect relates to Mochtar Mohammad. Pas-
tor Eric confirmed that Mochtar Mohammad was close to the 
Protestant and Catholic communities. In fact, his visit when 
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the church was experiencing problems was most surprising be-
cause, as far as Pastor Eric could remember, no one from the 
church had complained to the deputy Mayor. In addition, Pas-
tor Eric believes that several cases involving churches in Bekasi 
are attempts by Mochtar Mohammad’s political opponents to 
damage his image among local Protestants and Catholics. The 
Christian community was considered important in securing vic-
tory for Mochtar Mohammad and Rahmat Effendi, who defeat-
ed PKS candidates Akhmad Syaikhu and Kamaludin Djaini, by 
a margin of 9 per cent. This was also mentioned by Father yosef 
(see the section on the St. Mikael Catholic Church in Kranji). 
The dispute over the Seroja GKP church and its subsequent 
relocation was only minor. There were no demonstrations, vi-
olence or physical destruction. yet there are many things that 
can be learned from this case. First, the role of the RW head 
in localising the issue and not allowing outside organisations 
to participate was significant. Second, the decisiveness of those 
managing the complex played an important role. In this case it 
was Dharmais, supported by the Army, which was asked by the 
local government to find the best solution for both parties. State 
regulations were thus indirectly enforced by Dharmais, while 
social factors were represented by the community association 
unit or RW. 
Terang Hidup Indonesian Protestant Church 
In 1978, the Terang Hidup (Light of Life) congregation of the 
Indonesian Christian Church (GKI) was established by Pastor 
Amos Tan and his wife. The first sermon was held on 9 July 
1978 in the hall of the Pemberita Injil (Evangelist) Church on 
Mangga Alley, Kemurnian Street, West Jakarta. At the time the 
church was called the Tio Ciu Protestant Church. In July 1984, it 
became the Terang Hidup Protestant Church. 
The church building today is situated at No.19A Ketapang 
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Utara I Street, and was purchased in February 1987. The build-
ing was initially a residential house but was later renovated so 
it could be used by the church. 
The church was first established under the auspices of the 
Hongkong Swatow Protestant Church, which provided finan-
cial support. On 20 March 1994, however, the Terang Hidup 
Church council decided that it wanted to become a member of 
the official synod in Indonesia. The church currently has 200 
registered members, with 150 actively participating in services 
every Sunday. The congregation is led by two priests. The build-
ing is permanent and does not differ greatly from the buildings 
around it. There is a large cross on the church wall. Within the 
church fence, there is a car park that accommodates several 
cars, and parking is managed by local residents. 
The majority of the church community are ethnic Chinese. 
This contrasts with local residents who are mostly Javanese, Be-
tawi or Makassarese. Pastor Mellisa claims the congregation is 
not upper-class, although they are generally better off than local 
residents. Pastor Mellisa made the interesting observation that 
sometimes it is not the actual economic disparity that upsets lo-
cal residents. Although the socio-economic status of the church 
congregation and local residents are not so different, local resi-
dents tend to view the congregation as better off, simply be-
cause, “you have the money to build a church”. 
Beginning in 2003, the church approached the communi-
ty about plans for the renovation of the old building and the 
construction of a new church. The church argued that the old 
building was not large enough and often flooded. The church 
obtained more than 40 signatures from local residents3 and the 
Krukut subdistrict head verified them on 30 October 2003. 
In March 2004, during a session held by the subdistrict head 
3  At the time Joint Ministerial Regulation 8/9 of 2006 had not been issued 
and there was no minimum requirement for signatures.
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to announce the church renovation, a local figure and leader 
of a mosque, Ustadz Hasan (not his real name), expressed his 
opposition to the construction of the church. He reasoned that 
his house, which was located behind the church, would become 
hot and stuffy if the church was built higher as it would block 
the airflow around his house. The subdistrict head was able to 
resolve Hasan’s concerns. 
On 16 April 2004, the church applied for a permit for con-
struction of the church. In December 2004, the West Jakarta 
Mayor granted approval to change the current permit for a resi-
dential property into one for a place of worship, and forwarded 
the case to the Jakarta Governor. In August 2006, the deputy 
Governor of Jakarta, acting on behalf of the Governor, granted 
a permit for the development and renovation of the church. 
After obtaining the permit, the church began construction 
and erected a banner asking for the blessings of the local resi-
dents. According to Pastor Mellisa, erecting the banner was ef-
fectively like waking a sleeping tiger. Ustad Hasan voiced his 
opposition again. During a meeting in September 2007 in the 
RW 07 office, he accused the church of lying to his father, the 
deceased H. Ihsan (not his real name), by claiming they would 
only fill the land to reduce flooding when they actually intend-
ed to renovate and extend the church. 
From that day on, the head and the deputy head of RW 07 
acted as facilitators between local residents and the church. 
They suggested that the church be only one storey high. On 10 
October 2007, during a meeting between the facilitators and lo-
cal residents, local residents could not agree on this issue and 
accused the facilitators of accepting money from the church.  
On 6 December 2007, a group of local residents, acting in the 
name of the Krukut Muslim Community (Masyarakat Umat Islam 
Krukut) submitted a written letter in opposition to the church. 
The reasons they cited were (1) the church was originally a resi-
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dential property that never obtained a permit for a change of 
status (to a place of worship); (2) there was already a church 
on Ketapang Utara 1 Street; (3) the local residents around the 
church were Muslim; and (4) the church congregation did not 
come from Ketapang Utara 1. 
In January 2008, Taman Sari District invited the church and 
local residents to meet. According to information from Pastor 
Melissa, the Taman Sari district head was not present and the 
meeting was eventually moved to the Taman Sari police station. 
From then on, the police chief became the  chief mediator. 
Parallel to these processes, the church sent a letter to the re-
gional police chief regarding security and sent carbon copies to 
the National Police Chief, the National Commission for Human 
Rights (Komnas HAM) and the chairperson of PGI. In January 
2008, Komnas HAM wrote a letter to the West Jakarta police 
chief in response to the request for security. In May 2008, the 
church construction began. Local protests took place but as time 
passed they became increasingly infrequent. 
In the Terang Hidup case, state regulations were applied by 
the police. The police - in this instance the Taman Sari police 
station - acted as a facilitator between the church and its oppo-
nents. The police also provided security and helped approach 
local residents. 
Interviews revealed that during this mediation process the 
church spent IDR 50 million in police coordination fees. This 
was paid upfront in return for the achievement of certain objec-
tives. Further money was paid in instalments, depending on 
need. More recently, information has surfaced that the amount 
paid was much smaller than was originally reported, because 
the dispute was resolved earlier than expected. 
The active and courageous role the police played was ap-
parent in meetings between the church and its opponents. At 
one meeting, the police chief quite firmly stated that the police 
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would always refer to the church’s legal status in any dispute. 
In this case, because the church had already obtained a permit, 
local residents who opposed its existence were effectively op-
posing the government and the police. On the same occasion, 
the police chief also told local residents that the church had al-
ready forwarded the case to Komnas HAM and the regional 
police chief. “Does the regional police chief really have to be-
come involved?” the Taman Sari police chief asked rhetorically, 
as retold by Pastor Mellisa. 
There are several aspects to note regarding police involve-
ment in this case. First, the church tried to contact the Metro 
Jaya police office through Komnas HAM. Second, the church 
coordinated with PGI, which has connections with elements of 
the Metro Jaya police office. One member of the GKI synod was 
a policeman and assisted in taking these steps. 
The church’s success in obtaining police attention was ap-
parent in a statement by the local police chief which Pastor Mel-
lisa quoted in an interview: “Be patient yeah, we’re handling 
it. Senior management has also asked us to resolve it.” Third, 
according to Pastor Mellisa, the Taman Sari police chief told 
the church that he had often handled church issues of a similar 
kind. He assured the church that he understood fully what had 
to be done. 
The church felt that other institutions, such as FKUB and 
the Ministry of Religious Affairs, did not play an important or 
useful role. FKUB did become involved in the mediation pro-
cess, but the problems had largely subsided by that stage. The 
Ministry of Religious Affairs, on the other hand, was passive, 
and only wrote letters in response without becoming actively 
involved in the field. 
The most prominent party from the bureaucracy was the 
Kurkut subdistrict head. He was involved in mediation be-
tween the church and its opponents. Several meetings were 
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held on his initiative, although his involvement was not purely 
motivated by a desire to implement his duties. There were in-
dications that opportunism and pragmatism motivated him, as 
was evident for instance in the request that the church help with 
community work but do so by providing financial assistance. 
The church feared its permit would be cancelled, although 
this did not occur. A temporary permit requires that construc-
tion be started within six months. Resistance from local resi-
dents, however, delayed the construction and the church had 
to apply for an extension. The church felt that the Jakarta local 
government did not raise questions about the extension even 
though the church was being disputed. This was perhaps be-
cause the police had already guaranteed the church’s security. 
Social issues were the most important aspect in the Terang 
Hidup case. Resistance to the church came not from govern-
ment agencies but from local residents. As Pastor Mellisa said, 
the problem was initially quite trivial, with a mosque manager 
feeling that his house would become airless because a higher 
church would block ventilation. Pastor Mellisa admitted that 
the church had not been sensitive enough in responding to this. 
The issue then developed into accusations of ‘Christianisa-
tion’, church manipulation and claims that the ethnic Chinese 
congregation were not local residents. At its climax, Ustadz 
Hasan, who managed a local mosque, used the mosque’s loud-
speaker to express opposition to the church construction. This 
scared the congregation from worshiping without a police es-
cort. Those opposing the church also stirred up the issue of 
Christianisation, particularly by pointing out that a church of a 
different denomination was located not far from Terang Hidup 
GKI. Local residents argued that the presence of many churches 
was an indication of Christianisation. 
The church’s opponents were largely local residents, and 
not groups from outside the region. Their opposition usually 
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took the form of threats and intimidation as opposed to vio-
lent action. The groups suspected of being behind the closure of 
churches, such as FPI and FUI, were, according to Pastor Mel-
lisa’s observations, not present in this case. There were some lo-
cal residents who were also FPI members, but their opposition 
was more in their capacity as citizens of Ketapang Utara, rather 
than as FPI members. 
One important aspect often found in controversial church 
disputes arose here: the presence of “brokers”. Pastor Mellisa 
recalled that there were people who claimed to be FPI members 
and offered their services. The church declined these offers be-
cause, among other reasons, they had been warned by the local 
police chief that such people are often two-faced: they appear 
friendly to the church but speak out against them to local resi-
dents. 
Another aspect that deserves mention in the Terang Hidup 
case is the inseparability of state regulations and social factors. 
The Taman Sari police station dealt with the local disagreement 
and approached local residents in several ways, including by 
inviting an ustadz from another region who was respected by 
local residents and inviting him to deliver a sermon. The police 
station also employed the intelligence unit to help map out and 
talk with those who opposed the church. 
The police did not, however, ignore all demands of local 
residents. The police chief took the middle path in response to 
the demand that the church collect signatures again. The sig-
natures were taken again but the process was implemented 
through the neighbourhood association unit or RT. The rela-
tionship between the church and local residents (represented by 
the community association unit or RW) was good, apart from 
one strange aspect. During an interview with one RW official, 
the impression was that the RW was trying to maintain a dis-
tance from the church. Time and time again the RW declined 
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offers of help from the church. In fact, when the church invited 
the RW to celebrate Ramadhan, the RW also declined. Clearly, 
the RW wanted to establish a boundary between the two. This 
is substantially different from the attitudes of the RT and RW 
in the case of St. Mikael’s Catholic Church in Kranji (discussed 
above). 
Despite maintaining its distance, however, the RW became 
instrumental in calming individuals opposed to the church. 
RW members pointed out that the church had existed for a long 
time, which meant that the parents of those now opposed to it 
had, in fact, agreed to its construction. 
Ultimately, however, the most influential party in mediat-
ing with, and on behalf of, Terang Hidup GKI was the police. 
FKUB and the Ministry of Religious Affairs did very little. The 
RW helped calm the situation before the role was taken over by 
the police. The subdistrict head was considered an opportunist. 
The representative of higher levels of government administra-
tion, in this case the Taman Sari district head, failed to attend 
the meeting he had arranged. Assistance from the synod and 
PGI was also helpful in strengthening the congregation and ob-
taining access to state security agencies. 
The Cathedral 
The Cathedral is located directly in front of the Istiqlal Mosque, 
the construction of which began in the 1960s, with inaugura-
tion taking place in 1976. The Cathedral was first established in 
1808 but was, in fact, built twice, with the current building dat-
ing from 1891. The ‘mother church’ of all Catholic churches in 
Indonesia, the Cathedral has been protected by its inclusion in 
the 1931 Staatsblad (Statute) No. 238 on Monumenten Ordonantie 
(Ordinance on Monuments) and, later, Instruction by the Minis-
ter for Internal Affairs No. 65/1/17 of 5 February 1960 (Majalah 
Hidup 2001: 22). 
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The congregation of the Catholic Cathedral has increased 
over the years. In 1862, 2,359 people were recorded as mem-
bers. By 1892, its membership had increased to 4,144 people. In 
1911, this became 5,610; in 1922, 7,743; and in 1932 as many as 
7,966 people were worshipping there (Heuken 2007: 274). The 
construction of parishes also influenced the number of mem-
bers. In 1941, there were 5,491 congregants; in 1960, there were 
3,865 members; in 1970, this increased to 4,020; by 1990, there 
were 6,010 people and data from 2004 records a total of 9,995 
members (Heuken 2007: 274). 
The history of the Cathedral in Jakarta begins on 5 April 
1808, with the arrival of Priest Nelissen and Priest Prinsen in 
Jakarta. On 10 April 1808, the first Mass was celebrated openly 
in the house of Surgeon F.C.H Assmuss. This was the embryo of 
both the Cathedral and the Catholic Church in Indonesia (Heu-
ken 2007: 52). According to the head of the Cathedral Museum, 
Gina Sutono, the first mission in fact arrived in 1808 but the 
Catholic Church existed officially from 1807, the year the two 
pastors began their journey to the Dutch East Indies. This was 
why 200 years of the Catholic Church was celebrated in 2007, 
although the Cathedral parish was only established in 1808, af-
ter the two pastors had arrived. 
On 15 May 1808, the Dutch government borrowed a bamboo 
house for use as an emergency church. It was located on the land 
where the Ministry of Religious Affairs now stands (Cathedral 
Museum 2008: 6). Deemed improper, the government gave a 
plot of land in Pintu Air Pasar Baru to the Catholic community 
on which to build a church. The funds raised for the church con-
struction, however, were insufficient and it was delayed (Heu-
ken 2007: 52 – 53). Eventually, in 1811 Pastor Nelissen traded 
the land for an unused Protestant chapel on Kenanga Alley on 
the outskirts of Pasar Senen, where Atrium Senen now stands. 
The 8 x 32 metre church was able to hold about 200 people and 
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was called Santo Ludovicus (Heuken 2007: 54). At the time the 
Dutch East Indies was under the rule of Governor General Dae-
ndels, who supported religious freedom. 
On 27 June 1826, the first Catholic church was burnt down, 
along with dozens of Chinese traders’ houses. The heir, J. Cran-
sen, a high Dutch official who held authority over Pasar Senen 
was not prepared to sell the land and chapel (Heuken 2007: 58). 
In 1830, the dispute over ownership rights to the land led to the 
demolition of the chapel on Kenanga Alley (Majalah Hidup, 22 
April 2001: 21). One of the reasons was that the Catholic Church 
did not have a letter of ownership, or a construction permit, as 
it does today. The situation changed when the Commissioner 
General of the Dutch East Indies, Du Bus (1825 – 1830), a Catho-
lic, heard about the difficulties the Catholic community faced 
in trying to practice their religion. He gave the Jakarta Catho-
lic community the opportunity to purchase the land and the 
building that had once been the residence of General de Kock, 
in Lapangan Banteng (now No. 7 Katedral Street) (Cathedral 
Museum, 2008: 9 – 11). Gina Sutono, the head of the Jakarta Ca-
thedral Museum, talked about the assistance Du Bus gave, but 
said, “Although he helped, the land was still sold, not given 
away. Du Bus intervened a little, but why wasn’t the building 
just given to the Catholic Church seeing that it wasn’t being 
used anymore? So we bought it. We have all the documents 
from the sale. We have a construction permit. So the church 
land belongs to the Jakarta diocese.” 
Tromph, the engineer, was asked to draw up plans for a new 
church, although it was never built due to financial difficulties. 
Eventually, the building that existed was renovated so that it 
could be used as a church. On 6 November 1829, the 35 x 17 
metre church was inaugurated with the name The Ascension 
of St Mary (St. Maria Diangkat ke Surga). By the beginning of 
the 1870s, the old church building was deteriorating and had 
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to be restored. Lacking sufficient funds, the 80-year-old church 
building was renovated as best as possible but lasted only 10 
more years. On 9 April 1890, the church was totally destroyed, 
largely by an earthquake. As a temporary measure, the priest’s 
horse stables were used as an emergency church for community 
activities for the next ten years (Majalah Hidup 2001: 21 – 22, 
34). 
In 1891, Monsignor A.C. Claessen Sr began construction on 
the second Cathedral, architectural plans having been prepared 
by P.A. Dijkmans. One year after the first stone was placed, con-
struction was stopped due to lack of funds (Cathedral Museum 
2008: 21–22). The financial situation saw the new Bishop, Mon-
signor E. Luypen SJ (1889–1923), seek funding in the Nether-
lands. The second stage of the construction was continued by 
engineer M.J. Hulswit in 1898, with Pater Carolus Wanneker 
placing the first stone (Heuken 2007: 99). 
In 1988, the Cathedral underwent large-scale renovations, 
which even included the ornaments inside. At the same time, 
the Cathedral Museum was created in a balcony room within 
the Cathedral. The Museum was inaugurated on 28 April 1991. 
The Cathedral has three pastors, Father Broto Kartono as the 
head pastor, Father Budi and Father Suherman. The congrega-
tion has about 7,000 members, who are largely middle to lower-
class and 60% are ethnic Chinese. 
The Cathedral is 60 metres long and 20 metres wide. It can 
accommodate 800 people seated, or about 1000 standing. The 
architecture is neo-gothic, and the floorplan is in the shape of 
a cross. The construction is made of stone, while the ceiling is 
made of wood in anticipation of earthquakes. It is 17 metres 
high, and was installed by labourers from China. 
Gina, the head of the Jakarta Cathedral Museum, sees the 
construction of the Cathedral as something unique. “This 
church represents a combination of three nations. The build-
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ing is stone, but the interior is wood. So it’s called Neo-Goth-
ic. To be Gothic the ceiling should be stone. The architect was 
from the Netherlands. Then the Chinese were famous for the 
wooden parts, so labourers were brought over from China. The 
general construction was completed by local labourers. So the 
Cathedral is the work of three nations.” 
The Cathedral has three towers, the Benteng Daud Tower 
and the Gading Tower at 60 metres high, and the Angelus Dei 
Tower (the Tower of God’s Angel) between the two and 45 me-
tres high. In anticipation of earthquakes, the three towers are 
made of iron, although iron is not appropriate for a Neo-Gothic 
building (Heuken 2007: 100 – 101). These towers made the Ca-
thedral the tallest building in Jakarta at the beginning of the 20th 
century (Majalah Hidup 2001: 22). 
In 1901, construction was completed. On 21 April 1901, the 
Ascension of St Mary’s Church was inaugurated in a grand cer-
emony by Mongsinor E.S. Luypen SJ. From that moment, as the 
main church in Jakarta it was called “The Cathedral” because it 
contains the bishop’s throne (Majalah Hidup 2001: 22). 
The Cathedral’s position directly opposite the Istiqlal 
Mosque raises questions. The tendency is to think their posi-
tions reflect conflict and tension between the two religions. Ac-
cording to Gina, however, the relationship between the two is 
strong. “Since Istiqlal was established we have often worked 
together. For instance, when we celebrate holy days like Christ-
mas, because the size of our congregation keeps growing we 
use the Istiqlal car park. It isn’t a problem.” 
Nevertheless, the sound of the azan (prayer call) from the 
Istiqlal mosque does disturb the Catholic community during 
Sunday sermons. The Catholic church tries to be understand-
ing and not see it as a problem. “Because it’s always been like 
that we tolerate it,” Gina said. When the Indonesian govern-
ment planned the construction of the largest mosque in Indone-
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sia directly across from the Cathedral, no one from the Catholic 
community protested. According to Gina, this is representative 
of the Catholic attitude in general - to accept all change and 
attempt to live in peaceful coexistence, without making a ‘big 
deal’ of negative things. 
It must be noted that the Cathedral has experienced a num-
ber of threats. In November 1998, there was a riot near Keta-
pang Street. Crowds of people damaged the Ketapang Church 
of Christ and burnt the Pentecostal Church in Indonesia, as well 
as several others. During the riot, a number of people also at-
tempted to attack the Cathedral church, but were detained by a 
special unit of the Air Force (Aritonang 2004: 534). At the time, 
the Cathedral was guarded by the government security forces. 
Two years later, the Cathedral was faced with a more serious 
threat. On 24 December 2000, as Christmas Eve Mass was un-
derway at the Cathedral, the congregation was startled by an 
explosion in front of the Cathedral fence. Similar explosions oc-
curred in several cities in Indonesia including Bandung, Suka-
bumi, Mojokerto, Batam, Mataram, Medan and Pekanbaru (Ma-
jalah Hidup 2001: 35). According to media sources, a member of 
[the militant Islamist Group] Jemaah Islamiyah was responsible 
for the bomb attack on the Cathedral (Heuken 2007: 2). 
In the case of this church, the state played an important role 
during the Dutch colonial period. The construction of churches 
at the time was influenced by the levels of tolerance shown by 
the Governor General and other Jakarta officials. The Cathedral, 
which has always seemed peaceful, has at times experienced 
the same issues that other churches are experiencing today. In 
Gina’s eyes, “From the colonial era to the present there has been 
no difference in religious freedom. Establishing a church has 
always been difficult.” Intervention by the Dutch colonial gov-
ernment made it difficult for Catholics, as evident in policies 
restricting the number of priests, religious freedom, and pro-
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viding no support to the construction of Catholic churches. 
The Protestant colonial government was known to be an-
ti-Catholic. Some within the government, however, were sup-
portive of the right to religious freedom, including the develop-
ment of Catholicism. When the Dutch East Indies was ruled by 
tolerant Governor Generals, congregations trying to construct 
churches found they had strong government support. The op-
posite was the case when the Republic of Indonesia was estab-
lished. The government, however, was aware of the importance 
of the Cathedral for the Catholic community in Indonesia. To 
some extent the government was obliged to protect the church. 
Gina expressed the dynamic in this way, “Attacking the Ca-
thedral, because it is the centre, is like attacking Catholicism 
in Indonesia. So it’s like attacking an embassy.” Even after the 
Istiqlal Mosque was built tolerance was maintained, however. 
The government now uses the Cathedral-Istiqlal Mosque rela-
tionship as a symbol of religious harmony in Indonesia. 
Social factors were not so important in the Cathedral dis-
pute, at least not since the Republic of Indonesia gained inde-
pendence. There are several reasons for this. First, there were 
originally hardly any settlements near the Cathedral. Second, 
the Cathedral holds a unique position because it is not just an 
ordinary church but is also a political icon of religious harmony 
in Indonesia. This symbolism means that the Cathedral is af-
fected more by state regulations than social factors. 
Since Indonesian independence, the Cathedral church has 
not experienced many significant problems. Opposition oc-
curred in the colonial era and was a result of the nature of the 
ruling officers at the time. This has important implications. 
First, it suggests that the level of tolerance of those in power is 
important in determining state regulations. Second, the restric-
tion of religious freedom is not just a product of an exclusiv-
ist Islamic Indonesian government but has historical roots that 
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date back to the colonial period. The Cathedral case teaches that 
problems with places of worship are often not simply ideologi-
cal issues but also political ones. 
St. Albertus Catholic Church 
The first stakes to mark out the construction of the St. Alber-
tus Catholic Church were planted in May 2006. This church’s 
design has changed several times. It was initially intended to 
accommodate about 1250 people, but plans underwent two 
changes before its current design was decided upon. On 24 De-
cember 2009, just before Christmas, the first service was held in 
the St. Albertus Church. 
The building is about 2100 m² with a capacity of 2000 peo-
ple, and is located on land about 7000 m² is size. The church is 
only 500 metres from the Medan Satria police station in Bekasi. 
Geographically, it stands in the middle of vacant land waiting 
to be built upon. The closest village is Tanah Apit, which  is in-
habited largely by ethnic Betawis. 
The church design is minimalist, and in January 2011 the 
main structure was 90% complete, with the interior 65% com-
plete. IDR 8-9 billion has been spent so far on the construction, 
and was collected from the congregation and the diocese. 
The size of the congregation at St. Albertus Church contin-
ues to increase, in line with rapid increases in the number of 
people living in the Harapan Indah housing complex.  In 2006, 
the congregation was only 5000 strong. There are now about 
6000 people. This number will only continue to increase with 
the development of the Harapan Indah residential area. Of 
its total area of about 1800 m², only 30% has been developed, 
which leaves room for further development. 
The majority of the congregation of St. Albertus lives in 
Harapan Indah and surrounding areas, including Naga-Pon-
dok Ungu, Taman Harapan Baru and Rorotan. The St. Alber-
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tus Church, however, is still a station of the St. Mikael Parish 
in Kranji. The socio-economic situation of the congregation is 
largely middle to upper-class, with many working as business-
persons. Others are government officials or employees. Some 
are ethnic Javanese, a small portion are Batak, from Flores or 
are Chinese. The social conditions in the housing complex differ 
noticeably from the local residents, the majority of whom are 
middle to lower-class. These generally work as security guards, 
rubbish collectors, maids and office boys, and are largely ethnic 
Betawis. 
The St. Albertus Church was first initiated in 1995. It started 
off as a shop that doubled as a residential property in Taman 
Harapan Baru. When the property was burnt down by local 
residents, the place of worship was moved to a house in the 
Permata Harapan Baru complex. Opposition arose again. Lo-
cal residents threatened the house until the church was eventu-
ally closed down, and moved to another house. It was again 
threatened, and moved, splitting into four smaller churches. 
One house was rented in Hijau Boulevard, together with two 
separate houses in Harapan Indah and one in Harapan Baru. 
This situation continued until October 2009. 
Construction of a church for the Catholic community was 
a necessity. Not only was the community growing but hous-
es used to hold services continually received threats from lo-
cal residents. On 31 December 2009, the use of these houses as 
places of worship was finally brought to a halt. The Catholic 
community was told that even if they refused to move, they 
would no longer be able to hold services in those houses. 
From 1995, according to Christina Rantena, the head of 
the St. Albertus Church Construction Committee, a previous 
church committee had applied for a construction permit but 
never received one. At the time the reason was that the local 
community did not agree to the construction, and the Mayor 
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wrote a letter of rejection to that effect. In 2006, the Church Con-
struction Committee applied for a permit in accordance with 
the Joint Ministerial Regulations requiring 60 signatures from 
non-Catholics and 90 from Catholics. To obtain the 60 Muslim 
signatures the Committee approached the community. The 
Committee also talked with the heads of the RT and RW units, 
the subdistrict head and local community leaders. The church 
was successful in obtaining a permit this time and began con-
struction. 
From the start of the construction until 2009, there was no 
intimidation, protests, violence or opposition. The only violent 
incident occurred on 17 December 2009, one week before the 
church was to be used for the first time on 24 December 2009. 
Even this incident was not preceded by threats or any warning. 
The incident began when hundreds – Kompas mentioned 
thousands in an article on 18 December 2009 –gathered at the 
Statue of the Three Ancestors (Patung Tiga Mojang) roundabout, 
not far from the main entrance to Harapan Indah, just before 
midnight on 17 December 2009. There were children and adults, 
including mothers. They did not display any uniform to iden-
tify them with a particular Islamic organisation, and carried no 
banners. 
At about 11:00pm, the crowd began to push towards the 
St. Albertus Church. When they arrived, they began throwing 
stones at the church, smashing the windows and outdoor lights. 
“In addition to throwing stones, they burnt the security post, 
one security guard’s motorbike, and a container that functioned 
as the building contractor’s office.”4 Upon hearing word of the 
incident, Christina, who was on the way to the church that 
night, immediately turned around to report the incident to the 
4  “Gereja Dihujani Lemparan Batu dan Nyaris Dibumihanguskan,” 
Kompas.com, 18 December 2009, http://nasional.kompas.com/
read/2009/12/18/12204719 (accessed 26 August 2010).
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police station 500 metres from the church. One hour later, the 
police from the Harapan Indah police precinct and the Bekasi 
regional police station finally dispersed the crowd. 
According to Christina, the crowd had arrived prepared to 
burn the church down. They carried gasoline. When the police 
chief arrived at 2:00am in the morning (18 December 2009) he 
acknowledged that there was the smell of petrol in the air, “That 
was what caused thousands of boxes of ceramic tiles to burn 
through to the morning, as well as the contractor’s office.” The 
police sealed off the church on the Thursday night but took the 
police line down on Friday morning. According to Haryono, 
the secretary for the St. Albertus Church Construction Commit-
tee, “The crowd was not organised. Although it is possible they 
were being directed by a social organisation.” It was known, 
however, that the crowd came from Taruma Jaya district. 
The police station took over the case, “There were a lot of 
perpetrators arrested but they did not claim to be from any 
particular organisation.” The case was resolved without being 
taken to court. Initially a number of perpetrators were arrested 
for vandalism but only one was charged with theft, having been 
caught stealing an electric drill. Commenting on the charge, 
which changed from vandalism to theft, Christina responded, 
“Frankly, I don’t want to interfere with legal matters. I’ll leave 
that all up to the police.” Christina herself agrees there is no 
need to exacerbate the situation. It was possible the police in-
tentionally made the case about a lesser criminal offence in or-
der to calm the situation and avoid tension if the perpetrators 
were charged with arson against a place of worship. 
Prior to 2006, national regulations made it difficult to con-
struct a church. This is related to the fact that there was not a 
healthy relationship between the St. Albertus Church and the 
community. According to Christina, at the time the church only 
communicated with one figure, Haji Toha (not his real name) 
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who might not have properly represented the local community. 
In addition, the church did not establish effective cooperation 
with the developer, which also delayed the process of obtaining 
a permit from the government. 
When the church was attacked on 17 December 2009, state 
agencies, particularly the police, showed some ambivalence. 
On the one hand, they followed through relatively quickly, with 
the police chiefs from the regional and local police stations and 
several other officials from the Armed Forces and the Police vis-
iting the location the morning after the attack to monitor the 
situation and ensure it was secure. On the other hand, security 
agencies appeared reluctant to pursue the incident further. 
As to state regulations, the church committee was commit-
ted to not holding activities on the land they owned until they 
received a permit. To obtain the permit, however, the church 
had to do more than was required by the Joint Ministerial Regu-
lations. The church obtained an Environmental Impact Analy-
sis, traffic permits, safety permits and several other permits not 
explicitly required in the regulation. Christina herself acknowl-
edged that the church did not want any trouble and thought it 
better to be prepared. 
In addition, St. Albertus also learnt from the experience of 
St. Clara, which is still unable to construct a church building. 
The first stone of the St. Clara church was laid by the deputy 
Mayor Mochtar Mohammad before a permit was officially ob-
tained. This enraged the church’s opponents. As a result, they 
protested against St. Clara and stopped the construction. Learn-
ing from this, the St. Albertus construction committee refrained 
from taking any action at all before their permit was issued. 
Although in the initial stages of its construction there was 
some resistance from the developer and the local community 
towards the church, the committee under Christina was able to 
establish good relationships with both parties. A turning point 
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in the relationship with the developer was the church’s willing-
ness to move locations. Previously, the committee had bought 
land on Block O of the Harapan Indah Housing Complex. Dis-
cussions with the developer revealed that it was not possible to 
build a church there. According to the developer’s master plan, 
the area was not for social facilities. This caused internal tension 
over whether to find a new location or defend the land they had 
already bought. Christina decided that the church must move 
because staying there would make it difficult to develop a good 
relationship with the developer. 
In addition to moving, Christina also determined that she, 
as head of the committee, was the only one allowed to estab-
lish a relationship with the developer. She did so to minimise 
the confusion that comes out of communication without any 
centralised coordination. This had plagued the previous com-
mittee. This approach was successful. In fact, the construction 
committee acknowledged, and Wahono, the head of RW 09, fur-
ther confirmed, that it was the developer who approached the 
community. 
The church committee claimed that they refrained from giv-
ing out money. Communication was established not through 
money but by holding collective activities. The committee often 
held events in sports centres or restaurants with government 
officials, police and community leaders. According to Christina, 
a kiai (a Muslim teacher or scholar) and elder in the community 
said, “I’m grateful. All my life I’ve never eaten in this cafe, even 
though this land belonged to our ancestors.” 
The provision of financial support is another important as-
pect. As mentioned above, the church said they avoided using 
money as a form of persuasion. An interview with the head of 
RW 09, however, suggested that when the church was collect-
ing signatures of support from the RT, the developer paid those 
who gave their support. Wahono admitted that the developer 
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gave money, built footpaths and installed streetlights on the 
road to Kampung Tanah Apit. The Research Team did not con-
firm with the developer whether the money originated from his 
own pockets or from the church. 
In addition to approaching local residents at the beginning 
of the construction, the church committee also came up with the 
policy of entrusting management of parking to local residents, 
many of whom are FBR members. The labourers who worked 
on the church construction and the security force were also lo-
cal residents. These arrangements were seen as a fitting contri-
bution to the local community. 
Although she denies being the most instrumental figure in 
the construction process, Christina Rantena has a unique posi-
tion. She is a First Admiral in the Indonesian Navy and a mem-
ber of the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR) in the 
TNI-Police faction from 1997 to 2004. During that time she lived 
in Kalibata, in the DPR complex. In 2001, Christina bought a 
house in Permata Harapan Baru. In January 2005, she moved 
into the house. Upon hearing of her relocation, the Catholic 
community visited her and offered her the position as head of 
the Church Construction Committee. The offer was reinforced 
by a request from Father Gaby. Christina is now a senior advi-
sor to the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Secu-
rity Affairs in the Department of Ideology and the Constitution. 
The significance of Christina’s rank was apparent when the 
church was attacked. State agencies responded relatively quick-
ly and with care. Several officers from the police headquarters 
contacted her personally. Although Christina acknowledges 
that her senior title helped both her and the church committee 
to establish good contacts with government officials, she con-
tinues to emphasise the primacy of maintaining good relations 
with the community. 
The experience of the St. Albertus Church reveals a num-
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ber of important elements in establishing a church: (1) estab-
lish good communication and relationships with the local com-
munity, especially with key leaders both before and after the 
church is constructed; (2) establish a good working relationship 
with the developer if the church is in a housing complex, in 
order to facilitate communication with local residents; (3) re-
solve and obtain all permits and conditions before beginning 
any construction activities; (4) approach and establish good re-
lations with the government and local leaders; and (5) charisma 
and leadership by the church committee is crucial. 
Nehemia Javanese Protestant Church
The Javanese Protestant Church (GKJ) of Nehemia, Pondok In-
dah, is located on Pasar Jumat Road, Lebak Bulus, South Ja-
karta. It is close to the Lebak Bulus Fire Station in South Jakarta, 
and is opposite the Lebak Bulus Stadium, beside the Lebak Bu-
lus Bus Terminal. 
The church bought the land, and then obtained a permit on 
12 December 1983. Construction of the was completed on 6 No-
vember 1985, with the church community and its supporters 
working together to build a modern church. It can hold 1120 
people, was built on 4567 m2 of land and cost IDR 350 million. 
Nehemia GKJ began as a group from the Jakarta GKJ con-
gregation (previously known as Rawamangun GKJ) who lived 
in Kebayoran, South Jakarta. They called themselves the “Ke-
bayoran Group”. In light of the fact that the church was built in 
Pondok Indah, which is far from Kebayoran, they changed their 
name from Kebayoran GKJ to the Pondok Indah Nehemia GKJ. 
Nehemia GKJ has three pastors: Pastor Lucindo is the head, 
supported by Senior Pastors Agus Hendratmo and Samuel 
Bambang Haryanto. The Nehemia GKJ congregation is cur-
rently 3,500 strong, with members coming from seven areas, 
primarily Tebet, Pasar Minggu, Ciputat, Permata Hijau and Ke-
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bayoran Baru. The majority, about 75%, are Javanese. The rest 
represent a variety of ethnicities, including Batak, Ambonese 
and Manadonese. Most are civil servants, and many of the oth-
ers are private employees or are self-employed. This suggests 
that they are middle to upper-class. 
Since 1 January 1999, Nehemia GKJ has owned a multi-pur-
pose building next to the church. The building is about 1055 m2 
(ground floor and second story) and stands on 4980 m2 of land. 
As mentioned, Kebayoran or Nehemia GKJ was initially 
part of the Jakarta GKJ. On 6 November 1966, it established a 
church on Persahabatan Street, Rawamangun, East Jakarta. The 
Kebayoran group had been around since 1953. At the time, the 
Kebayoran congregation consisted of only about 20 people. For 
services they used a classroom at the State Senior High School 
(SMAN) 6 in Kebayoran (Soediono 1985). 
In 1955, services were moved to the Graphics School on Mel-
awai Street (now Melawai Plaza) with the congregation increas-
ing in size to about 100 people. In 1961, the Kebayoran congre-
gation moved its services again to the Kebayoran GKI Church 
at 1/51 Panglima Polim Street. By 1966, 400 people were attend-
ing services (Soediono 1985). 
Its establishment coinciding with the development of Ke-
bayoran, the Jakarta GKJ congregation in Kebayoran continued 
to grow. By 1970, it was estimated to have 850 people. Eventual-
ly, in 1971, the Kebayoran group officially became the Javanese 
Protestant Church in Kebayoran, under Pastor Roesman Moel-
jodwiatmoko. As it developed, Kebayoran GKJ was divided 
into 13 regions, spread across South Jakarta, later increasing to 
16 regions, including Depok and Tangerang. At the beginning 
of its development Kebayoran GKJ had 992 members (Soediono 
1985). 
On 1 June 1972, Kebayoran GKJ established the Nehemia 
Church Construction Foundation, which was responsible for 
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establishing a Javanese Protestant Church in Kebayoran. In 
1973, an application for land for the church was submitted to 
the Jakarta government, asking the government release land 
to the church (Soediono 1985). In 1974, the Nehemia Founda-
tion submitted a request to the Pondok Indah project for a piece 
of land. PT Metropolitan Kencana, the real-estate developer 
for Pondok Indah, said it might be possible to incorporate the 
church into land allocated for education and cultural facilities. 
In October 1976, the Nehemia Foundation asked the Jakarta 
Advisory Body for Places of Worship to facilitate the adminis-
trative process concerning the land on which the church would 
be built. The Jakarta Department of City Planning had already 
given the church alternative locations in Pasar Minggu, Ci-
landak and near Pakubuwono Street. The Department of City 
Planning later withdrew these options, however. 
At the end of 1976, a location near the IKPN Bintaro complex 
in Pondok Pinang was found. The government quickly can-
celled that option, because the land was to be used for another 
building. In 1977, the Governor of Jakarta instructed the Mayor 
of South Jakarta and the South Jakarta Sub Department of City 
Planning to find a replacement location. In February 1978, the 
government eventually found a place opposite the Lebak Bu-
lus Stadium and next to the Fire Station (where the church cur-
rently stands). 
This location was ideal because it had once been a rubber 
plantation and was far from residential areas. After two years, 
however, the mayor had still not issued a letter to allow the 
church to begin construction. On 22 December 1980, a meet-
ing between Nehemia GKJ and the Mayor of South Jakarta was 
held in which the mayor emphasised that in principle he agreed 
with the plan to construct a church at that location, but asked 
that the construction be delayed until after the 1982 general 
election (Soediono 1985). 
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On 10 November 1982, the managers of the Nehemia Foun-
dation met with the Mayor of South Jakarta and asked for an 
official statement allocating the land in Lebak Bulus for use by 
Kebayoran GKJ.  The mayor asked the managers to submit an 
official request to the Governor of Jakarta, the chairperson of 
the Jakarta Advisory Team for the Construction of Places of 
Worship and Places for Religious Activities and the head of 
the Mental and Spiritual Bureau of Jakarta. On 7 March 1983, 
the Governor of Jakarta finally issued a decree that asked PT 
Metropolitan Kencana to prepare the location near the Lebak 
Bulus Fire Station in South Jakarta for the construction of Ke-
bayoran GKJ. The decree took into consideration the fact that 
it was a public building and that the surrounding area was not 
crowded. 
The land spans about 4200 m2. As mentioned, it was pre-
viously a rubber plantation and was now uninhabited. On 6 
June 1983, the documents for sale of the land were signed and 
the Nehemia Foundation paid the deposit to PT. Metropolitan 
Kencana. After nearly 12 years, the Nehemia Foundation had 
finally obtained land on which to build a church. Construction 
did not begin until the end of 1984, and was later completed on 
6 November 1985. From then on, Sunday sermons were moved 
to the new Kebayoran GKJ building. On 29 November 1985, the 
Deputy Governor of Jakarta for Social Welfare inaugurated it. 
Nehemia GKJ is one church in Jakarta that experienced dif-
ficulty establishing a church during the New Order. The Ne-
hemia GKJ management tried many different ways to obtain 
permission to build a church, including meeting officials such 
as the Governor of Jakarta but for a decade these efforts pro-
duced no results. 
As an “offshoot” of Rawamangun GKJ, Nehemia GKJ had 
to move the location of its services several times until it was 
finally able to use the Kebayoran GKI building on Panglima Po-
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lim Street in 1961. Pastor Samuel explained, “Because it was dif-
ficult to obtain a permit, we used the Kebayoran GKI building 
on Panglima Polim Street. The one building was used by two 
different churches, GKI and GKJ.” 
According to the official records of Nehemia GKJ, the permit 
from the Department of City Planning and the Mayor took a 
long time to procure because the church itself had trouble de-
termining a location for construction. Pastor Samuel acknowl-
edged that difficulty in obtaining a permit from the government 
was generally related to allotment of a site, “The Regional Gov-
ernment has a particular plan for any one region with specific 
allotments. We can understand these kinds of reasons.” 
When they obtained the land in Lebak Bulus, the church 
continued to struggle for a permit. According to Pastor Samuel, 
the church believed the location in Lebak Bulus to be empty 
land, which had once been a rubber plantation. There were nat-
urally no complaints because there were no houses nearby, and 
thus there was no reason for the government to deny a permit. 
Despite this, the permit was only issued after a long and bu-
reaucratic process.  
Pastor Samuel acknowledged the role of certain political 
leaders in facilitating the issue of the construction permit. He 
said, “Honestly, there was Pak Radius Prawiro, he’s a Javanese, 
his parents are GKJ like us, though he himself is a GKI member. 
He helped us out and backed us up behind the scenes.” Accord-
ing to Pastor Samuel, one reason the government was reluctant 
to issue a permit was because the church had not obtained sup-
port from the local residents as required in the Joint Ministerial 
Regulations. 
In reality, the requirement to obtain support from local resi-
dents did not apply to the Lebak Bulus location because the land 
had been a plantation and was far from any residential area. 
Local opposition could not be used as a reason for not grant-
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ing the Nehemia GKJ a permit. The only village nearby was a 
housing complex for employees of the Department of Public 
Works and the church has had no problems with the residents 
of that compound. Their relationship has remained cordial, as 
acknowledged by Bangun Waspodo, the head of RW 10. 
When the church was ready to begin construction there were 
some protests. No one knew where the perpetrators had come 
from and, according to Pastor Samuel they were not from the 
Public Works housing complex. The Regional Military Com-
mand quickly dispersed them: during the New Order era the 
military was indeed efficient at mitigating conflict, especially in 
relation to the construction of places of worship. 
From 1985 onwards, Nehemia GKJ faced no opposition, pro-
tests or demonstrations from local residents or social organisa-
tions. This, according to Pastor Samuel, is because it was able to 
establish good relations with the local community. For instance, 
Nehemia GKJ established the Community Health Centre, 
which has benefited Muslims and the less fortunate. Nehemia 
GKJ also provides free cataract operations. Pastor Samuel ex-
plains, “We’re open, we do not discriminate based on ethnicity 
or religion. The only condition is that patients are poor. And we 
do not evangelise.” In addition, to address the socio-economic 
sector, every Christmas and Lebaran the church runs a cheap 
market that sells basic ingredients at reduced prices. 
This case study suggests several general patterns relevant 
to this second category. The first reveals the need for the state 
to urgently resolve issues faced by churches. In each case, the 
problems these churches faced were resolved because of, or af-
ter, the state showed its support. This support may have been 
be in the form of a decisive security agencies, as in the St Mikael 
and Terang Hidup GKI cases, or it may have been support from 
the government bureaucracy, as in the Cathedral and Nehemia 
GKJ cases. 
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State support clearly influences social factors, the second 
pattern discernable in this category. These churches established 
good relationships with their local communities, although that 
does not mean that local residents supported the church 100%. 
It is possible that some continued to have issues with the church 
but were not brave enough to speak up because of the church’s 
close relationship with the majority of local residents and the 
firm stance of the government. In some cases, as in the Terang 
Hidup GKI case, a close relationship between the two parties 
is not necessarily always visible, because there was, in this in-
stance, resistance from the community association unit or RW. 
This slightly distant relationship did not cause problems for the 
church because the police were supportive. State support, how-
ever, does not automatically result in support from local resi-
dents (or vice versa). The resolution of issues in this category 
was possible because the churches obtained support from both 
the government and local residents, and did not rely solely on 
one or the other. 
Another matter worth noting is that there was no demo-
graphic pattern common to the cases studied in this category. 
Examining the demographics of the church congregations and 
the local communities in each case shows that it is difficult to 
find evidence that they influenced the church disputes. For ex-
ample, the demographic profile of Seroja GKP was different to 
that of Terang Hidup GKI (the former is surrounded by Seroja 
veterans and the latter is a case of ethnic Chinese living in the 
midst of Betawi, Javanese and Makassarese local residents), yet 
both were disputed by local residents and both were later re-
solved. 
In terms of politics, these cases also suggest a connection be-
tween church disputes and political issues. Generally speaking, 
the resolution of disputes over church construction was a result 
of supportive state officials and good relations with local resi-
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dents. There was little sign that politicisation compounded the 
disputes in this second category. 
Undisputed Churches, Now Disputed 
Our third category, which consists of churches that were ini-
tially undisputed but have since become problematic, includes 
case studies of three churches: St. Bernadet Catholic Church in 
Ciledug; Taman yasmin GKI in Bogor; and Cinere HKBP in De-
pok. The first church’s dispute overlaps with the Sang Timur 
case. For 12 years, this church was not disputed and was al-
lowed by the subdistrict to hold sermons in the Sang Timur 
School complex. This ended in 2004, following protests. yasmin 
GKI and Cinere HKBP, however, faced another issue: both ob-
tained permits but were then banned from conducting religious 
activities by their respective regional heads. Among the reasons 
why we selected these churches for study was the common fact 
that in each case their dispute with locals received wide media 
coverage and attracted public attention. 
St. Bernadet Catholic Church
St. Bernadet is a parish in Tangerang city. Its roots can be traced 
back to 1987. At the time, Pastor S. Bintaro, SJ, who was the 
pastor of the Santa Maria Parish in Tangerang, suggested that a 
new parish be established. It was proposed that the new St. Ber-
nadet Parish cover congregants in Karawaci, Serpong, Tanjung 
Kait and Ciledug. The parish activities were initially held at No. 
29 Barata Raya Street, the pastor’s home. 
In December 1989, the Archdiocese of Jakarta bought 5129 
m² of land between the Treasury Complex and the Barata Com-
plex. They planned to build the Sang Timur School and a church 
on the land. The Archdiocese of Jakarta entrusted PT Tripatono 
Sri to design the architectural drawings and plans. As the par-
ish congregation continued to increase in size, the need to con-
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struct a new church became a pressing issue. When it was first 
established, there were about 2,000 members at St Bernadet. 
This increased to 5,400 in 1995, 8,000 in 2001, and 9,000 in 2005. 
By 2009, numbers had reached 12,000 in 2009. The increase was 
not only due to an increase in reproduction among members of 
the congregation but also a greater capacity to travel longer dis-
tances. There were very few new members from conversions, 
although there were some. The reason for this low rate of con-
version to Catholicism is that to become Catholic requires time 
and certain conditions must be met that are not always easy to 
fulfil. 
The congregants are middle-class with occupations ranging 
from teaching to private sector employment, civil service and 
trading. The congregation is also ethnically diverse. The major-
ity are migrants. In this respect the parish congregation cannot 
be described as original inhabitants of the area, as they are not 
ethnic Betawi. Most have nonetheless lived in Ciledug for quite 
some time. 
When it was first established, St. Bernadet rented three plac-
es to hold sermons: (1) the Archives Building of the Ciledug 
Finance Housing Complex (owned by the Ministry of Finance); 
(2) the Loka Genta Bakti Hall of the Ciledug Indah housing 
complex (an ecumenical facility); and (3) the Tinggi Building 
of the Ciledug Police Dormitory (owned by the Indonesian 
National Police). After purchasing land in December 1989, the 
Archbishop of Jakarta, Leo Soekoto SJ, suggested that the par-
ish immediately build a centre for religious activities for the 
Catholic community, in the form of a temporary church. 
In April 1990, the Church Construction Committee was 
formed and the church applied for a permit. The regional gov-
ernment rejected the application. The church applied for an-
other permit, this time for a multi-purpose building. The per-
mit was rejected again, with the reason given that the building 
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would be used as a church.  As a solution, the church applied 
for a permit to build a temporary school building in the name 
of the Sang Timur Foundation. Application for the permit was 
based on the consideration that the same building could be 
used as a church and a school until the school building could 
be constructed in accordance with the master plan. The regional 
government granted the permit with the Decree of the Regent 
of Tangerang No. 642.2/ 409-PERK/1990. Traffic for the con-
struction would use the road through the Finance Department 
Complex, so the committee also obtained the approval of local 
residents and agreed that the church would be responsible if the 
construction trucks damaged the road. 
Despite having obtained the approval of local residents, the 
construction was stopped. Acting on behalf of local residents, 
the managers of the Finance Department Complex closed the 
road. The Department for Public Works in Tangerang also or-
dered construction to stop by a letter dated 19 September 1990. 
The reason stated was that the building resembled a church. The 
church and the diocese then approached the relevant parties, 
including JB. Sumarlin, then Minister for Finance. In April 1991, 
the construction of the temporary school building resumed and 
continued until the building was complete. 
At the beginning of 1992, the committee submitted an appli-
cation to the subdistrict head of Karang Tengah to use the build-
ing as a place of worship on Sundays and religious holidays. 
The committee then submitted a similar application to the Re-
gent [Bupati] of Tangerang. On July 1992, the subdistrict head 
of Karang Tengah issued recommendation number 192/Pem/
vII/1992 on the use of the Sang Timur Temporary School Build-
ing for religious activities. On the basis of this recommendation 
the committee used the building as the centre for worship by 
members of the St. Bernadet Parish. 
On 14 November 2003, the committee finally obtained a per-
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mit for a multi-purpose building to be built at the Sang Timur 
School location. Like the construction process for the temporary 
school, the committee first sought permission from the residents 
of the Finance Department Complex for use of their road. The 
construction was halted when some local residents protested. 
To resolve the issue the church bought additional land so that 
the church and the Sang Timur School had their own access 
road, reducing the effect on the local community. 
While the church was finalising the purchase of the extra 
land and continuing mediation, the Tangerang Ministry of Reli-
gious Affairs issued Letter Number Kd.258.5/BA.00/248/2004 
dated 29 July 2004. The letter was addressed to the Sang Timur 
School Principal and declared that the school building should 
not be used as a place of worship. In addition, the subdistrict 
head of Karang Tengah also revoked the permit issued in 1992 
for the use of the temporary school building as a place of wor-
ship. On the basis of the letter from the Ministry of Religious Af-
fairs, a number of people protested against the construction of 
the multi-purpose building. The protest reached its peak when 
the road to the Sang Timur School was sealed off. In previous 
protests, opponents of the church had also interrupted sermons 
and forced congregants to leave. 
St. Bernadet had to recommence the construction process 
from scratch. After the protests and the road closure, the con-
gregation was forced to worship at home. For religious holi-
days, the church had no option but to rent out a building be-
cause of the large number of congregants attending. The church 
changed the construction location to land that they bought in 
Sudimara Pinang subdistrict in 2001. The church is currently in 
the process of obtaining a permit for this new location. 
In the case of St. Bernadet in Ciledug the state was initially 
supportive of the use of the multi-purpose Sang Timur School 
building for religious activities. This is clear from the recom-
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mendation issued by the Karang Tengah subdistrict. In 2004, 
however, a different subdistrict head revoked the permit. In ad-
dition to revoking the permit, the Tangerang Ministry of Re-
ligious Affairs banned the use of the Sang Timur building for 
Catholic religious activities. The church construction permits 
that had initially been applied for in the 1990s had also been 
rejected several times. 
After 1992, the church construction committee had tried to 
obtain a permit but their applications never received a response 
from the government until the road to the Sang Timur complex 
was closed off.  Even when the committee tried to obtain a new 
permit for a church elsewhere, they received no response from 
the regional government. The police who were present when 
the gate to the Sang Timur Complex was walled up could do 
very little and were unable to act as mediators. The government 
paid very little attention to this incident, which occurred one 
year into the new Tangerang Mayor’s term.
In 2009, the committee changed the location for construction. 
At the time, Wahidin Halim had been re-elected as Mayor. He 
won in a landslide victory with 80% of the vote. Several sources 
said that when the parish asked for help, Wahidin Halim ig-
nored their request, saying that his re-election was not due to 
Catholic support. It did not matter to him whether the Catholic 
community voted for him or not. This suggests that responses 
to applications for the construction of places of worship can of-
ten be influenced by the extent to which a regional head needs 
the support of non-Muslim communities. 
State and government ambivalence was also apparent when 
in 2004 the Tangerang government mediated the purchase of 
land by the church from local residents to be used as a road. 
As soon as the church had purchased the land, the government 
withdrew its assistance and left the church to face its problems 
alone. 
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The construction of St. Bernadet Church also ran into diffi-
culties when it confronted by the community. The primary trig-
ger was access to the Sang Timur Foundation, which required 
the use of the Finance Department Complex’s road. According 
to Tempo,5 the Sang Timur location and the use of the road pass-
ing through the Finance Department Complex had been sug-
gested by the former Minister for Finance, JB. Sumarlin, before 
school construction had been approved. Every Sunday, dozens 
of Catholics drive their cars to attend Mass using this road. It 
was this issue that triggered several other incidents, including 
accusations of ‘Christianisation’ and apostasy (by Muslims con-
verting to Christianity) because it was suspected that St. Berna-
det would be the largest church in Asia. Opposition continued 
even after the church chose to buy land for its own road, at the 
cost of IDR 1 billion. 
In fact, St. Bernadet’s activities have been of benefit to the 
surrounding community. As well as trading, the Finance De-
partment Complex provides a special transport service within 
the complex. When the road was still open, Catholics congre-
gants and students were the main passengers using the service. 
Closure of the Sang Timur road caused a financial loss to local 
residents. They have not spoken of their financial loss, for fear 
of sounding supportive of the church and contradicting those 
who wish to see it closed. 
The opponents of St. Bernadet came from the Karang Ten-
gah Islamic youth Front. They erected a number of banners and 
demonstrated on 15 and 28 August 2004 in opposition to the 
existence of Sang Timur and the plan to build the St. Bernadet 
multi-purpose building. On 3 October 2004, the Islamic youth 
Front interrupted 7:00am Mass led by Pastor Derikson, forcing 
5  “Bara di atas Nama Tuhan,” Tempo.com, <http://majalah.tempointeraktif.
com/id/arsip/2004/11/15/AG/mbm.20041115.AG92983.id.html> 
(accessed 22 December 2010).
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it to end early. According to one church manager, church rep-
resentatives were forced to write a declaration that they would 
stop holding religious activities in the building. They signed the 
declaration under pressure from the Islamic youth Front. Their 
opponents then used the letter as a basis to close the Sang Timur 
road, which they claimed belonged to local residents who had 
not agreed that the church could use it. 
This was the peak of the demonstrations against the church. 
The committee had tried as hard as it could to discuss the issues 
and clarify the accusations of Christianisation. They never re-
ceived a response from those objecting to the church, however. 
According to one member of the church construction commit-
tee, very few of their opponents were local residents. Most were 
from outside the region, and some were FPI members. The resi-
dents of the Finance Department complex preferred just to ob-
serve, although undeniably some also objected to the church’s 
presence. 
The St. Bernadet Parish, which had held sermons for 12 
years in the Sang Timur School’s multi-purpose building, had 
to find, and move to, a new location. The church committee 
chose this option because of the obstacles they faced from state 
regulations and social factors. The difficulties concerning state 
regulations included the refusal to grant a construction permit; 
revocation of the Karang Tengah subdistrict head’s permit; the 
letter from the Ministry of Religious Affairs which banned reli-
gious activities; and security officials failing to deal firmly with 
the anarchy that took place in 2004. 
There were also social obstacles raised by opposing parties, 
many of whom were from outside Karang Tengah. They mobil-
ised people based on the discontent of local residents from the 
Finance Department complex regarding the access road to the 
Sang Timur School. Although the church had tried to resolve 
the problem by purchasing land, opposition continued until a 
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barrier was erected, closing off the road. 
Yasmin Indonesian Protestant Church
The Indonesian Christian Church (GKI) of Taman yasmin in 
Bogor was established as part of the expansion of Bogor GKI. 
Planning for construction of yasmin GKI began in 2001. The 
idea grew out of the inability of the Bogor GKI building to ac-
commodate all members, as well as insufficient parking that 
caused traffic congestion. This interrupted transportation for 
local residents, including public transport services. In light of 
this, the Bogor GKI management formed a new Church Con-
struction Committee in the Taman yasmin Housing complex in 
Curug Mekar, Bogor, West Java. 
The Taman yasmin GKI priests were still based at Bogor 
GKI. The land where the Taman yasmin GKI was proposed to 
be built was 1720 m² and was held in the name of Sumantoro, 
Chair of the Bogor GKI Congregation Council. For Bogor GKI, 
the Taman yasmin complex was a strategic location. The Taman 
yasmin GKI has about 300 members from 100 families, from 
Curug Mekar and surrounding areas. 
Taman yasmin is a new and developing housing complex. 
The residents are generally middle to upper-class and come 
from various regions throughout Indonesia. One side of the 
Taman yasmin complex borders a local village. The village is 
populated by original inhabitants of the area, although some 
migrants live there as well. 
Initially, PT Inti Inovaco, the developer of the Taman yas-
min complex, said that the social and public facilities for the 
construction of a church in the Taman yasmin complex were 
not available. The church was not built in the first location, in 
Sector 3, because of debate over which Christian denomination 
had the right to build the church. A small mosque, or musholla, 
was built there instead. Similarly with the second location, Sec-
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tor 5, what was initially to be a church was later changed into 
a mosque. GKI was offered two plots of land in the complex 
but the committee chose only to buy a single 1720 m² plot, due 
to financial considerations. The money for the purchase of the 
land came from contributions from the church congregation 
and from Central GKI. PT. Inti Inovaco gave the church a year 
to pay for the land. 
After purchase of the land, the construction committee be-
gan informing local residents of their plans in 2002, in order to 
fulfil the conditions for a permit to construct the church. Com-
mittee members went from house to house approaching, ex-
plaining and seeking signatures from local residents as an indi-
cation that they had “no objection to the church construction”. 
In 2003, the committee held an initial event to inform the Curug 
Mekar youth. 100 people attended the meeting, and the youths 
present said that they had no objections. This was on the condi-
tion that when the GKI church was completed, it would also be 
available for use by local residents of other denominations who 
had previously held informal services in their houses. 
The process of informing and asking the permission of local 
residents was stopped for a number of reasons. In 2006, sev-
eral regional officials were approached and the ‘socialisation’ 
process started again. Two events were held. The first, held on 
12 January 2006, was especially for local residents who lived 
outside the Taman yasmin Complex. The second, on 15 Janu-
ary 2006, was specifically for local residents who lived in the 
complex near the land on which the church was to be built. The 
committee took the minutes of these two meetings to the De-
partment for National Unity. This Department then invited the 
district head, the subdistrict head, the regional military com-
mander, the regional police chief, the head of the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs and the Church Construction Committee. The 
meeting was intended to ensure that there were no problems 
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with the planned construction. At the time, the Department of 
National Unity acknowledged that the application for the per-
mit to construct the place of worship had been made according 
to the procedures. Not long afterwards, the Mayor issued his 
recommendation. 
To obtain a permit, the committee had to fulfil a range of 
other conditions, including obtaining recommendations from 
the Department of Environmental Management, the Depart-
ment of Land Management, the Department of Traffic, the De-
partment of City Planning and Landscaping and the Depart-
ment of Highways. After obtaining recommendations from the 
relevant parties, on 13 July 2006, Taman yasmin GKI received 
its permit. On 19 August 2006, the committee invited the rel-
evant authorities to lay the first stone. The event was attended 
by the subdistrict head, the district head, the regional military 
commander, the regional police chief, the head of the Office of 
the Ministry of Religious Affairs, an officer from the Christian 
Community Guidance division of the Ministry of Religious Af-
fairs, the Provincial Assistant and various community leaders. 
For a number of reasons that remain unclear, Taman yasmin 
GKI’s permit was suspended by the Bogor government on 14 
February 2008. This meant that the church was not allowed to 
continue construction and the congregation was not allowed to 
use the church for religious activities. The suspension is still in 
place, even though the church has since successfully appealed 
to the Bandung Administrative Court (Crouch, 2010). 
In reality, suspension of the permit was initiated by the Cu-
rug Mekar subdistrict head. At the end of 2006, he requested 
that the church construction be halted for a number of reasons. 
First, the church was being built prior to the arrival of George 
W. Bush and it was feared that it would become a target for 
those parties who disliked Bush. Second, at the time Aa’ Gym6 
6  yan Gymnastiar, more commonly known as Aa’ Gym, is a Muslim preacher, 
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was holding a public prayer gathering for Muslims (tabligh ak-
bar) and it was feared that the church would be targeted by the 
crowds. Taking these matters into consideration, the committee 
obeyed the request and delayed construction of their church. 
After these two events had passed, the committee resumed 
construction. It was then that opposing groups began to emerge. 
They not only protested but also pressured the Bogor govern-
ment to revoke the church’s construction permit. Bowing to this 
pressure, the Bogor government suspended the church permit 
on 14 February 2008. The committee then approached the may-
or and questioned the decision. According to one yasmin GKI 
committee member, the government representative argued that 
the suspension was put in place in order to appease the mass-
es. They argued that the suspension was only temporary and 
would eventually be removed. 
Taman yasmin GKI took legal action through the Bandung 
Administrative Court, suing the Bogor government. The court 
decision No. 41/G/2008/PTUN-BDG, September 2008, stated 
“On the Exception: Rejects the exception of the Accused (the 
government). On the Principles of Dispute: (1) Rules in favour 
of the Plaintiff (GKI) in all matters; (2) Revokes the Suspension 
on the Construction Permit; (3) Orders the Accused (the gov-
ernment) to revoke the Suspension on the Construction Permit; 
and (4) Requires the Accused to pay the court fees”. 
The Bogor government them appealed to the Jakarta High 
Administrative Court but that court ruled as follows: “verdict: 
upholds the decision of the Bandung Administrative Court 
Number 41/G/2008/PTUN.BDG.” As a result the Bogor gov-
singer and author who rose to fame primarily for a style of preaching that 
combines theatrics with practical Islamic teachings generally applicable 
to everyday life, ranging from issues of self control to one’s conscience, 
tolerance and sincerity. This is in contrast to conventional preaching, which 
centres on the virtues of prayer, fasting and the splendour of heaven.
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ernment was required to withdraw its suspension of the con-
struction permit. The government continued to uphold the 
suspension, however, and tried to appeal again in September 
2008. In response, the Bandung Administrative Court issued a 
letter dated 11 June 2009 No. W2.TUN2/696/HK.06/vI/2009, 
which stated that because the object of the lawsuit (the suspen-
sion of the permit) was only valid in a restricted administrative 
region the “case does not fulfil the formal requirements to be 
filed as an appeal … as such it will not be accepted.” The ruling 
on the case was “final and binding”. The government, however, 
has chosen to simply ignore the court’s ruling and has kept the 
church sealed. 
The police have not supported the court decision either. Un-
der the pretext of protecting the church from members of Fork-
ami, a forum formed to oppose the church, the police tightened 
security during religious activities. In addition to assigning 
more personnel, police also intentionally parked their vehicles 
on the side of the road where sermons were held. As a result the 
congregation had to listen to sermons amidst the police cars. 
On one occasion, the Bogor police chief also approached the po-
dium and asked the congregation to stop the sermon. 
Another disappointment came when police allowed the 
church to be vandalised and the legal advisor to the church, H. 
Ujang Sujai of Nadhlatul Ulama (NU),7 to be assaulted. Ironical-
ly, the police charged one of the church members who had been 
actively struggling to defend the church. As a result of these 
two incidents, the National Commission for Human Rights 
wrote to the Bogor Police Station and Police Headquarters on 
9 February 2010. The first letter to the Bogor Police Chief was 
7  Nadhlatul Ulama is the largest Islamic organisation in Indonesia. It was 
established in 1926 with a traditionalist Sunni orientation in response to 
the modernist Muhammadiyah organisation. Membership is estimated at 
40 million.
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titled “Complaint against Human Rights violations”. The letter 
to the National Police Chief was titled “Request for Professional 
Police Behaviour”. 
The indifference of the police was also apparent when they 
did not follow up on the letter, written by the police themselves, 
dated 30 May 2010. The letter (number SPH2HP/522/v/2009/
Sat Reskrim re: Notification of Investigation Results (SPH2HP)) 
addressed the church’s report of 22 April 2010 on an incident 
in which the GKI church gate was padlocked. The police letter 
stated “investigations revealed sufficient evidence that a crime 
had been committed.” This was despite the fact that the criminal 
act at issue is, in fact, stipulated in Article 175 of the Criminal 
Code.8 The Bogor municipal police were the suspected perpe-
trator. On 12 April 2010, yasmin GKI intended to hold a church 
service on the church land. An announcement was made to all 
GKI members around Taman yasmin. Without warning, on 11 
April 2010, the day before the service, Satpol PP padlocked the 
gate. The service had to be held on the side of the street in front 
of the church. Instead of pursuing the investigation, the police 
sided with the local government and took no further action.
On another occasion the Taman yasmin GKI committee had 
a confrontation with Satpol PP. At the time, Satpol PP members 
were caught stealing iron owned by the church in the middle of 
the night. They argued that they did so because the construc-
tion was not allowed to continue due to the suspended permit. 
The next day the committee visited the Bogor Satpol PP office 
to seek an explanation for the theft of the iron. 
Political factors further complicated the issue. On 11 March 
8  Article 175 of the Criminal Code guarantees the right to freedom to 
worship according to one’s religious convictions. It states that anyone found 
guilty of impeding by force an authorised public religious gathering, or 
burial ceremony, faces a maximum sentence of one year and four months 
imprisonment.
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2010, Satpol PP locked the GKI fence under orders from the 
deputy Mayor, Ahmad Ruhiyat, who is also a cadre of the Pros-
perous Justice Party (PKS). PKS involvement was also evident 
from the very beginning of the mobilisation of the masses. PKS 
cadres distributed anti-church pamphlets in mosques and mush-
ollas in Curug Mekar. The opposition movement then adopted 
the name Forkami, with the approval of the deputy Mayor of 
Bogor. 
The Taman yasmin GKI dispute is also complex at the so-
cial level. During the process of community consultation, Iwan 
(not his real name), who lives in Sector 3 of the Taman yasmin 
Complex, was opposed to the planned church construction. In 
2004, Iwan became head of the neighbourhood association unit 
or RT. When the church committee asked Iwan to confirm more 
than 200 signatures of support, he refused to do so. This made 
it impossible to continue with the application for a permit. In 
2006, during the second community consultation process, Iwan 
declared that according to his faith, he was able to express nei-
ther acceptance of the church nor objection to it. He said he had 
no problems if there was a church in his region, so long as it had 
government permission. 
In addition to Iwan, during the second consultation one of 
the 70 people in attendance spoke openly of his opposition. 
Rahman (not his real name) was a PKS cadre. He argued that 
the church was opposite the mosque that he ran in Curug Me-
kar. In reality, the church and mosque are not opposite one an-
other. In fact they are quite some distance apart. 
In 2008, when the construction committee was ready to be-
gin laying the church foundations, the community began to 
protest. Bonar (not his real name), a migrant from Medan who 
claims to be an Afghanistan veteran and lives in Taman yasmin, 
mobilised the protestors. The protestors demanded a stop to the 
construction. They threatened to burn the cement trucks and 
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equipment used to lay the foundations. The construction was 
eventually stopped. 
The committee intended to recommence construction be-
cause they already had all the materials. This time, the commit-
tee met with representatives from the district and subdistrict 
to discuss how to prevent local residents from taking violent 
action. During the meeting, the church’s opponents suddenly 
arrived and forced those from the subdistrict government agen-
cies and H. Ujang to leave. They even hit H. Ujang several times. 
In January 2010, the construction recommenced, with the 
church employed a Madurese contractor. Four days after con-
struction had begun a pamphlet signed by Bonar was distrib-
uted, urging local residents to oppose the church. Eventually 
the committee stopped work again, in order to prevent further 
conflict. Although the police said they would guarantee the 
security of the church, the crowd destroyed the church fence 
without warning and the police did not respond. 
After this incident the crowd mobilised by Bonar adopted 
the name Forkami (Forum Komunikasi Muslim Indonesia, Forum 
for the Indonesian Muslim Community). Its agenda was to urge 
the mayor to revoke the Taman yasmin GKI permit. Although 
Forkami is run by local residents of Curug Mekar subdistrict, it 
was initiated by elements from outside of the region. In fact, ac-
cording to the local RW, people from Jasinga, South Bogor, were 
involved in protests. 
According to an official from RW 08, Forkami was also of 
concern to the community, particularly when it pressured lo-
cal residents to oppose to the church. One local resident com-
plained to the RW that he was unable to refuse when five Fork-
ami members came and demanded his signature. In addition, 
Forkami tried to force a mother to support Forkami and pro-
vide a copy of her National ID card. At the time, her oldest son 
came to her defence and refused to agree to their request. Fork-
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ami kept insisting and they argued. The next day, the woman’s 
husband, an Army officer, visited Forkami headquarters and 
pulled out his pistol. Fortunately the situation was finally re-
solved without violence. 
According to one RW officer in Curug Mekar, several com-
mercial buildings on Ring Road were also pressured by local 
residents, including Bonar. For instance, Hermina Hospital for 
Women and Children and Giant Supermarket were both sites of 
protest. The issue was resolved when relatives of the protestors 
were given jobs at Hermina and Giant [major retail outlets]. Op-
position aside, however, there were many local residents who 
supported yasmin GKI. In addition to their signatures and cop-
ies of their National ID cards, support came in other forms. Aki 
Pohman, a Muslim retiree, approached the subdistrict head to 
attest to the need for the church to be constructed. Aki Pohm-
an also assisted when the committee decided to build a fence 
around the yasmin GKI property.  
The discussion above shows there were a number of aspects 
concerning state regulations that impeded the church construc-
tion. The first was the Mayor’s suspension of the Taman Yas-
min place of worship permit. This was followed by the decision 
of the deputy Mayor to allow the Satpol PP to lock the church 
gate. Police indecision was the third obstacle, as it allowed the 
church opponents to act as they pleased. 
The primary obstacle in terms of social factors came from 
the Forkami organisation and leaders like Bonar and Rahman, 
who mobilised local residents against the church. The church 
itself was able to obtain support from a number of local groups. 
The indecisiveness of the security agencies meant, however, 
that the church’s opponents were able to speak louder than its 
supporters. 
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Pangkalan Jati HKBP 
Pangkalan Jati Batak Christian Protestant Church (HKBP) in Ci-
nere was an extension of South Jakarta HKBP. The idea to estab-
lish a branch in Cinere was proposed in 1980. At the time, the 
HKBP congregation consisted of 12 families. They temporarily 
held sermons in the house of one of their members, Bella Shafi-
ra. After eight months, sermons were moved to the Ecumenical 
Church in the Navy complex in Pangkalan Jati. 
With the move to Cinere came an inevitable increase in the 
number of Bataks living in Cinere. This development saw the 
Cinere HKBP congregation expand. By the 1990s, it had 100 
families and about 400 members. During this time the Java-
Kalimantan district of the Batak Christian Protestant Church 
bought 5000 m² of land in Cinere. From the date of purchase, 
the land was always intended for use as the site of a church. 
Today, the Cinere HKBP consists of 300 families or 1,100 
people. Thirty years after its establishment the congregation 
continues to worship in the Navy Ecumenical Church. Cinere 
KHBP has one priest and several board members. The board 
members are replaced every two years. HKBP members are 
Batak migrants, residing in Cinere, and are generally middle-
class. 
By the authority of the Java-Kalimantan district of HKBP, 
Cinere HKBP formed a church construction committee and a 
district office. In 1988, Bukit Cinere Indah took over develop-
ment of the area on which the church stood from the previous 
developer, Sumarecon. This caused a change in the layout of the 
area, including changes in land allocated to social facilities and 
public facilities. The change also divided HKBP’s land, allocat-
ing 700 m² to be used as a residential area, with the remaining 
4200 m² tagged to become a road, Bandung Street. 
In 1991, Cinere HKBP started to form its church construction 
committee. The increasing size of the congregation demanded 
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that Cinere HKBP have its own church building. Although there 
was no written regulation at the time, the committee asked local 
residents for their signatures of support to meet the request of 
the Bogor Ministry of Religious Affairs. Two people chose not 
to sign the declaration of “no objection” but the committee was 
able to gather a large number of signatures. On 13 June 1998, af-
ter waiting seven years, the construction committee was grant-
ed a permit. On the basis of the permit, which required that the 
construction begin within six months from the issuance of the 
permit, the committee immediately began laying the founda-
tions and the stakes. Construction was brought to a halt in 1999, 
however, due to lack of funds. 
After six months, a number of local residents started pro-
testing in the name of the Muslim community. They protested 
through collective prayers or istighosah. At the time there was 
no clash because the HKBP congregation was worshipping in 
the Navy church. In 2000, the local protests led the deputy May-
or of Bogor to ask HKBP to stop construction. He argued that 
suspension of the construction would prevent any undesirable 
incidents and would continue until the situation became ‘con-
ducive’ again. Although there was no clear time frame for the 
suspension, the committee complied with the deputy Mayor’s 
request. 
The committee stopped the construction until 2006 and con-
centrated on collecting funds. In 2006, the committee was re-
placed. In addition to acquiring further funding, the new com-
mittee began to prepare to recommence building. The first step 
was taken on 4 August 2008 when the committee sent a letter to 
the Mayor of Depok. They received no response, so in the same 
month the committee decided to continue constructing the first 
floor. After two weeks, about 100 members of the Cinere Islamic 
Forum protested and forced the builders to stop. Before their 
protest, they had erected banners opposing the construction. 
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According to Betty J. Sitorus, HKBP identified the protestors 
as people from outside the region. The local residents who ob-
jected to the church were not present during the protest. Police 
were present but did nothing to stop the protestors. 
Three days later, there was an incident at night. The perpe-
trators tore the church gate off its hinges with a chain pulled by 
motorbikes. A number of items were vandalised. The workers 
who lived in the building escaped to the river behind the site. 
The only person left was the cook, who could not run, and she 
was the only witness who could identify the perpetrators. The 
incident was reported to police but after two weeks they closed 
the case due to lack of evidence. 
Two weeks later, representatives of the opposing party asked 
for a meeting. During the meeting two local residents spoke for 
the opponents. They said that the church was not allowed to be 
built, that builders were not allowed to work on the church and 
that no fence was to be erected until the deputy Mayor issued a 
statement to the effect that suspension of construction was re-
voked. The committee agreed not to continue the construction, 
so long as the fence was left intact because it contained all their 
equipment and materials. 
On 28 October 2008, the opponents held collective prayers, 
or istighosah, again to oppose the church. 800 people attended 
from several areas. Claiming to act on behalf of the local resi-
dents, they reported to the Mayor of Depok that local residents 
were opposed to the church. In February 2009, the Mayor of De-
pok revoked the church permit. That night, the council decided 
to appeal to the court. In March 2009, hearing of the appeal 
began at the Bandung Administrative Court. In August 2009, 
the court ruled in favour of Cinere HKBP. Their opponents ap-
pealed. Cinere HKBP won again in the Administrative High 
Court. Their opponents appealed again and, on 14 July 2010, 
the Supreme Court rejected the appeal. 
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On Wednesday 15 September 2010, new committee mem-
bers were elected. A week before recommencing construction, 
the committee sent a letter to the President, the Governor of 
West Java, the Mayor of Depok, the district head, the subdis-
trict head, Jakarta police, regional police and the local FKUB. 
The letter stated that the church would begin construction and 
asked for blessings and a guarantee of security from the au-
thorities. As it turned out, that was the week prior to the local 
elections and so the construction continued unimpeded. 
The Mayor then invited the church to a meeting. Present 
were the district head, the subdistrict head and regional and 
local police heads. The Mayor asked that the construction be 
delayed so as not to ‘startle’ local residents, which could lead 
to ‘anarchy’. Cinere HKBP expressed their objection to the fact 
that they had been asked to suspend the construction but had 
no clear idea of when they could start it again. Construction 
has been underway from that meeting until today. At the be-
ginning of October, banners protesting against the church were 
erected again. The committee ignored them because they had 
a legal basis for construction. In addition, the police began to 
be work more effectively [to protect the church site] out of fear 
that the Ciketing HKBP incident9 would be repeated in Cinere. 
Construction continues today. 
This discussion reveals a number of obstacles from the state. 
The first came from the deputy Mayor of Bogor who halted 
the construction of the church. In 2009, when the regional ad-
ministration was transferred to Depok, the Mayor of Depok, 
Nurmahmudi Ismail, who was influenced by PKS, revoked the 
permit. Although he had asked for the construction to be sus-
pended, the Mayor of Depok did not prevent the continued con-
9  In August 2010, FPI attacked members of a HKBP church in Ciketing, 
Bekasi, injuring several people. See The Jakarta Post, ‘FPI members attack 
HKBP church members in Bekasi’, 8 August 2010, www.thejakartaglobe.com. 
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struction of the church after the court ruled in favour of Cinere 
HKBP. The police, on the other hand, failed to behave profes-
sionally. They did not stop the demonstrators who threatened 
the builders. They also failed to investigate vandalism of the 
church. They did, however, eventually increase security at the 
site. In addition to the court ruling in favour of Cinere HKBP, 
the Ciketing HKBP incident also forced the Depok police to pay 
more attention. The police continue to maintain a presence at 
the construction site today. 
The Depok FKUB sided with the opponents of the church. 
They supported the Mayor of Depok when he revoked the 
church permit. The Protestant representative of the FKUB could 
not prevent this because he was a minority of one. After the 
court ruled in favour of Cinere HKBP, the FKUB agreed that the 
construction could continue. 
In relation to social factors, those who opposed Cinere 
HKBP were not local residents. During the vandalism, the local 
residents who disagreed with the church construction were not 
present. They were only present during meetings, along with 
representatives from outside Cinere. As such, very few local 
residents were directly involved in the opposition movement. 
They invited outside parties to stop the construction instead. 
One of their strategies was to hold collective prayers or istigho-
sah. 
The majority of the HKBP congregants are Batak migrants 
who work in Jakarta and live in Depok. Their opponents were 
also migrants from various regions, and not local Betawi resi-
dents. In fact the local residents seemed to have no problems 
with the church. Cinere HKBP even asked several local resi-
dents to help secure the construction site. One of them appoint-
ed the head of the neighbourhood association unit as a security 
guard for the church. 
Although opponents claimed to be from the Cinere FUI, 
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Betty identified a number of people wearing FPI clothing. It 
was unclear whether they were from FPI Central or the Cinere 
branch. Sobri Lubis, an FPI Central official, gave speeches at 
several istighosah held at the church construction site. Since the 
police increased security and the court ruled in favour of Cinere 
HKBP, there have been no visible protests. Only banners in op-
position to the church have been erected, and this was done in 
secrecy. 
There are several conclusions that can be drawn from the 
Cinere HKBP experience. First, the legal process was impor-
tant as it enabled the church to retain its permit, even when the 
case was heard by the Administrative High Court. Government 
agencies, from the city government, police and FKUB to the dis-
trict and subdistrict heads, accepted the court ruling. Although 
they did not support construction, they no longer prevented it. 
The police also eventually responded appropriately as a result 
of fears that the Ciketing HKBP incident could be repeated in 
Cinere. 
Second, the Mayor of Depok, who was clearly influenced by 
PKS, actively opposed the church construction by revoking the 
permit. Third, suggestions that opposition to the church con-
struction was related to urban migration and tension between 
local residents and the newcomers were unfounded. The op-
ponents were not local residents but migrants from outside of 
Jakarta. By contrast, the head of the RT, a Betawi local, was even 
willing to become a church security guard. Fourth, although op-
ponents of the church did not explicitly act in the name of FPI, 
there were indications that FPI was, in fact, the organisation ac-
tively opposing the church construction. Fifth, there were indi-
cations of bribery concerning the construction. 
There are several similarities between our case studies 
of churches that were originally undisputed but which have 
since become contested. The first relates to the inconsistent at-
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titudes of, and lack of support from, local governments. The 
cases studied show that the process of establishing a place of 
worship is not confirmed simply because the government has 
issued a permit. In the St. Bernadet case, the new subdistrict 
head revoked the permit for worship that the previous head 
had issued. Meanwhile, Taman yasmin GKI and Cinere HKBP 
both obtained permits to construct churches, but these were 
then revoked after pressure from their opponents. In both these 
cases, the Administrative Court ruled in favour of the churches, 
deciding that there was no basis for cancellation of the permits. 
The second factor is the involvement of groups actively op-
posing the church. Opponents are present in almost all disputes 
over the construction of churches. The difference for cases in 
this category is that their opponents’ demands were strength-
ened by the indecisiveness of local government. In Bogor and 
Depok these opponents were one of the main reasons for the 
suspension of the yasmin GKI and Cinere HKBP church per-
mits. In Ciledug, the opponents continued to call for people 
to oppose the church, and in one incident were able to force 
congregants to leave a service and block the road without any 
intervention by the police. 
The third similarity is timing. Protests occurred when the 
construction was being planned or underway. The church op-
ponents protested against Taman yasmin just as construction 
had begun. Cinere HKBP was also opposed as it was about to 
restart the suspended construction. In the Sang Timur case, op-
position emerged when the church began building the newly-
authorised multi-purpose building. 
This shows that simply obtaining a permit does not guar-
antee there will not be problems during construction. The gov-
ernment, security agencies and the church committee appear to 
pay more attention to the initial construction processes. The Re-
search Team believes that more research is needed to examine 
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this crucial point in the construction of churches, and ascertain 
whether problems that commonly arise at this time are a coin-
cidence or not. 
Disputed Churches, Unresolved 
This final category discusses churches that have faced obstacles 
from the beginning that are yet to be resolved. The three church-
es examined here are Filadelfia HKBP, St. Johannes Baptista 
and St. yohanes Maria vianney. We also received a suggestion 
to analyse Getsemane HKBP and Ciketing HKBP, which at the 
time received national media attention. Due to time restrictions, 
however, and our operational definitions, we researched only 
the three churches first mentioned. The operational definition 
the Research Team used thus sidelined several interesting cases. 
The Ciketing HKBP case, for instance, could not be included 
because it did not fulfil the condition requiring a sign indicat-
ing that the building in question was a church. It is important 
to realise that in using this operational definition the Research 
Team does not intend to define which buildings are churches 
and which are not. The definition was only used so that the Re-
search Team could focus on clear cases in greater depth. 
Filadelfia HKBP 
In April 2000, the Batak community established Filadelfia Batak 
Christian Protestant Church (HKBP). The community primar-
ily lives in Jejalen Jaya, Mangun Jaya, Satria Jaya and Sumber 
Jaya villages in Bekasi. From 2000 to 2002, they held Sunday 
sermons in different houses, alternating between them. In 2003, 
Filadelfia HKBP bought a plot of land and built two multi-
purpose buildings that functioned as both shops and houses in 
villa Bekasi Indah 2 Housing Complex, in Sumber Jaya village, 
with Building Utilisation Right (HGB) certificates No. 10095 
and No. 10096. The two buildings were also intended to be used 
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as places of worship but local opposition soon arose. 
Filadelfia HKBP consists of 131 families or 521 individuals 
and Pastor Palti Panjaitan. Pastor Palti is the church’s most re-
cent pastor, after Pastor Josua Butarbutar and Teacher (Guru) 
Elmun Rumahorbo. Pastor Palti has been assigned to the church 
since July 2007, after previously being assigned to West Pade-
mangan, in North Jakarta. In terms of socio-economic status, 
the completely Batak Filadelfia HKBP congregation is middle-
class, with 60% earning IDR 2-3 million a month, and the rest 
earning more than that. Most are factory workers, the remain-
der civil servants and entrepreneurs. They are spread through-
out several housing complexes in Jejalen Jaya, Mangun Jaya, 
Satria Jaya and Sumber Jaya villages. 
After local residents opposed the use of the two residential/
retail buildings as a place of worship, the church returned to 
holding services in congregants’ houses from 2003 to 2006. In 
April 2006, local residents banned sermons conducted in the 
housing complexes, particularly in Block C of the villa Bekasi 
Indah 2 Complex. On 2 April 2006, the Filadelfia HKBP leader-
ship was forced to sign a declaration that had been prepared in 
advance, stating that they would find new land for the construc-
tion of a church because sermons were disturbing neighbours. 
On 15 July 2007, Filadelfia HKBP decided to buy Ibu Sumiati’s 
land. Not only was it clear that the land the church purchased 
was to be used for a church, the owner of the land stated that 
she had no objections to the use of the land as a church in a 
statutory declaration witnessed by several local residents and 
the local village head. The land was purchased with the Title 
Certificate No. 149, dated 26 September 2007, and issued by the 
Bekasi State Land Agency. The plan was to build a church to 
accommodate 300-400 members on the 1088 m2 block of land. 
Following this purchase, Filadelfia HKBP started to consult 
the local community in 2007 seeking for support in accordance 
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with the Joint Ministerial Regulations. The conditions were sat-
isfied and the church obtained more signatures than required, 
with 300 National ID cards and 259 signatures of agreement 
from the local community. As a result, Sukardi, head of Jejalen 
Jaya village, had no objections to the construction of the church 
and issued a recommendation for the construction of Filadel-
fia HKBP church by Letter No. 451.2/09/X/2007 of 11 October 
2007. In fact, according to reports by KBR 68H journalists,10 Su-
kardi noted that the majority of the 13,000 residents in the vil-
lage were in support of the church. 
These documents and the recommendation later came to be 
at the heart of the disputes over the church. Some local resi-
dents who objected to the construction of the church accused 
the church of bribery and deception in obtaining local support. 
They believed that community support had been engineered. 
The majority of local residents, particularly those close to the 
construction site, confirmed that they had willingly given their 
support, claiming that it was FKUI that had threatened and 
pressured them to withdraw their support. On 2 April 2008, Fi-
ladelfia HKBP applied for permission to construct the church 
to the Regent [Bupati] of Bekasi, the head of the Bekasi Office 
of Religious Affairs, the Bekasi Forum for Religious Harmony 
(FKUB) and the Tambun Utara district head. 
The head of Tambun Utara district wrote a letter reject-
ing the construction of the church on the basis that there were 
some local residents who objected to the construction. The 
letter, No. 452.2/76/II-/Eksmasy/2008 Re: Report to the Re-
gent of Bekasi, was copied to Filadelfia HKBP. After that, the 
Bekasi Office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs issued letter 
No. Kd.10.16.11/1473/2009 of 18 August 2009, re Application 
10  “Gereja HKBP Filadelfia Dilarang di Bekasi,” Forumkami.com, http://
www.forumkami.com/forum/Kristen/34137-gerejahkbp-filadelfia-
dilarang-di-bekasi.html, accessed 28 July 2010.
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for Recommendation, which stated that it was not yet possible 
to grant a recommendation for the construction of the HKBP 
church because there was local opposition according to a report 
by the district head of Tambun Utara. The letter also advised 
the committee to approach the local community and continue 
to spread information about the church to local residents and 
their religious leaders. 
In December 2009, facing an uncertain future, and needing 
to find a way to perform their religious activities and obliga-
tions, Filadelfia HKBP built a temporary place of worship from 
plywood and red clay. This emergency church could hold 200 
congregants. For security, a two metre high gate was erected. As 
soon as the temporary church was established in 2009, it was at-
tacked several times, including two days before Christmas and 
two days after the 2010 New year. The congregation was then 
forced to worship in the village Hall. 
On 31 December 2009, the Regent of Bekasi issued Decree 
No.300/675/KesbangPollinmas/09 on Halting Construc-
tion and Religious Activities. After the decree was issued, the 
church was sealed by the Bekasi government. The official docu-
mentation in relation to the closure of the church was signed 
by several representatives of the Bekasi government, including 
the district head of Tambun Utara, A. Junaedi Rakhman, BCom 
and the head of the Bekasi Office of the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs, Drs H. Jaja Jaelani, MM. They justified this Decree by 
reference to a Local Regulation of Bekasi No. 7/1996 on Con-
struction Permits (IMB). Since the church was sealed on 17 Jan-
uary, the congregation held sermons in front of the gate to their 
church. They even set the gate back four metres from the edge 
of their land in anticipation of possible road widening. 
Until 20 July 2010, the services they held outside the church 
gate were constantly disturbed, and the land was strewn with 
animal faeces, carrion and rotten eggs. This stopped after 20 
Disputed Churches in Jakarta102
July 2010, when church leaders appeared as witnesses in court. 
Filadelfia HKBP challenged the Regent’s decree in the Band-
ung Administrative Court. The church argued that the decree 
overstepped the Regent’s authority. On 2 September 2010, the 
church won the case and the judge cancelled the Regent’s De-
cree. 
The Bekasi FKUB consists of 17 people, with 12 represent-
ing Islam and the remaining five members representing Protes-
tantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism. 
Sulaiman Zakhorus is the chairperson of the FKUB. According 
to HKBP, 9 of the 17 FKUB members supported the church con-
struction including several among the Muslim members. Zak-
horus, however, was very persuasive and forced these mem-
bers to consent to his decision to not issue a recommendation. 
Generally speaking, according to Filadelfia HKBP it is al-
most impossible for churches in Bekasi to obtain a recommen-
dation for a permit from the FKUB because, although there is no 
voting system within FKUB, the non-Muslim members have lit-
tle power. The deputy head of FKUB, Sudarno, acknowledged 
that, although an application for a recommendation had been 
received in the Filadelfia case in 2008, there had been no spe-
cific meeting to discuss the church. 11 On 29 July 2010, Sudarno 
lied when he gave testimony during a hearing at the Bandung 
Administrative Court. He stated that in order to obtain a recom-
mendation from the FKUB, a recommendation from the Minis-
try of Religious Affairs must be obtained first.12 According to 
the 2006 Joint Ministerial Regulations, however, there is no such 
requirement. 
The government was also pressured by opponents of the 
church, represented by FKUI, a local organisation formed spe-
cifically in response to the construction of the Filadelfia HKBP 
11  Testimony given at the Bandung Administrative Court, 29 July 2010.
12  Testimony given at the Bandung Administrative Court, 29 July 2010.
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church. This was apparent in the attitudes of the head of RW 09 
and the head of Jejalen Jaya village, who were forced to with-
draw their support. FKUI also influenced the district head, who 
did not want to issue a recommendation for a permit, and the 
Regent, who due to social pressure eventually issued the decree 
stopping services and sealing the church. The Bekasi govern-
ment itself has not introduced a local regulation that specifi-
cally regulates the construction of places of worship. The Re-
gent has, however, issued a Decree on Halting Construction 
and Religious Activities with reference to the Local Regulation 
of Bekasi No. 07/1996 on Construction Permits (IMB) and the 
2006 Joint Ministerial Regulations. 
In addition to support from the heads of several RT units, 
sub-village heads, and the head of the RW unit in Jejalen Jaya, 
the majority of local residents and several religious leaders be-
lieve that there is no problem with the construction of a church 
in the selected location. H. Heri, a religious leader who has lived 
about 1 km from the church since 1992, supports the church 
construction. He is a member of NU, the largest traditionalist Is-
lamic organisation in Indonesia, and former head of the Tambun 
Utara MUI, a branch of the Indonesian Ulama Council. He runs 
a religious study group in the area, called the Majelis Zikir Ikh-
wan. Throughout the debate over the construction, his support 
did not waver. In fact, when one local spread faeces around the 
Filadelfia church site, Heri ordered his religious study group to 
clean it up.13 Heri often argued in favour of the church from an 
Islamic perspective, opposing ustadz or religious teachers who 
objected to the church. 
Another man who gave his support is Bongkon, the head of 
RW 09, which includes the church location. He gave his sup-
port to the construction, but recently admitted he withdrew it 
after being threatened by Ustadz Naimun, Ustadz Amil Amung 
13  Testimony given at the Bandung Administrative Court, 22 July 2010.
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Mariadi and Ustadz Acep. They threatened that if he did not 
withdraw his letter of support then when he died the village 
would not pray for him. Sadih, a local who lives next-door to 
the church, is not bothered by the presence of the church and 
has no objections to its construction. He was one Muslim sup-
porter of the church who was brave enough to appear as a wit-
ness in the trial at the Bandung Administrative Court. 
People who opposed the church included Junaedi Rachman, 
district head of Tambun Utara. He eventually decided not to 
issue a recommendation supporting the church construction 
because he believed that the church was not transparent in the 
way it sought local support.14 Nesan, head of FKUI in Jejalen 
Jaya village was another opponent. He was a former candidate 
for village head who was eventually defeated by H. Sukardi. 
During one FKUI demonstration he tore up the Regent’s letter 
banning religious activities, because he believed that the Fil-
adelfia HKBP members did not respect it.15 
The primary opponents of the church’s construction, how-
ever, were Ustadz Naimun, Ustadz Amil Mariadi and Ustadz 
Acep. These three ustadz approached local residents who sup-
ported the church construction and asked them to withdraw 
their support. Several witnesses who supported the church said 
that the ustadz threatened them, although they denied this.16
Ustadz Naimun, FKUI advisor and ustadz for RT 01/04, 
claimed that the community had been deceived by the letter 
of support for the Filadelfia HKBP church, which stated that it 
was for the legally mandated salary bonus given to employees 
during religious festivals such as Christmas or Ramadhan (Tun-
14  Testimony given at the Bandung Administrative Court, 29 July 2010.
15  “Gereja HKBP Filadelfia Dilarang di Bekasi,” Forumkami.com, http://
www.forumkami.com/forum/Kristen/34137-gerejahkbp-filadelfia-
dilarang-di-bekasi.html, accessed 28 July 2010.
16  Testimony given at the Bandung Administrative Court, 29 July 2010.
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jangan Hari Raya, THR). Meanwhile, Ustadz Amil, who admit-
ted that he lived in a different village to the one in which the 
church is to be built and claimed to be a member of the village 
Consultative Body, said that the church had lured people with 
money when asking for their support. He did acknowledge, 
however, that the church had obtained the signatures of 259 lo-
cal residents. 
These opponents identified themselves as being from the Je-
jalen Jaya FKUI, which was established on 22 February 2008. 
According to its letterhead, the FKUI secretariat is located at the 
village office, although when asked the village head claimed 
not to know about it. Nesan claimed that the forum was formed 
in order to establish hospitality amongst the Muslim communi-
ty, not just because of the construction of the Filadelfia Church. 
According to Ustadz Acep, however, FKUI was established 
with the specific mission of cancelling the letter of agreement 
to the construction of Filadelfia HKBP.17 They believed that 
support for the church was obtained by deception and trick-
ery. The three ustadz above, who are known as the Team for the 
Annulment of Filadelfia HKBP’s Letter of Support, claimed to 
be from the FKUI when approaching local residents. According 
to Ustadz Acep, they visited local residents in order to check 
whether their support was genuine or whether they had been 
deceived. 
Although not directly linked to other organisations, in the 
middle of January, the FKUI held a public prayer meeting for 
Muslims that was attended by over 700 people from Tanjung 
Priok and Petamburan (FPI). The Bekasi police, aware of the 
vulnerability of the church and of a planned attack, sent 400 of-
ficers to protect the premises in anticipation of the attack. Police 
Chief Herry Wibowo had asked Filadelfia HKBP not to hold 
17  Testimony given at the Bandung Administrative Court, 29 July 2010.
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services but HKBP chose to do so anyway.18 Pastor Palti claimed 
that the attackers were not all local residents but included peo-
ple from outside Jejalen Jaya.19
According to the church, the dispute was not directly caused 
by political affiliations and local elections. Information received 
suggests, however, that the Regent once said at a public forum 
that as long as he was in power, the church would not obtain 
a permit. Since 2007, Regent H. Sa’duddin and deputy Regent 
Darip Mulyana have run Bekasi after being nominated by the 
PKS Faction. The Regent is also more frequently called Pak 
Ustadz (Mr Religious Teacher) than Pak Bupati (Mr Regent). 
Pastor Palti himself said that he had never found a case where 
the Bekasi FKUB had issued a recommendation for the con-
struction of a church. The Research Team has not examined 
FKUB further. 
There are several conclusions to draw from this case. Fi-
ladelfia HKBP is an example of a church that successful ob-
tained signatures of support well above the required minimum 
and yet was obstructed by masses mobilised from outside the 
area. The government and the FKUB further complicated the 
process of obtaining a permit. There are at least two interesting 
aspects of this case, also often found in other cases of disputed 
churches: first, the accusation that the signatures of support 
were falsified; and, second, the government’s refusal to give a 
recommendation on the basis that some parties objected to the 
church. It is important to note that this second reason makes no 
sense because the Joint Ministerial Regulations emphasise that 
the important thing is the signatures of 90 people who will use 
the church, together with those of 60 other residents. There is no 
provision stating that there must be no objections at all. 
18  http://www.forumkami.com/forum/kristen/34137-gerejahkbp-
filadelfia-dilarang-di-bekasi.html, accessed 28 July 2010.
19  Interview with Pastor Palti Panjaitan, 6 September 2010.
Contests over Church Buildings 107
St. Johannes Baptista Catholic Church
The St. Johannes Baptista Parish in Parung was formed after a 
long and difficult journey, beginning with an influx of migrants 
during the development of Jakarta and West Java. In the 1970s, 
the most significant development occurred through a program 
in which teachers were recruited and appointed by reference to 
a Presidential Instruction, particularly in 1977. Many appointed 
teachers from outside the area were settled in districts around 
Parung. In 1978, the Catholic community was divided into five 
stations: namely the Gunung Sindur Station, Bojong Gede Sta-
tion, Parung Station, Duren Seribu Station and Lebak Wangi 
Station. 
Initially the Parung community was a part of the Santo Pau-
lus Parish in Depok Lama. Since 1982, a pastor alternated be-
tween the five stations. This kind of ministry began with the 
presence of Pastor Guido Brod, OFM, at the Santo Paulus Parish 
in Depok. Mass was held twice a month at the Duren Seribu 
Station and only once a month simultaneously in the other four 
stations. This arrangement was considered to negatively affect 
the development of the community’s faith. 
On 19 November 1989, a meeting and regional Mass incorpo-
rating all the stations was held at a residential house. Through 
the initiative of Father Hugo Brod, OFM, the Pastor of the Santo 
Paulus Parish at the time, it was agreed that all stations should 
be combined into one station of the Santo Paulus Parish in De-
pok and be given a new name: the Santo Johannes Baptista 
Station, which would be led by Richard Haryanto. Mass ser-
vices for the newly-merged station were held every Sunday in 
Wimpie Sukendar’s house. There were only 85 families (about 
300 individuals) involved. 
In anticipation of increasing numbers and the need for pas-
toral guidance, the station proposed owning its own church 
building. At the same time, several non-Christian residents 
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near Bapak Wimpie’s house raised objections to the use of a res-
idential house as a place of worship. Through Decree No. 036/
DP/II/1990, and with the agreement of Monsignor Ignatius 
Harsono, Pr., a Church Construction Committee was formed, 
and tasked with preparing land and other requirements for the 
construction of a church. From 1992, the weekly Eucharist cel-
ebrations were moved to the Lebak Wangi Garden Restaurant, 
owned by the family of Felix Djohari, a member of the church. 
The congregation expanded further and pastoral care had 
to be taken more seriously. There was no other choice but for 
the Parung Station to have its status increased to that of a par-
ish. In accordance with the provisions stipulated in the Church 
Constitution, through Letter No. 010/IX/JB/2000, the Parung 
Station congregation asked the Bishop of Bogor to raise their 
status. Then with Decree No. 47/SKB/IX/00 of 24 September 
2000, the Bishop of Bogor increased the status of the station 
and inaugurated it as the Parish of Santo Johannes Baptista in 
Parung. From then onwards Mass and religious activities were 
held on the church’s land in Tulang Kuning, although no build-
ing had been constructed. 
As a parish, the church covered several districts, including 
Parung, Gunung Sindur, Sawangan, Sawangan Baru, Tajur Ha-
lang and Sasak Panjang. Meanwhile, according to the central 
Catholic Church the region was divided into three regions (Re-
gion I, II and III) and 15 Zones (Petrus, Paulus, Philipus, Ig-
natius Loyola, Fransiskus Xaverius, Sisilia, Stephanus, Markus, 
Lukas, Benediktus, Anna, Maria Fatima, Antonius Maria de 
Claret and Theresia). For the first period of 2000-2003, the Par-
ish Pastoral Council consisted of Pastor vitalis Nonggur, OFM 
(Head), Patrick Suwartho (deputy Head), Thomas Suhardjono 
(Secretary I), Ny. Budi Kentarti Tampatty (Secretary II), Ny. Ros-
ilawati Dewi S (Treasurer I) and Ny. Rosalia Wempie Sukendar 
(Treasurer II). The Pastoral Council included the following sec-
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tions: Preaching, Liturgy, Family Apostleship, Socio-Economic 
Development, youth, Interfaith Relations, Women, Social Com-
munication and Management of Facilities. 
The Bishop of Bogor then issued Decree No. 48/D/SKB/
IX/00, declaring the establishment of the Church Board and 
Poverty Fund (PGDP) of the Santo Johannes Baptista Parish, 
with the following members: P. vitalis Nonggur, OFM (Head), 
Patrick Suwartho (deputy Head), Thomas Suhardjono (Secre-
tary), Rosilawati Dewi S (Treasurer), FX Sidi Harsoyo (mem-
ber), Roy Edward Tampatty (member), yPC yodopratomo 
(member) and Bonaventura Huwa (member). At the same time 
the Parish Pastor issued Decree No. 001/DP/IX/2000 to renew 
the Church Construction Committee. 
The St. Johannes Baptista Parish now has more than 2,500 
congregants. The majority are young families and migrants 
from Java, Flores and Sumatera or of Chinese descent. To date, 
weekly Mass has been held in a semi-permanent tent in Tulang 
Kuning village, next to the villa Citra Lestari complex. The lo-
cation is adjacent to the Kwan Im Bio Confucian statue and the 
Tulang Kuning office of the Indonesian Confucian Community. 
From 1990-1993, the community felt they needed a church 
building so that they could worship properly. Led by the Church 
Construction Committee, the community collected money to 
buy land on which the church and its supporting facilities could 
be built. Eventually the congregation bought a 7000 m2 piece of 
land in Tulang Kuning, Waru, Parung. The title was transferred 
to the Roman Catholic Church board of directors. At the same 
time the parish board started a process of engaging with the lo-
cal community. As with other churches, they did this through 
involvement in community events, such as sporting and social 
events. In fact, the parish also became the location for one of 
the two Integrated Health Clinics or Posyandu20 in Waru village. 
20  Short for Pos Pelayan Terpadu, these centres provide pre- and post-natal 
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From its upgrade from a station to a parish in 2000 until the 
introduction of the Joint Ministerial Regulations in 2006, the 
church continued to consult the community before the con-
struction began. During this process the parish was opposed 
twice. The first occurred in 2001, when the church was planning 
on building a multi-purpose buildin, for which it had already 
obtained a construction permit. Protests by the Parung Mosque 
youth Group (Irmas), however, interfered with these plans. The 
second incident occurred in 2005. At the time the parish was 
believed to have financed a candidate for village head of Waru, 
who won the election and still holds the position today. About 
10 local residents (the other candidates who ran in the local elec-
tion) approached the church and angrily accused the church of 
paying IDR 80 million to ensure that their opponent won. The 
Parish denied that they had backed the successful candidate 
and claimed not to have paid money to any candidate. 
The introduction of the Joint Ministerial Regulations on 
places of worship gave the parish new enthusiasm to construct 
a church. They believed that the regulation gave certainty to the 
rule of the law, making the process more reliable. As a result, at 
the end of 2006 and the beginning of 2007, the Parish organised 
the necessary administrative documents, including signatures 
of support from both congregants and non-Catholic local resi-
dents. The Parish easily obtained 225 signatures. 
On 1 February, the church officially applied for a construc-
tion permit from the Regent of Bogor. On 1 September, after 
90 days and no response (in breach of article 16 (2) of the Joint 
Ministerial Regulations), the church sent a follow up letter to 
the Regent. On 22 March 2008, the afternoon before Easter, 
care for women and children. They are run by the local community and 
usually offer services on a monthly basis, providing children under 5 years 
old with a meal, immunisations and vitamin A, and measuring their height 
and weight.
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hundreds of people from the Jamiul Fataa Muslim youth Com-
munication Forum, held a demonstration and demanded that 
the church halt all activities. There were about 10 adults at the 
demonstration and the remainder were junior and senior high 
school children. Although they called the demonstration a 
peaceful protest, they forced their way into the parish yard and 
made the church take down the hired tent that had been set up 
for the Easter celebration that night. They even threatened that 
they would become violent and were prepared to die if their 
demands were not met. 
Representatives of the demonstrators (H. Umar, Asep and 
Surip - not their real names) then asked to talk and entered the 
church. They presented a declaration that they had prepared 
beforehand. The church was forced to sign a letter stating that 
the Church agreed to the dismantling of the tent, to cessation 
of all forms of worship in Tulang Kuning, and the halting of all 
efforts to obtain a construction permit for the church. In the end 
the church gave in, took the tent down and called off the Eas-
ter event that night. It was not willing to sign the declaration, 
however. H. Umar, dissatisfied with the church’s refusal to sign, 
reverted back to the mob, inviting them to turn to violence. The 
Parung Satpol PP was able to control the crowd, however, and 
said that the declaration would be handed to the Bogor FKUB. 
The church then suggested that its members celebrate Easter in 
other nearby Catholic churches. 
On 19 July 2010, the church continued the process to obtain a 
permit by applying for a Land Usage and Management Permit 
(IPPT) in accordance with the regional government’s request. 
According to some sources, they did not receive a response 
from the government. The Research Team, however, found two 
letters in relation to St. yohanes Baptista’s request for a permit 
in the archives of the Bogor Ministry of Religious Affairs. 
In general the relationship between the church and the gov-
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ernment is quite good. There are no problems with the personal 
relationships with the heads of RT 01 and RW 06, the police 
chief, the regional military commander and the village head. 
The only slightly problematic relationship is with the current 
Parung district head, who is less supportive than his two pre-
decessors. For instance, in December 2008 when the church 
sent a letter informing the current district head of its planned 
Christmas celebrations, the district head replied that he had no 
authority to issue a recommendation for the Christmas event 
because the church had not obtained a construction permit in 
accordance with applicable laws. These personal relationships 
aside, it was the state bureaucracy that delayed the administra-
tion of the construction permit. The heads of the local RT and 
RW units did not want to sign off on the local signatures of sup-
port. As a result, the village head was not prepared to sign a rec-
ommendation before the heads of the RT and RW had signed. In 
2007, the subdistrict head of Parung who was very supportive, 
felt that matters of law were beyond his authority, being the 
direct responsibility of the regent. 
Consequently, on 1 February 2007, the church submitted the 
application for a permit without the signatures of the RT head, 
the RW head and the village head as the relevant authorities. 
The church informed the Bogor Government (Office of National 
Unity and Community Protection and the Department of Spa-
tial Planning and the Environment) of its reasons for doing so. 
On 22 February, these two government institutes sent officers 
to verify the signatures of support and form a conclusion as 
to their appropriateness and veracity. The Office of National 
Unity and Community Protection verified the signatures with 
the head of the local neighbourhood association unit. As men-
tioned previously, however, the church received no response 
from the government within the required 90-day period. 
On 13 September, the Department of Housing, Planning and 
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Urban Development of Bogor wrote a letter replying to the Par-
ish’s letter. The letter asked the church to complete further ad-
ministrative requirements for the permit. It also mentioned that 
MUI in Parung had sent two letters objecting to the construc-
tion of the Santo Johannes Baptista Parish in Parung. One of 
the requirements was a recommendation from the Bogor FKUB, 
which was only formed in August 2007, several months after 
the church first applied for the permit. 
On 14 October 2008, the Bogor Department of Spatial Plan-
ning and the Environment also responded to the church, ask-
ing it to complete its application with a recommendation from 
the FKUB. Almost two years later, on 5 May 2010, the FKUB 
finally wrote a letter in response to the church’s application for 
a permit. The letter made three points. First, it did not recom-
mend the construction of the Santo Johannes Baptista Parish in 
Parung. Second, it asked the church to stop all the activities in 
Tulang Kuning. Third, it asked the regent to follow up on the 
issue. In response to the FKUB’s letter, the parish wrote to the 
Regent stating it letter was legally flawed for two reasons. First, 
the FKUB had exceeded its authority. Second, there were issues 
with the means by which decisions were made within FKUB, 
because the Catholic representative within FKUB had objected 
to the FKUB letter. In addition, the parish asked for legal and 
physical protection. 
The church acknowledged that they had spoken twice with 
FKUB. The first meeting was facilitated by the Office of Na-
tional Unity and Community Protection and took the form of a 
‘sharing session’ between the two parties. The second meeting 
was held on 8 May 2010, three days after FKUB sent out its let-
ter. For the church, the two meetings were ineffectual because 
FKUB did not regard dialogue as an appropriate way to resolve 
the issues at stake. 
In response to the church’s letter, the government ordered 
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the Satpol PP to check on the parish. Satpol PP concluded that 
there were no problems between the church and the local resi-
dents, and suggested that the church continue the application 
for a permit. These government institutes aside, the parish did 
not perceive itself to have any problems with the police pre-
cinct, the regional military command or the district military 
command. The three agencies performed their duties as re-
quired and took a neutral stance to the issues the parish faced. 
According to the parish, the one community leader who was 
very influential in provoking opposition to the church was one 
of the board members of Parung MUI, H. Umar. In addition to 
issuing MUI’s formal rejection in 2007, he was allegedly behind 
the mass action that stopped the church’s Easter celebrations 
in 2008. The demonstration itself was largely attended by chil-
dren from schools affiliated with H. Umar’s foundation. This 
education foundation is located in Waru Jaya village, the neigh-
bouring village to that in which the church is located. H. Umar 
himself was also involved in leading the action, although he did 
so in the name of ‘Muslim youth’. 
The official reason for MUI’s rejection was that there were 
already lots of churches in Parung. The church explained to 
the Office of National Unity and Community Protection that 
the churches MUI was talking about were Protestant churches. 
There was not one Catholic church in the seven districts cov-
ered by the Santo Johannes Baptista Parish. According to the 
church, it is possible that the rejection by the heads of the RT, 
RW and Waru Village was influenced by MUI’s attitude, wheth-
er directly or indirectly. 
As mentioned, the church’s efforts to consult and its man-
ner of approaching the local residents was quite successful. The 
church provided job opportunities for local residents because 
the parking was managed by local youth who lived near the 
church. In addition, the church had a very good relationship 
Contests over Church Buildings 115
with local ojek (motorcycle taxi) drivers. Several local residents 
that the Research Team met testified to the good relationship 
between the church and local residents. Gito and Iing, two ad-
herents of Confucianism who lived close to the church, said that 
the church was not an issue. In fact, the church had provided a 
means of living for the residents of RT 01 who worked as trad-
ers or parking attendants. 
Tony, a member of a Pentecostal church who lived about 100 
metres from the church, and Amir, a senior santri or student at 
the Islamic Orphanage who lived about 300 metres from the 
church, also confirmed that there were no problems with the 
church. Although the orphanage had not been directly involved 
in either supporting or opposing the church, Amir said that so 
long as it did not disturb anyone it was only fair that the Catho-
lics could build a church. 
Within the village administration, Joko, the head of RW 06 
who lives 200 metres from the church, was supportive. When 
yayang, the head of RT 01, consulted him on whether she had to 
confirm the signatures from local residents who supported the 
church, Joko asked her to support the church. For Joko, heads of 
RTs and RWs had no reason not to confirm the signatures if lo-
cal residents had already expressed their support. Joko himself 
suggested that the church could gather further support because 
their opponents were arguing that the Catholic community in 
Waru village was small in comparison to other religious com-
munities. 
The church has come to view the Joint Ministerial Regula-
tions of 2006 critically. While they believe the regulations give 
greater legal certainty to places of worship, the lack of state 
monitoring of their implementation means that they often im-
pedes the construction of churches on the ground. This is espe-
cially the case with FKUB, and its unequal representation that 
meant that, in this case, of 17 members, 12 were Muslim and the 
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remaining members represented the other 5 state-sanctioned re-
ligions. This results in FKUB playing a very different role from 
that suggested by its name. Instead of harmonising religious 
communities, it sometimes impedes religious harmony. 
At the time of writing, the parish was waiting for a response 
to its request for a Land Usage and Management Permit and 
was considering taking the issue to court. The parish has al-
ready formed an Advocacy Team to take further action, because 
the prolonged process of obtaining a permit has meant the con-
gregation has had to hold sermons in a tent for a long time now. 
The St. Johannes Baptista dispute is primarily a result of 
government inconsistency in enforcing the law. This is apparent 
in the refusal to grant a construction permit despite verification 
of local residents’ signatures. Further, FKUB was an influential 
opponent. Religious representation within FKUB was suspect-
ed to have played a role in FKUB’s letter of objection. Parung 
MUI was also involved as its leader, H. Umar, claimed to act 
on behalf of local residents. Of these issues, the primary fac-
tor in the dispute over the church construction was resistance 
from religious organisations, including the government-formed 
FKUB. In addition, the government failed to fulfil its duty to 
protect its citizens. 
Santo Yohanes Maria Vianney Parish
The Santo yohanes Maria vianney Parish in Cilangkap was an 
offshoot of the Santo Robertus Bellarminus Parish in Cililitan 
and the Santo Aloysius Gonzaga Parish in Cijantung. The Cili-
litan Parish community was spread throughout Ceger, Bambu 
Apus, Cipayung and Cilangkap, while the St. Aloysius Gonza-
ga Parish community of Cijantung lived in Cipayung, Ciracas, 
Kelapa Dua Wetan, Munjul, Pekayon, Pondok Ranggon, Cibu-
bur and Setu. 
The two parishes grew so large that it was proposed to split 
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the two and form a third parish. In a joint meeting between the 
Cililitan and Cijangung Parish Councils on 3 March 1998, the 
parishes agreed to form a new parish from several areas in Ci-
langkap. This became the 53rd parish under the Archdiocese of 
Jakarta, with the name St. yohanes Maria vianney, as stipulated 
in a Decree of the Archbishop of Jakarta issued in August 1998. 
The first pastor was V. Sudarmo, O.Carm. In 2000, the manage-
ment of the parish was handed over to the priests of the diocese. 
Until 1996, the parish held sermons in the Taman Mini Indo-
nesia Indah tourist church. From 1996 until1998 it moved to the 
Mekar Wangi Kindergarten Church and the Nusa Melati Pri-
mary School Church (mass was held in a classroom or sheltered 
outdoor assembly areas). In April 1998, when protests broke 
out and stones were thrown at services held in the St. Anna 
School and Kindergarten, services were moved to the Melati-
Cipayung Catholic School and the Economic vocational School 
owned by the Budi Murni Christian Foundation. Then, in 1998, 
due to the kindness of KRMT21 Sinambela, services were moved 
to the Budi Murni Primary School. Services were held in tents 
that were erected every Saturday and taken down every Sun-
day after the service was over. In 2002, the Budi Murni Hall was 
constructed. 
Until today, Eucharist and other religious activities are held 
every Sunday in the Budi Murni School Hall. The parish con-
gregation are migrants. Initially there were 3,000 members but 
this number has since increased to 5,600. None of the local Be-
tawi residents in the area are congregants, because during the 
12 years that the parish has existed no new members have been 
baptised. 
The local residents are aware that the hall is used as a place 
of worship, yet they know it is not a church. They have no 
21  KMRT is a traditional Javanese noble title that stands for 
Kanjeng Raden Mas Tumenggung.
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objections to the existence of the church. In fact, they are con-
cerned that the church might move, because many depend on 
the church congregants to earn a living, especially those who 
work as parking attendants and snack vendors. The Cilangkap 
Parish congregation is largely middle to lower-class, as are the 
local residents. There is no inequality between the parish com-
munity and local residents, as most congregants live in villages, 
not in housing complexes. The parish is currently led by Pastor 
yohanes Hadi Suryono, Pr. 
In 1997, before the Cilangkap parish was officially formed, 
the community bought a piece of land on Malaka Street in Ci-
langkap, in the name of the Cijantung Parish. The 4,500 m2 
block has remained empty due to strong opposition from lo-
cal residents. The Church then bought land on Kramat Street in 
Cilangkap. The church invited local residents to be involved in 
the process of purchasing the land. 
During this community consultation process and the early 
stages of construction, fears arose that the church might actu-
ally prove to be “Doulos 2”. The local residents in Cipayung 
and Cilangkap were reminded of an incident on 15 December 
1999, in which the Doulos Christian Foundation (a Protestant 
organisation) was attacked, one person was killed and several 
others injured. The arson and attack of the Doulos complex was 
triggered by fears of ‘Christianisation’. 
The St. Maria vianney Parish was on the receiving end of the 
community’s collective memory of the incident. Generally, local 
residents cannot distinguish between Protestants and Catholics 
(the Doulos Christian Foundation being Protestant, not Cath-
olic). Stirring up fears of a Doulos 2 incident was effective in 
triggering local opposition to the planned church construction. 
Eventually the parish sold the land and looked for an alterna-
tive location. 
The parish next bought 8000 m2 of land on Bambu Wulung 
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Street, Bambu Apus, after having already bought a house in the 
area to function as the pastor’s temporary place of residence. As 
they had done previously, the parish involved local residents in 
the purchase of the land and erection of a fence. Several local 
residents who opposed the church later claimed that they had 
always objected to the church being built at this location. 
The land on Bambu Wulung Street turned out to be prob-
lematic because it lay on a greenbelt established by the East 
Jakarta Government. After negotiations, the parish eventually 
traded land with the government. The Parish gave the land on 
Malaka Street to the Mayor of East Jakarta to be used as part of 
a greenbelt, while retaining its land on Bambu Wulung Street. 
In 2005, the Cilangkap Parish began the process of obtaining 
a permit, based on the Jakarta Governor’s Decree No. 137/2002 
on the construction of places of worship. The Governor’s De-
cree stipulated that the general prerequisite for the construction 
of churches is that they be “based on the actual needs of the 
congregation”. The regulation also stipulated that the church 
“must obtain support from the community/community lead-
ers”, indicating that there must be statistics on religious ad-
herents in the community. Although no required number was 
stated, the parish obtained nearly 300 signatures from local resi-
dents who supported the church construction. 
A successful approach and consultation process by the 
church meant that village officials, including the local RT and 
RW units and the subdistrict head, gave their support. Only 
one RT head objected. The parish had a close relationship with 
the district head of Cipayung, H. Iwansyah Ali, who was also 
the head of East Jakarta Forkabi.22 The application process went 
relatively smoothly, and in 2007 the parish obtained a recom-
22  Forum Komunikasi Anak Betawi, the Betawi Communication Forum. This 
forum acts to preserve Betawi culture and works with the government in 
building and developing Jakarta to this effect.
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mendation from the East Jakarta Mayor. Based on the Mayor’s 
recommendation, the parish also obtained a recommendation 
from the East Jakarta FKUB in the following year. 
The main problem in processing the permit was conflicting 
legal regulations. The first regulation was the Governor’s De-
cree No. 137/2002, and the second the Joint Ministerial Regu-
lations No. 9 and 8 of 2006. According to the Joint Ministerial 
Regulations, once a recommendation is issued by the FKUB the 
parish is entitled to a construction permit. The Governor’s De-
cree from 2002 remained in place, however, after the introduc-
tion of the new Regulations in 2006. The result was conflicting 
legal requirements, as follows. 
•  According to the Governor’s Decree, a construction permit 
is issued by the Office of Planning and Building Control 
(P2B) on the Governor’s recommendation. The Governor’s 
recommendation in turn requires a recommendation from 
the Bureau for Mental and Spiritual Education or the Advi-
sory Board formed by the Governor. 
•  Although the Joint Ministerial Regulations do not require 
support from community leaders, the Governor’s Decree 
does. The practice on the ground is therefore that five of the 
60 local signatures of support required in the Joint Ministe-
rial Regulations should come from community leaders. 
•  In practice, the process of obtaining a permit involves sev-
eral stages, that include the Legal Bureau, the Assistant for 
Public Welfare, the Public Bureau, the Bureau for Mental 
and Spiritual Education, the Regional Secretary, the Deputy 
Governor and finally the Governor. 
The existence of these two different regulations is com-
pounded by the absence of clear guidelines in the 2006 Joint 
Ministerial Regulations, which means that the verification of 
local signatures was repeated five times. Each agency felt they 
had the authority to verify the signatures, including the sub-
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district government, the municipal FKUB, the provincial FKUB, 
the Bureau for Mental and Spiritual Education and the Regional 
Office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The verification pro-
cess is lengthy, and often the National ID cards of the signato-
ries were no longer valid by the time they were verified. The 
cards would therefore be questioned by whichever agency was 
undertaking the verification process.
On the other hand, the village bureaucracy was also pres-
sured by community leaders who objected to the church’s 
construction. Over time, several RT and RW officials came to 
agree with the opinions of the more influential community 
leaders. Local residents who signed their names in support of 
the church were approached by the heads of the RT and RW, 
Babinsa officers23 or community leaders and asked to withdraw 
their support. 
Although all these processes were eventually completed, it 
took a long time. The church is now hopeful that the permit will 
be issued. To date, the (spoken) response of the deputy Gov-
ernor of Jakarta who visited the church is that the situation is 
‘currently unconducive’. In the opinion of the parish, this is just 
an easy excuse that effectively suspends the process, because it 
implies that there is no time limit for when the permit will be 
issued. 
Another issue in the context of state regulations concerns 
spatial planning and regional governance. The Governor of Ja-
karta from 1992 to 1994, Suryadi Sudirja, had determined which 
areas would be set aside for catchments, settlement and so on. 
East Jakarta was given the largest portion of catchment areas. 
Of the 13.8% of land set aside for catchments, almost 4% was in 
East Jakarta. The spatial planning and regional governance al-
locations only set out a greenbelt and business area. social facili-
23  Babsina stands for Bintara Pembina Desa, non-commissioned military 
intelligence officers stationed in villages.
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ties and public facilities were not established at this time. The 
Parish did not initially take spatial planning into consideration 
and as a result ran into difficulties. This became an excuse used 
by several government agencies to justify their refusal to grant 
a permit. 
Aside from the tiring and discouraging formal process de-
scribed above, the parish also informally lobbied the Governor, 
and even the President, as several parish members had con-
nections to the political elite. These efforts were not successful, 
however. 
Although the formal process for obtaining a permit reached 
the provincial stage, local social factors were the dominant in-
fluence throughout the process. According to Father Anto, there 
are about 60 small social organisations around the Cilangkap-
Cipayung area but no single dominant organisation. As a re-
sult, any consultation conducted by the church had to include 
all these various groups.  The Parish considered the situation 
and undertook an intensive process to approach the various or-
ganisations, especially the larger and more influential ones. It 
received help from H. Deni (not his real name), a community 
leader and member of the Jakarta regional legislature. H. Deni 
approached the various social organisations in the region, and 
was also able to pacify H. Hari (not his real name), a Laskar 
Hizbullah24 elder who objected to the church’s construction. 
The close relationship between the parish and the district head 
of Cipayung, who was also the head of Forkabi, also meant that 
Forkabi supported the church. The Association of Betawi Resi-
dents (Paguyuban Warga Betawi) led by Bang Adi (not his real 
name), initially objected to the church but discussions with Adi 
proved successful. 
There was no clear reason for the opposition to the church. 
24  Laskar Hizbullah was an Indonesian local militia active during the 
Japanese occupation in the fight for Indonesain independence.
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Those objecting to the church were aware that Catholicism is 
one of the recognised official religions of Indonesia. Several 
times they raised the issue of ‘Christianisation’, but when they 
heard that the parish had never baptised a local resident during 
its 12 years they started citing issues with the church permit. 
More recently, FPI has been the driving force behind the op-
position. Initially FPI did not have a presence in the area but H. 
Deni’s attempt to reach out to social organisations in the com-
munity disappointed some parties, who then invited FPI to the 
region. 
The trigger that caused the problem was simple. After suc-
cessfully buying land on Bambu Wulung Street, the parish 
was committed to including local residents in the construction 
through H. Deni. When it was time to build the church fence, 
one community leader had been promised that he could be in-
volved but restrictions meant H. Deni did not end up including 
him. H. Soleh (not his real name), the community leader who 
initially supported the church and signed his name to that ef-
fect, changed his mind and invited FPI to the region. H. Soleh 
held several religious study sessions in his home and invited 
FPI members. It was during these sessions that FPI called for 
the rejection of, and hatred towards, the church. There are still 
several FPI and NU flags erected near the construction site and 
the pastor’s house. Banners of objection in the name of “FPI, 
PERSIS, NU, ETC” were also erected in front of Bambu Apus 
branch of the Majlis Ta’lim Dzikir Mudzakarah Ar-Rahman re-
ligious group, which stands directly opposite the church con-
struction site. 
H. Soleh also influenced several other leaders, leading to 
the social isolation of some members of the Islamic community 
who supported the church. One victim, Syaifudin (not his real 
name), an indigenous Betawi ustadz, was banned from giving 
sermons and talks in mosques or teaching at educational in-
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stitutes because he consistently supported the church. He was 
even forced to temporarily flee the area because of rumours that 
his house was going to be attacked. 
When the Research Team met several community leaders 
objecting to the church (who wished to remain anonymous), 
the team found out why they objected. The primary reason was 
that the church was in the middle of a Muslim community. Ac-
cording to them, 99.9% of local residents near the church were 
Muslim. In addition, they also felt that the location was not suit-
able because the road in front of the church was narrow. They 
claimed to have objected to the church from the very first time 
it was announced, both formally and through informal forums 
facilitated by the local government. 
This opposing group believed that it was illogical to con-
struct a church in a community that was nearly 100% Muslim. 
As regards the conditions stipulated in the Joint Ministerial 
Regulations, one leader said that they were illogical and unfair, 
because how could 60 + 90 people defeat thousands of people 
who objected to the church? They were also disappointed with 
the local government, which eventually agreed to exchange 
the land that was planned to be part of the greenbelt with the 
church’s land. They argued that there were indications of ma-
nipulation and corruption in the way the signatures of local 
support were obtained in order to meet the requirements for 
the construction permit. They also deplored the way the church 
approached the local residents. For instance, they said that 
priests from the rectory often did not greet local residents as 
they passed them, although they acknowledged that maybe the 
church or priests were scared due to the local opposition. They 
felt that the church construction had only triggered interfaith 
tension. Prior to the planned construction religious harmony 
had been maintained in the region, they claimed. 
Although several demonstrations had been held, they were 
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said to have all been peaceful, with no acts of violence. The 
church opponents acknowledged, however, that they could not 
guarantee that this would continue in the future if the church 
construction continued. What they did not understand was 
why the church persisted with building when it had been well 
received in its old location (Cipayung). They questioned why 
the church did not just look for land in Cipayung or try to use 
the Budi Murni building as their official church. 
In addition to these leaders, the Research Team also inter-
viewed two local residents who lived near the construction site: 
Ibu Ayu (not her real name), a resident of Bambu Apus and a 
Muslim, who lived about 1 km from the site; and Pak Sukidi 
(not his real name), also a Muslim but from Solo, who lived be-
hind the church construction site. Although both were reluctant 
to take a stance on the issue, both said that they had not been 
disturbed and, in principle, had no objections to a church being 
built on the site. 
In this case, the two regulations on the construction of plac-
es of worship were questioned not only by the church as the 
victim, but also by the Jakarta FKUB. The latter has requested 
that the Governor annul the Decree No. 137/2002 to eliminate 
the inconsistencies between the two laws. Ahmad Syafii Mufid, 
head of the Jakarta FKUB, said that the Governor should im-
mediately grant a recommendation for a permit once a church 
obtained a recommendation from the FKUB. 
Another note concerns the greenbelt and spatial planning 
and regional governance. Strangely, when the land was owned 
by local residents the government did not dispute it. When the 
land was purchased by the church, however, the government 
did question it. The final point to make concerns the high fees 
the church had to pay in order to complete the permit applica-
tion process. For every step during the authorisation and con-
struction process, the church said it had to increase its budget 
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by double what it should have been, in light of the number of 
fees and charges sought and the need to “take care of” local 
support. 
In terms of state regulations, the Cilangkap church dispute 
should not have been protracted if the government had ad-
hered to the regulations and had not resorted to outdated laws. 
Once the church obtained a recommendation from the FKUB, 
the rest of the process should not have been protracted, but in 
reality the government bureaucracy created many obstacles, 
compounded further by the need to obtain from the consent of 
the Advisory Council formed on the basis of Governor’s Decree 
No. 137/2002. 
In terms of social factors, it was apparent that government 
indecisiveness also influenced local residents who used the per-
mit as an excuse to oppose the church construction. The pres-
ence of radical organisations also contributed to the St. yohanes 
Maria vianney dispute by further complicating the dispute. 
Although each of the three cases described above have their 
own unique issues there are some generalisations that can be 
made about this category. First, in terms of government agen-
cies, the churches in this category faced less than supportive 
government bureaucracy and more convoluted bureaucratic 
processes. St. yohanes Maria vianney in Cilangkap, for in-
stance, had to undergo several verification processes. These de-
layed the application for a permit, even though the church had 
already obtained local support and a recommendation from the 
FKUB. On the other hand, churches like St. Johannes Baptista 
in Parung and Filadelfia HKBP were unable to obtain a recom-
mendation from the FKUB, despite obtaining the support of 
local residents. Filadelfia HKBP was even sealed by the local 
government and, despite winning its case in the Administrative 
Court, the Bekasi government has been unable to make signifi-
cant progress on the issue. 
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Second, in terms of regulations, there was non-compliance 
and lack of uniformity in the application of the Joint Ministe-
rial Regulations to cases from this category. In Cilangkap, there 
were contradictions between the Joint Ministerial Regulations 
and Governor’s Decree No. 137/2002. In the Filadelfia HKBP 
case, the deputy head of the Bekasi FKUB stated that the FKUB 
could issue a recommendation only after the Ministry of Reli-
gious Affairs first issued a recommendation. Meanwhile in Pa-
rung, there were delays over the reluctance of heads of the RT 
and RW units to confirm the signatures of support from local 
residents that the church had obtained. 
This refusal to confirm signatures of support by the heads of 
RT and RW units is found in many of the cases examined in this 
research. One interesting thing is that the three churches expe-
rienced issues because of inconsistent application of the Joint 
Ministerial Regulations, among other things. All interviewees 
agreed that in principle the regulation was far better than its 
predecessor. If the government had the courage and consisten-
cy to uphold its own regulations, church disputes would not be 
as protracted as they have been recently.  
Third, deeper examination of the cases in this category re-
veals patterns in the way churches are opposed. Almost all the 
groups who disputed the churches did so in the name of Islam 
or made reference to Islam. The Research Team suggests, how-
ever, that this attitude is not representative of the wider Mus-
lim community because in many cases there were also Islamic 
groups who had no objections to, or even openly supported, the 
construction of these churches. 
The opponents of the construction of the churches in this cat-
egory used a variety of methods, from mass protests, letters of 
objection sent to government and intimidation, to the more fre-
quent accusations of falsification of local support. For the cases 
in this category, the church had difficulty in approaching local 
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residents for several reasons. First, the church had no support 
or back-up from the government. Such support is important be-
cause the government acts as both a mediator and protector. 
The absence of a government that plays these two roles leaves 
the church “alone” to face its opponents. Second, the church’s 
opponents were often from outside the area. Although the ma-
jority of churches secured support from local residents, in sev-
eral cases the residents who objected to the churches called in 
groups from outside the region. In the end, the churches had to 
approach these outside groups too. The more outside groups 
that were involved, whether intentionally invited or arriving on 
their own initiative, the more difficult it was for the churches to 
consult with them all. 
The fourth conclusion for churches in this category is an ac-
cumulation of the three points just described. Government in-
decisiveness and the opposition of various groups in the com-
munity (each with their own motives) always increases the cost 
of the church construction. This could be prevented if the gov-
ernment reformed the bureaucracy and refused to bow to pres-
sure from the opposing groups.*** 
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III
Dynamics Of Church Permits
In this chapter we analyse the findings discussed in the pre-
vious chapters in order to further clarify the relationships be-
tween the various actors and the dynamics at play in church 
disputes in Jakarta and the surrounding areas. We begin with a 
discussion of the role of the FKUB. 
FKUB’s Authority and Representation
According to Joint Ministerial Regulations No. 9 and 8 of 2006, 
the FKUB has several duties, including consultation with reli-
gious and community leaders; accommodating and channel-
ling the various aspirations of religious organisations and the 
community; disseminating legislation related to interreligious 
harmony; and, specifically for the city/regency FKUB branch-
es, issuing recommendations in relation to applications to con-
struct places of worship. 
In several cases where churches have been disputed, the 
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FKUB has become part of the problem, by refusing to issue a 
recommendation. This occurred with Filadelfia HKBP in Bekasi 
and St. yohanes Baptista Catholic Church in Parung. The FKUB 
refused to give a recommendation, even though the churches 
involved had obtained the number of signatures required. 
Without a recommendation from the FKUB, it is impossible to 
continue to apply for a permit. FKUB thus holds a critical posi-
tion when it comes to impeding the construction of places of 
worship. 
On the other hand, churches like St. yohanes Maria vianney 
in Cilangkap obtained a recommendation from the FKUB but 
could not build a church due to local opposition and an am-
bivalent government. The Jakarta Government still implements 
Governor’s Decree No. 137/2002, which creates extra condi-
tions for the construction of places of worship. This old regu-
lation duplicates the verification requirements and delays the 
application process. In these kinds of cases, the FKUB, which 
is supposed to facilitate, does not hold so decisive a position 
because there are many other institutes that can negate its rec-
ommendations. According to the head of FKUB in Jakarta, Sy-
afii Mufid, and the head of its Recommendation’s Department, 
Rudy Pratikno, the regional government should immediately 
grant a permit once FKUB issues a recommendation. In doing 
so, legal certainty is guaranteed. 
Besides the formal legal aspects, the FKUB is also required to 
facilitate communication between religious organisations and 
adherents. In this regard, FKUB should be involved in church 
disputes by seeking to bridge gaps and establish dialogue be-
tween opposing and supporting groups. Unfortunately, this 
role was not undertaken in any of the cases examined here. 
There are at least two reasons for this. First, efforts to establish 
dialogue often progress slowly and ‘behind the scenes’. The ef-
fects of this dialogue are also not necessarily visible, although 
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that is not to say they do not exist. This was evident in the St. 
Albertus case in Harapan Indah. The Catholic representative 
in the Bekasi FKUB provided information to the church about 
which important leaders to approach, and the church then met 
with these leaders. This is different to the role of the police, for 
example, which is immediately detectable and has a direct im-
pact on church services, congregants and their protection. 
Second, this research was based on information provided 
by those involved in building the churches (the church com-
mittees) and then developed to include significant actors men-
tioned by the church committees. FKUB was mentioned in sev-
eral cases as having been a significant actor but it was never 
seen as important as other actors, who were usually from the 
local community. As such there are not many sources that can 
shed light on the role of the FKUB. This is an aspect that should 
be examined in further research. 
Triggers and Fuel for the Conflict 
From the 13 cases examined in this research, we identified 
nine different factors that caused or exacerbated disputes over 
churches. The first factor is the issue of ‘Christianisation’. Parts 
of Indonesian society still identify churches with religious 
conversion (from Islam to Protestantism or Catholicism). This 
is also related to misunderstandings within society about the 
differences between Protestantism and Catholicism. A lack of 
understanding of the different church denominations makes it 
difficult for the community to understand why another church 
needs to be built when there is already a Christian church in 
any particular area. 
The second factor is that the local residents who object to 
the church often do so because they believe they receive no ben-
efit from its presence. This is largely a socio-economic, rather 
than ideological, objection. It was apparent, for instance, in the 
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Terang Hidup GKI case in Ketapang, where one ustadz objected 
to church construction because it would obstruct the ventilation 
of his house, making it hot and stuffy. In the St Mikael case in 
Kranji, the church initially selected the wrong partner to work 
with, which complicated relations with other leaders and im-
peded the church’s construction. 
The third factor is ideological resistance. This is an impor-
tant factor but, at least in this research, is not as significant as 
many people assume would be the case. One example of ideo-
logical resistance is in the St. Mikael case in Kranji, where one 
ustadz who opposed the church was eventually banned from 
giving sermons by the neighbourhood association unit. The 
possibility of ideological resistance in church disputes must be 
taken into account even if it is not a primary cause. In the cases 
examined here, the more dominant factors were religious lead-
ers’ lack of knowledge and fears of Christianisation (factor 1) 
or local residents feeling disadvantaged because they did not 
receive benefits (factor 2). 
The fourth factor relates to radical Islamic organisations. 
These organisations were often involved in protracted disputes, 
such as the St. Bernadet case in Ciledug and the St. yohanes Ma-
ria vianney case in Cilangkap. The most notorious among these 
organisations was FPI, which at times possibly operated under 
other names to try to claim a local identity, such as the Karang 
Tengah Islamic youth Front in Ciledug and the Cinere Islamic 
Forum, which opposed Cinere HKBP. These radical organisa-
tions tended to complicate the situation because of the way they 
manipulated local politics. In addition, the presence of radical 
organisations meant that there were more leaders and actors 
that needed to be approached. 
The fifth factor is the possibility that changes in church coun-
cils or boards may affect relationships between churches and 
local residents. This was apparent in this study from the words 
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of Bapak Mulyadi (head of RT 07) in respect of the St. Mikael 
Church in Kranji. He said that the relationship with the church 
became distanced after a change in membership of the parish 
council. This could explain why several churches that initially 
had good standing in their communities were later disputed. In 
addition to external factors (provocation from outside), it is also 
necessary to recognise that a church may lose a close relation-
ship with the local community if the new committee members 
are unable to maintain the same spirit as those who struggled 
for the church to be constructed in the first place.   
While these first five factors are related to social aspects, 
the next pertains to the government. The sixth factor that can 
hinder the construction of churches is an unsupportive bureau-
cracy. This ranges from the reluctance of RT/RW unit heads to 
confirm the support of local residents; to FKUB failing to issue 
recommendations; and permits not being granted despite all 
conditions having been met. In Jakarta, this is also related to the 
inconsistencies between Joint Ministerial Regulation No. 9 and 
8 of 2006 and Governor’s Decree No. 137 of 2002. 
The seventh factor is unwillingness on the part of the gov-
ernment to uphold its own decisions, as indicated by the can-
cellation of permits due to pressure from certain groups. This 
occurred in the Cinere HKBP case and the yasmin GKI case, and 
clearly complicates the construction of churches, as it demon-
strates a lack of legal certainty. After the committee of a place of 
worship has approached local residents and gained their sup-
port, met the conditions, and obtained a permit, its efforts can-
not stop there because there is always a significant possibility 
that the church will be disputed by groups that are able to rally 
large crowds of people. 
The eighth factor, similar to factor 6, concerns the role of 
the police force. Disputes over churches can be protracted if 
the police are not firm and decisive in performing their duties. 
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Unfortunately, in the cases examined here, negligence by secu-
rity agencies was not due simply to poor performance. Rather, 
the attitude of security forces was largely determined by the 
attitude of the regional government. In cases like the St. Mi-
kael Church in Kranji and Terang Hidup GKI, security agencies 
helped the church because the government was also coopera-
tive. By contrast, in the Filadelfia HKBP and GKI Yasmin cases, 
the security forces did little, because the local government was 
ambivalent towards the church. 
The ninth factor relates to the level of intolerance in society 
more broadly, which, according to several studies, is quite high. 
This intolerance can come from ideological aspects (see factor 3) 
or non-ideological aspects such as fear of Christianisation and 
misunderstanding of the differences between Protestantism 
and Catholicism (factor 1) or government negligence (factors 6, 
7 and 8). With such a level of intolerance in addition to minimal 
government support, it is no surprise that in several cases the 
democratic principle of “majority rules, minority rights” was 
not fulfilled, and minority groups were forced to fight harder 
for their rights. 
Mediators and Conflict Resolution 
One surprising result that differed from our initial expectations 
was that the most important factor in resolving church disputes 
was neither state regulations nor social issues. In fact, the main 
factor was the internal solidarity of the church itself. This issue 
deserves to be highlighted because it influences the dynamics 
of state regulations and social factors. In several cases, such as 
with St. Mikael in Kranji and St. Albertus in Harapan Indah, the 
church had difficulties in obtaining a permit because it was in-
ternally divided. Lack of internal solidarity contributed to poor 
coordination and planning in these cases. In addition, differ-
ent factions within the church committee approached different 
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community leaders, as if they were competing with one another. 
The second factor is correct identification of which leaders 
should be approached from the local community around the 
church. The heads of the RT and RW units and ustadz from local 
mosques and mushollas are often on this list. The heads of the 
local RT and RW units hold strategic positions within society, 
and are responsible for confirming the list of local supporters 
required for a permit. Churches that resolved their disputes, 
such as St. Mikael in Kranji, Terang Hidup GKI in Ketapang 
and Seroja GKP in Bekasi, did so after the RT and RW units 
assisted in reducing the conflict. By contrast, in cases such as 
St. Bernadet in Ciledug, the RT and RW units were part of the 
problem. 
The third factor, following on from identification of local 
leaders, is the ability to successfully approach these leaders. 
The common assumption is that the best approach is to hand 
out cash but our research shows that the reality is more com-
plex. In the St. Mikael case in Kranji, an effective way of ap-
proaching the ustadz turned out to be through giving chicken 
nuggets to one of his grandchildren. The head of an RT also 
became close to the church after the church employed several 
unemployed local residents. In the St. Albertus case in Harapan 
Indah, one ustadz was emotionally moved when for he was in-
vited to eat the first time in a café that stood on the land of his 
ancestors. These cases show that there is no uniform approach 
that works for everyone. The church committee must identify 
the particular characteristics of each leader in order to discover 
the best way to approach him or her. 
The fourth factor is the presence of community leaders com-
mitted to religious freedom (pluralism). These leaders are im-
portant because they are willing to defend and show concern 
for churches when the majority of the community chooses to 
remain silent. The head of RT 03 at the St. Mikael church and H. 
Disputed Churches in Jakarta136
Heri at Filadelfia HKBP are examples of such leaders. 
The fifth factor is the ability to contain disputes. This includes 
the church’s ability to refrain from escalating the issue where it is 
not absolutely necessary to do so. If the dispute can be resolved 
at the RT, RW or subdistrict levels it is counterproductive for the 
church to take it further, for instance, by involving the media. 
This complicates the issue by involving more parties. The best 
example of this is Seroja GKP, which resolved its dispute within 
the complex, by mediating through the Dharmais Foundation. 
When the dispute continued, the head of the RW unit urged both 
the church’s opponents and the church not to invite parties from 
outside the area to become involved. 
The sixth factor is the need for an impartial and competent 
state agencies, including both the bureaucracy and the police 
force. The importance of this factor is evident in the St. Mikael 
case in Kranji, the Terang Hidup GKI case in Ketapang and the 
St. Albertus case in Harapan Indah. All of these churches were 
protected by government agencies. Psychologically, a police 
force that protects citizens and performs its duty will make not 
just the church congregation, but also local residents who have 
no objections to the church, feel safe. Opposing groups will then 
find it difficult to intimidate local residents into withdrawing 
their support. 
There was one inconsistency apparent in the role of the state. 
In some churches like Terang Hidup GKI and St. Albertus, mem-
bers in the congregation with connections to officials or the gov-
ernment were able to achieve positive results. On the other hand, 
some churches that had difficulties, such as St. Yohanes Maria Vi-
anney in Cilangkap, also had connections with officials but were 
unable to obtain the desired result. It thus seems that the pres-
ence of powerful people can help, but it does not guarantee that 
a church will be free from, or be able to resolve, disputes. The 
reason for this may be that in the current democratic era power 
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and influence tend to be dispersed to many people and groups, 
as opposed to during the New Order when power was central-
ised and the influence of connections was more pronounced. 
Actors behind the Conflict 
There are several actors in the cases examined here who often 
play an influential role, which might mean helping with the 
construction of the church but could also mean opposing it. 
The first actors here are the heads of the neighbourhood (RT) 
and community (RW) association units. They played support-
ive roles when they did not impede the construction process or 
when they firmly opposed the involvement of outside organ-
isations. More infrequently, they played a supportive role by 
monitoring religious sermons in mosques in their regions, as 
did the head of RT 03 in the St. Mikael case in Kranji. At times, 
the RT and RW heads played unsupportive roles by refusing 
to confirm signatures of local support. Their confirmation is 
crucial, because the subdistrict and district heads are usually 
reluctant to sign off if there is no confirmation from the RT and 
RW heads. This is somewhat ironic, given the Joint Ministerial 
Regulations do not, in fact, require the RT and RW heads to 
confirm signatures at all. 
The second actors are the religious leaders or ustadz based 
in the mosques in the RT or RW units near the church. These in-
dividuals hold important positions because they are a reference 
point for local residents in relation to religious matters. Reli-
gious leaders who resist the construction of a church can easily 
use religious pretexts to influence local residents. In reality, this 
research showed that religious arguments were rarely used to 
oppose a church, at least not publicly. 
The third actor is the FKUB. It is an important institution due 
to its authority to issue recommendations. Without an FKUB 
recommendation an application cannot be approved. On the 
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other hand, obtaining a recommendation is not a simple pro-
cess. Not only is it complicated by objections from opponents of 
a church, there is sometimes disagreement within FKUB itself 
as to whether a church should be constructed or not. Factors 
internal to FKUB can influence a recommendation, such as the 
religious understandings of the FKUB head and members. In 
addition, representation can also be problematic in Muslim-ma-
jority areas, because the majority of FKUB members are Muslim 
and this can potentially impede church construction, although 
it is difficult to generalise in this regard. For more information 
on matters related to FKUB and its complexities see the Report 
on Religious Life published by CRCS (2009).1
The fourth set of actors includes the Mayor, Regent or head 
of the regional government. In the cases examined here, there 
were at least three different roles that regional heads played. 
Some actively opposed the church, like the Mayor of Bogor in 
the yasmin GKI case, or the Mayor of Depok, who annulled the 
permit given to Cinere HKBP. Others, including heads of gov-
ernment, firmly stated their support for a church. The Mayor 
of Bekasi in the St. Mikael in Kranji case falls into this category, 
because in a meeting with the church and its opponents he stat-
ed he would take action against those who disrupted law and 
order, or disputed the church, which had already obtained a 
permit. Other regional heads were passive and reluctant to take 
a clear stance. These kinds of heads did not actively oppose the 
church but did refuse to help it resolve its disputes. The dis-
pute over St. yohanes Maria vianney is a good example. The 
Governor of Jakarta did not interfere in the application process 
for a permit but neither did he attempt to reduce the complex 
chain of bureaucratic process created by Governor’s Decree No. 
137/2002. 
It is necessary to note that churches experience difficulties 
1  The Report can be accessed at: http://crcs.ugm.ac.id/. 
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due to lack of government support when the regional heads are 
resistant or passive. Of course, even when regional heads are 
supportive a church might not be able to resolve its problems 
immediately. Supportive regional heads are thus capital for the 
church but not an automatic cure for all ills. 
The fifth actor is the police force, primarily the regional and 
local police chiefs. The police are responsible for guaranteeing 
law and order, and acting as mediators between the church and 
its opponents. The Bekasi police chief in the St. Mikael case in 
Kranji and the Sawah Besar police chief in the Terang Hidup 
GKI case provide an example of policing that helps mediate the 
dispute. On the other hand, in the yasmin GKI case the police 
sided with the regional government and its wish to cancel the 
church’s permit. 
Another issue is the role of the police in relation to the po-
sition of the local government. If the local government does 
not interfere, the police are usually supportive of a church. If 
the local government objects to a church, however, the police 
may also obstruct attempts by the church to hold services, as 
occurred in the Yasmin GKI case. In general, the most influen-
tial state actors in disputes over places of worship are regional 
heads and the FKUB. 
The sixth actor is social organisations that become involved 
in church disputes. The most notorious organisation here is FPI. 
At the very least, the organisation was involved in the opposi-
tion to St. Bernadet in Ciledug and St. yohanes Maria vianney 
in Cilangkap. In addition to established organisations like FPI, 
there are often similar organisations acting on behalf of local 
Muslim residents involved in the opposition to churches. These 
organisations usually identify with the name of the area in which 
the church stands in order to emphasise their locality. Further 
research is needed in order to examine the relationship between 
these local organisations and more well-established radical or-
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ganisations, such as FPI. 
There are several issues surrounding the relationship between 
social organisations and church disputes. First, this research re-
vealed that organisations often become involved after being in-
vited by local residents living near a church who object to the 
church but feel they lack support. This was evident in the case 
of St. Mikael in Kranji and yasmin GKI in Bogor. As a result it 
is difficult to determine whether the dispute comes from “lo-
cal residents” or “outsiders”. The Research Team believes that 
this dichotomy between “local residents” and “outsiders” is not 
helpful because there are almost always local residents involved. 
Rather than distinguishing between the two, it is more important 
to work out how to approach the local RT and RW units so that 
they can become a “security network” for churches against any 
problems that may emerge. 
Second, a clearer definition is needed of the term “involve-
ment”. A definition of this term is important because in several 
cases, such as the Terang Hidup GKI case, organisational involve-
ment (FPI) turned out to be nothing more than claims made by 
individuals associated with FPI. On the other hand, churches like 
St. Bernadet experienced mass action by FPI first hand. Defining 
the boundaries of involvement is necessary, because individual 
disputes and actual mass protests require different responses. 
The third issue concerning social organisations relates to 
Chernov-Hwang’s study (2009). She stated that peaceful mo-
bilisation requires a strong state. A state that lacks the capacity 
or is hesitant in performing its duties is one of the factors behind 
anarchy. This research arrived at a similar finding. In the church 
cases examined, it was clear that the lack of a strong state encour-
aged radical groups to impose their will. Churches that were able 
to resolve their disputes are examples of how state protection 
and guarantees can force radical groups to soften their stance. 
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Socio-Economic Demographics 
It is important to note that this research does not use evidence 
such as statistics from the Bureau of Statistics or from the sub-
district government. The relationship between church disputes 
and demographic and economic factors was examined through 
interviews and, if possible, through examination of the docu-
ments stating the demands of the opposing groups. The Re-
search Team did not directly ask interviewees, “Is the church 
dispute related to ethnic or economic factors?” Rather, the Re-
search Team inquired about the demographic characteristics of 
church congregants and local residents. These characteristics 
were then compared to the demographics of the other church-
es examined here. From these data, the Research Team found 
no relationship between the demographic composition or eco-
nomic level of local residents and church members. If there was 
any correlation between economic factors and church disputes 
it was in relation to local residents’ expectations about employ-
ment or economic benefits as a result of the church construction. 
Ethnicity also had little impact. Although local residents liv-
ing near the church in dispute in Bekasi were largely Betawi, 
other groups such as the Javanese were also well-represented. 
In the St. Bernadet church case, the residents of the Finance 
Department complex who objected to the church had no par-
ticular ethnic character. Generally speaking the Research Team 
concluded that there were too many inconsistencies to identify 
demographic and economic factors as causes of church dis-
putes. 
One interesting case is Terang Hidup GKI. If demographic 
and economic reasons cause church contruction disputes, then 
this one should have been almost impossible to resolve. First, 
local residents near the church tended to be middle to lower-
class, while congregants were not. Second, and even more com-
plex, the church congregation was almost 100% ethnic Chinese 
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and lived far from the church, while local residents were Be-
tawi, Javanese, Bugis or members of ethnic groups other than 
the Chinese. In reality, however, letters of demand from the 
opposing groups and interviews with the church and RW unit 
gave no indication that the opposition was about either ethnic 
or economic factors. 
There is therefore very little likelihood that demographic 
and economic factors play a significant role in church disputes. 
If demographic factors are considered, they refer more to the 
mobility of local residents who then bring their “need” for the 
construction of a church to the area in which they settle. Fulfill-
ing this need can potentially lead to disputes for the variety of 
reasons described earlier.  
The Local Politics of Conflict 
The cases examined in this research reveal three interesting as-
pects of political dynamics and their influence on church dis-
putes. Political dynamics do, however, require further research. 
First, the cases of St. Mikael in Kranji and Seroja GKP pro-
vide several possible reasons for the position of the Mayor of 
Bekasi, Mochtar Mohammad, and explain why many churches 
experience difficulties in Bekasi. Sources from the two churches 
agreed that Mochtar Mohammad was close to both churches. 
This opens up the possibility that some parties intentionally 
objected to the contruction of several churches in Bekasi in or-
der to decrease his popularity among the Christian community. 
Another explanation is that Mochtar Mohammad was only ex-
ploiting the support of the Protestant and Catholic communi-
ties as a political commodity in order to win the Bekasi local 
election, or that he was not actually as strong as expected in 
defending religious freedom. 
Second, it is possible that regional heads who require sup-
port from Christian communities in order to win local elections 
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give greater attention to churches by comparison with regional 
heads who already have well-established political legitimacy. 
This finding is based on a comparison between Mochtar Mo-
hammad in Bekasi and Wahidin Halim in Tangerang. Mochtar 
Mohammad won with a margin of only 9% and thus the non-
Muslim votes were a significant factor in his election. By con-
trast, Wahidin Halim won the Tangerang local election with 
more than 80% of the votes. This is further supported by a 
discussion the Research Team had with one observer of the St. 
Bernadet case in Ciledug, who stated that Wahidin Halim had 
been asked to look into the issue because during the election the 
Christians had voted for him. According to this source, how-
ever, Wahidin Halim paid little attention because he did not be-
lieve that the Christian community’s support had, in fact, been 
important for his victory. 
The third aspect relates to political parties and church dis-
putes. The deputy Mayor of Bogor in the yasmin GKI case, 
the Mayor of Depok in the Cinere HKBP case and the Regent 
of Bekasi in the Filadelfia HKBP case were all from PKS. On 
the other hand, in areas such as Bekasi and Tangerang the re-
gional heads were not members of PKS but the churches were 
still disputed. Nevertheless, there are differences between the 
two situations. In Bogor and Depok the regional heads actively 
made things difficult for the churches by annulling their per-
mits. The Mayor of Tangerang did not do so, but he did not help 
the church either. The Mayor of Bekasi (at the time the Dep-
uty Mayor) was actually generally supportive of the church. 
Apart from the difficulty this Research Team faced in finding 
supportive actors from PKS, further research is required to see 
what positions Islamic parties take towards the construction of 
churches.*** 
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Conclusion
Having discussed and analysed the results of the research de-
scribed the previous chapters, this chapter will draw a number 
of conclusions and recommendations. In the final section we 
will also discuss the limitations of this research and the extent 
to which the results reflect disputes over places of worship in 
other regions in Indonesia. 
Conclusion 
In accordance with the initial design of this research, we have 
grouped our conclusions into those related to state regulations 
and social factors. 
State Regulations 
•  The Indonesian government can, and must, do more to guar-
antee the right to construct a place of worship and religious 
freedom in general. In this research, every church dispute 
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that was resolved involved firm and decisive government 
agencies, especially the police force (the institution respon-
sible for security) and the regional head (the bureaucratic 
authority). Weak government is one of the main causes of 
the significant number of church disputes today. 
•  Joint Ministerial Regulations No. 9 and 8 of 2006 give greater 
legal certainty and clarity than previous regulations. There 
are, however, also many weaknesses in these regulations, 
such as the requirement for a minimum number of signa-
tures, which can be difficult to obtain in some cases, as well 
as the government’s inconsistency in providing legal cer-
tainty. 
•  There is inefficiency and the potential for delay in the con-
struction of places of worship in the way this regulation is 
implemented, in the sense that meeting the requirements at 
one stage in the process does not guarantee that a church can 
move on to the next stage. This is clear from the experience 
of churches that fulfilled the requirement for signatures of 
support and recommendation, but were still unable to ob-
tain a permit. 
•  Regional heads are influential in determining bureaucratic 
policies for disputed churches. Of the cases covered in this 
research, almost all churches that resolved their issues were 
assisted by supportive regional heads or professional secu-
rity forces. By contrast, regional heads who are resistant can 
complicate the church construction process, and may even 
revoke permits that have been issued previously. 
•  The opposing groups in this research almost all used sym-
bols relating to Islam or acted in the name of the Muslim 
community. Although this might seem like a trivial matter, 
it deserves serious attention, for at least two reasons. First, 
it gives the impression that the majority of Muslims object 
to or oppose the construction of churches, regardless of how 
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accurate that impression might be in reality. Second, it sug-
gests that when an organisation hides behind the name of 
religion, the government and police often lose the will to act 
against them. 
Social Factors 
•  There are indications that the high level of intolerance 
among the religious majority towards minorities plays a 
role in church disputes in Jakarta and the surrounding areas. 
This intolerance is caused by a number of reasons that can-
not be explored further in this preliminary research. What 
is clear, however, is that both the religious majority and mi-
norities, and especially the government, are responsible for 
educating society so as to overcome this intolerance. 
•  The relationship between a church and its local residents, 
especially community leaders, plays a significant role in de-
termining whether the church will face obstacles or not. This 
relationship is also important because it affects whether the 
church receives enough support from local residents if out-
side groups challenge the church. The heads of neighbour-
hood and community association units are also key leaders 
in church disputes. Their support or lack of it influences lo-
cal residents. Their position is also crucial because in prac-
tise they have the authority to confirm local support. 
•  Ethnicity or economic status does not influence whether lo-
cal residents will object to or accept a church. Rather, com-
munity leaders who respect religious freedom are influen-
tial. These leaders are different to other leaders because they 
continue to speak out in defence of churches when others 
are silent. For instance, the majority of local residents might 
not object to the presence of a church. If this majority re-
mains silent, however, it is not very helpful. 
•  Involving local residents in the construction of a church helps 
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decrease the possibility of opposition. What is important is 
that local residents should be employed based on from the 
recommendation of local leaders (particularly the heads of 
the RT and RW units). The wrong choice of employee can 
complicate relationships with local residents, because they 
may feel that the church is favouring certain people at the 
expense of others. 
•  The internal solidarity of the church can influence the dy-
namics of state regulations and social factors. Lack of inter-
nal solidarity makes it difficult to fulfil state regulations, and 
social issues may complicate relationships with those lead-
ers or institutions that the church wishes to approach.
Recommendations
To the Government
•  The police force must act firmly in response to groups who 
provoke others or vandalise places of worship. This research 
shows that opposing groups are actually scared to act if the 
police respond decisively. Church disputes are not the same 
as other interreligious conflicts, such as occurred in Poso, 
where revenge gave people the courage to oppose the po-
lice. In church disputes the dominant factor is dissatisfaction 
or misunderstanding. As feelings of dislike are less serious 
than revenge, sanctions or penalties are much more effective 
solutions. 
•  Regional governments must better understand and pay 
more attention to all the provisions of Joint Ministerial 
Regulations No. 9 and 8 of 2006. In Jakarta, for instance, 
the government is still using Governor’s Decree No. 137 of 
2002, which is no longer valid. Using the Governor’s Decree 
means additional requirements must be met in order to ap-
ply for a permit to construct a place of worship, processes 
that do not exist in the Joint Ministerial Regulations. 
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•  The central government needs to form an autonomous body 
to monitor the effectiveness of the Joint Ministerial Regula-
tions, so that whenever a church cannot meet the requirement 
for local support in the Regulation the regional government 
can be called in to help facilitate the process to obtain a place 
of worship for the church. The Administrative Court also 
needs to be revamped so that its rulings are enforced and 
so that there are sanctions for those state institutions that ig-
nore its rulings. This is necessary because if the Administra-
tive Court rules in favour of the church the local government 
may still decline to make any significant changes or take any 
steps. With some kind of sanction or powers of enforcement 
behind the court’s rulings local governments would stop de-
laying resolution of the issues behind disputed churches. 
•  FKUB needs to help churches approach groups who oppose 
them, at least after the church has successfully obtained the 
minimum requirement of local support. This is necessary to 
guarantee legal certainty and to ensure that protests do not 
automatically halt the construction of a church, especially 
after the church has obtained support from local residents. 
Furthermore, the government and FKUB must focus on the 
stipulations in the Joint Ministerial Regulations. When a 
church has obtained signatures from 60 local residents and 
90 congregants then FKUB must issue a recommendation 
and the government a permit. This would ensure that there 
is no gap through which the church’s opponents can influ-
ence the process. If these groups want to stop the construc-
tion, they have to do so by convincing local residents not 
to give their signatures in support at the outset. It is hoped 
that this would lead to a more balanced contest between the 
church and its opponents in approaching the local commu-
nity. 
•  The government and FKUB must actively educate society 
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about the different denominations within Protestant and 
Catholic churches. This may be done through an introduc-
tion to the beliefs and institutes of the main religions in pub-
lic schools at various levels. Such an understanding is im-
portant because in many cases, social resistance is a result of 
local residents’ awareness that there is already a church in 
the area but not realising it is of a different denomination.
To Religious Leaders and Organisations 
•  Islamic social organisations such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), 
Muhammadiyah, and the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) 
must pay more genuine attention to problems concerning 
the construction of churches. This is evident from our find-
ing that these organisations rarely play a role in mediating 
church disputes. NU, Muhammadiyah and MUI should be 
able to do much more to guarantee religious freedom and 
resolve disputes over construction of places of worship in 
Muslim-majority areas. 
• Islamic organisations need to support the government in 
taking legal action against groups who act violently in the 
name of religion. The law must be enforced, and if these or-
ganisations support the government it will reinforce the fact 
that legal action against violent groups is not an act of hostil-
ity against Islam but an attempt to combat criminal groups 
who exploit the name of religion. 
•  Christian organisations, such as PGI and KWI, need to con-
tinue to promote interfaith dialogue and establish close re-
lationships with other religious organisations. Because reli-
gious issues are sensitive and freedom of religion is difficult 
to enforce in Indonesia, relationships need be built not only 
by the majority but by minority groups as well. PGI and 
KWI need to have some kind of internal control mechanism 
in order to avoid irresponsible efforts at Christianisation by 
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some elements within the organisations. Such control is im-
portant because Christianisation is one of the most frequent 
issues encountered during church disputes.  
•  PGI and KWI need to train their leaders in how to build rela-
tionships with society. This is necessary particularly to recti-
fy the understanding that resistance to the church is always 
about money. Emphasis needs to be placed on the fact that 
often money is less important than the way in which that 
money is given as a contribution to society. Finally, PGI and 
KWI must address vertical disputes (with the government) 
and avoid horizontal conflict or tension within society. 
•  Specifically to church construction committees: In order to 
avoid potential disputes in the future over the signatures 
of support from local residents, churches must not only ob-
tain signatures but also a photocopy of each individual’s 
national ID card and a completed form provided by the 
church. The church construction committee should not ac-
cept demands from brokers who promise to resolve all the 
church’s problems for a certain sum of money. Not only are 
such promises unable to be guaranteed (in this research the 
church disputes were complex and it is doubful that a single 
person or group could resolve them singlehandedly), they 
also set a bad precedent for the future. 
•  Also to church construction committees: In responding to 
the difficulties churches face, committees must carefully 
consider whether or not to involve the media. In some cases, 
using the media is beneficial but in others it can be counter-
productive. The Research Team recommends not involving 
the media for small-scale issues where opponents are local 
residents and before outside parties have become involved. 
In these cases using the media only escalates and further 
complicates the issue. 
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Limitations and Generalisations 
As a study that is, as far as we know, the first on the problems 
surrounding the construction of churches, this research certain-
ly has its limitations. The first is the lack of literature available 
to give a picture of what was happening on the ground. This 
has meant the Research Team had to use trial and error to find 
out more about local dynamics. This proved to be a lengthy pro-
cess. 
The second limitation was restricted funding and time, 
which proved disproportionate to the difficulty of the condi-
tions on the ground. More churches could have been studied if 
there was more funding and time. Almost half the time avail-
able was spent on collecting background information about the 
dynamics of the churches that were researched in depth. If ad-
ditional research is undertaken, the time taken to gather back-
ground information will be decreased significantly because this 
research itself provides much information. 
Another consequence of limited funding and time relates to 
the diversity of sources. The majority of informants relied on in 
this research were from the churches or were local residents rep-
resented by neighbourhood and community association units. 
Although they provided enough information to give an idea 
as to the background and context of the various disputes over 
the construction of churches (which we complimented with sec-
ondary sources), we also tried to obtain other information, par-
ticularly from the opposing parties. For future research, another 
Research Team should use this initial research and focus further 
on the opinions of the opposing parties. 
The third limitation relates to balancing the number of Cath-
olic and Protestant churches and representing the denomina-
tions within the Protestant Church. Of the 13 churches exam-
ined here, seven were Catholic and six were Protestant. This 
was not actually planned, and was purely a consequence of 
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dynamics on the ground. Of 12 churches in the four categories, 
we initially intended to study five Catholic churches and seven 
Protestant ones. The dynamics, however, forced us to make ad-
justments, which altered that representation. The lack of accom-
modation of the wide range of Christian denominations was a 
result of the Research Team’s limited information, which led to 
a rather specific research sample of only a few denominations. 
The final limitation relates to the generalisation of these re-
search results. We believe that the factors identified in this re-
search are also valid in other disputes over the construction of 
churches, or even places of worship in general, in other regions 
in Indonesia. Majority-minority relations, suspicion of others, 
political utilisation and socio-economic motives are general fac-
tors that can be encountered anywhere, not only in Jakarta and 
the nearby areas. Opposing actors require a mention in relation 
to the generalisation of these results, however. As discussed pre-
viously, the churches examined here were disputed by groups 
acting in the name of Islam, as the majority group in society. In 
other regions where Muslims are a minority, it is possible that 
other religious groups who represent the majority might act in 
an intolerant manner towards Muslims when they seek to con-
struct a place of worship. For example, although unrelated to 
places of worship, in Manokwari several Christian groups from 
the majority proposed a draft Regional Regulation (Peraturan 
Daerah) declaring Manokwari as a Gospel Town, or Kota Injil 
(although it has not been passed to date). In North Sumatra, the 
Christian and Muslim communities interfere in the religious 
practices of the local Parmalim community (a mystical sect). 
It is clearly apparent that a person of any religious belief can 
be intolerant. Only further research can reveal precisely the ex-
tent to which this is the case. This research does, however, offer 
a number of interesting hypotheses to be tested further.*** 
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Attachments
List of Interviewees
No Name Position Date
1 Rudy Pratikno Secretary of the Human 
Rights Commission of 
the Jakarta Archdiocese 
and head of the 
Recommendations 
Department of FKUB in 
Jakarta
8 June 2010
2 Setyawan FKUB in East Jakarta, 
Catholic representative
14 August 2010
3 Jeirry 
Sumampow
Deacon’s Commission of PGI 2 June 2010
4 Gomar Gultom Secretary General of PGI 10 August 2010
5 Hieronimus 
Kasman
One of the founders of St 
Aloysius Gonzaga Church in 
Cijantung
10 October 2010
6 Sugeng Treasurer of RW 06, which 
is close to the Cijantung 
Church
14 December 
2010
7 Sukirno Head of RT 01 RW 06, which 
is close to the Cijantung 
Church
14 December 
2010
8 Krissantono Head of the Church 
Construction Committee of 
St Mikael, Kranji
14 August 2010
9 yosef Jaga 
Dawam
Parish Pastor of St Mikael 
Church, Kranji
18 August 2010
10 Mulyadi Head of RT 7, which is close 
to St Mikael Church, Kranji
16 September 
2010
11 Basyuni Head of RT 3, which is close 
to St Mikael Church, Kranji
16 September 
2010
12 Supriyono Head of RW 08, which is 
close to St Mikael Church, 
Kranji
16 September 
2010
13 Eric Egne Pastor at Seroja GKP 14 September 
2010
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14 Martin Resident in the Seroja 
complex and a veteran, 
member of Seroja GKP
14 September 
2010
15 Mellisa Pastor at Terang Hidup GKI 13 August 2010
16 Anonim Manager of RW 07, which is 
close to Terang Hidup GKI
23 September 
2010
17 Gina Sutono Head of the Jakarta 
Cathedral Museum
29 September 
2010
18 Christina 
Rantetana
Head of the Church 
Construction Committee of 
St Albertus Church, Harapan 
Indah
4 September 
2010
19 Haryono Secretary of the Church 
Construction Committee of 
St Albertus Church, Harapan 
Indah
4 September 
2010
20 Wahono Head of RW 09, Kampung 
Tanah Apit, which is close to 
St Albertus Church
15 December 
2010
21 Nur Hasan Head of RT 03/09, Kampung 
Tanah Apit, which is close to 
St Albertus Church
15 December 
2010
22 Samuel 
Bambang 
Heryanto
Pastor at Nehemia GKJ, 
Pondok Indah
6 October 2010
23 Bangun 
Waspodo
Head of RW 10, Pondok 
Pinang, Pasar Jumat Public 
Works Complex, close to 
Nehemia GKJ
18 December 
2010
24 Anonymous Church Construction 
Committee of St Bernadet 
Church, Ciledug
4 September 
2010
25 Anonymous Church Construction 
Committee of St Bernadet 
Church, Ciledug
4 September 
2010
26 Anonymous Manager of the Nurul Iman 
mosque, Department of 
Finance Complex, close to 
the Ciledug Church
9 December 
2010
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27 Anonymous Resident at the Department 
of Finance Complex, owner 
of a street-side stall, close to 
the Ciledug Church
9 December 
2010
28 Anonymous Manager of RW 03, 
Department of Finance 
Complex, close to the 
Ciledug Church
9 December 
2010
29 Thomas Church Construction 
Committee of yasmin GKI
19 August 2010
30 Anonymous Manager of RW 08, close to 
yasmin GKI
7 October 2010
31 Jayadi Lawyer for yasmin GKI 19 August 2010
32 Betty J. Sitorus Elder of Cinere HKBP 2 November 
2010
33 Syafii Security guard at Cinere 
HKBP, local resident
22 November 
2010
34 Anonymous Manager of RT 04 RW 14, 
close to the Cinere Church
22 November 
2010
35 Anonymous Sub-district government 
officer, related to the Cinere 
Church
22 November 
2010
36 Anonymous Manager of RW 01, close to 
the Cinere Church
23 November 
2010
37 Palti Panjaitan Pastor at Filadelfia HKBP 6 September 
2010
38 Bartolomeus 
Gatot W.
Parish Pastor at St Johannes 
Baptista Church, Parung
8 September 
2010
39 FX Sidi Harsoyo Head of the Church 
Construction Committee of 
St Johannes Baptista Church, 
Parung
8 September 
2010
40 Tony Local resident near St 
Johannes Baptista Church, 
Parung
27 December 
2010
41 Gito Local resident near St 
Johannes Baptista Church, 
Parung
27 December 
2010
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42 Iing Local resident near St 
Johannes Baptista Church, 
Parung
27 December 
2010
43 Joko Head of RW 06, close to St 
Johannes Baptista Church, 
Parung
27 December 
2010
44 Ferdinandus 
Kuswadianto
Parish Pastor of the 
Cilangkap Church
5 September 
2010
45 Sihite Ignatius 
Sukirman
Treasurer of the Parish 
Council of St yohanes Maria 
vianney, Cilangkap
5 September 
2010
46 Billy Joseph Secretary of the Parish 
Council of the Cilangkap 
Church
5 September 
2010
47 Sukidi (not his 
real name)
Catholic youth of the 
Cilangkap Church
5 September 
2010
48 Ayu (not her 
real name)
Local resident near the 
Cilangkap Church
27 December 
2010
49 Anonymous 1 Local resident near the 
Cilangkap Church
27 December 
2010
50 Anonymous 2 Opponent of the Cilangkap 
Church
27 December 
2010
51 Anonymous 3 Opponent of the Cilangkap 
Church
27 December 
2010
52 Anonymous 4 Opponent of the Cilangkap 
Church
27 December 
2010
53 Anonymous 5 Opponent of the Cilangkap 
Church
27 December 
2010
54 Opponent of the Cilangkap 
Church
27 December 
2010
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Attachments 
List of Church Addresses 
No. Name of Church Address
1 St. Aloysius 
Gonzaga
St. Aloysius Gonzaga Catholic Church, Jl. 
Pendidikan III/2, Cijantung II, East Jakarta 
2 St. Mikael St. Mikael Catholic Church, Sekolah Strada 
Complex, Jl. Bintara Raya Gg. Strada 1 
No.38, Kranji, Bekasi 17135
3 Seroja GKP Seroja Pasundan Protestant Church, Jl. Tomat 
No. 10, Seroja Complex, Pamentas, Bekasi
4 Terang Hidup 
GKI
Terang Hidup GKI, Jl. Ketapang Utara I No. 
19A, Krukut Subdistrict, Taman Sari District, 
West Jakarta
5 The Cathedral The Cathedral, Jl. Katedral 7B, Central 
Jakarta
6 St. Albertus St. Albertus Catholic Church, Jl. Boulevard 
Raya Kav.23, Kota Harapan Indah, West 
Bekasi 021-379 777 66
7 Nehemia GKJ Nehemia GKJ, Jl. Raya Pasar Jumat, Pondok 
Indah, South Jakarta 12310
8 St. Bernadet Jl. Barata Pahala 31 RT01/03, Sekolah Sang 
Timur Complex, Central Karang, Ciledug, 
Tangerang, Banten
9 yasmin GKI yasmin GKI, Jl. KH. Abdullah bin Nuh, 
Curug Mekar, Bogor City, West Java
10 Pangkalan Jati 
HKBP
Pangkalan Jati HKBP, Jl. Bandung Pangkalan 
Jati, Cinere, Depok, West Java
11 Filadelfia HKBP Filadelfia HKBP, Dusun III RT01/09, Jejalen 
Jaya village, Tambun Utara District, Bekasi 
Regency, 0815-184-7304, 0813-184-21070
12 St. Johannes 
Baptista
St. Johannes Baptista Parish, Jl. Metro Parung 
No. 36, Tulang Kuning, RT01/06 Waru 
village, Parung District, Bogor Regency, Telp. 
(0251) 8610067
13 St. yohanes Maria 
vianney
Jl. Bambu Wulung No.60, Bambu Apus Sub-
district RT 33/05, Cipayung, Jakarta 13890
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Institute Biographies 
Paramadina Foundation 
The Paramadina is a non-profit and independent institute, es-
tablished by several intellectual leaders and professionals from 
Indonesia. This institute actively studies social and religious is-
sues, both directly and indirectly. Its primary focus is on religious 
thought and advocacy of religious freedom. The institute covers a 
vast area of thought, as shown by the ideas of Cak Nur on Islam, 
modernity and Indonesian-ness. In 1998, the institute established 
its own formal educational institute, the Paramadina University. 
Paramadina Foundation was established on 31 October 1986. In 
the Indonesian context, Paramadina was established in anticipa-
tion of the intellectual boom among santri (religious students) that 
occurred in the 1980s as Indonesian Islamic intellectuals began 
to adopt an outward-looking orientation instead of the inward-
looking orientation that had previously been dominant. For 
about 20 years, Paramadina Foundation has produced original 
thought during the Islamic renewal of this period. Its vast scope 
of thought has given room to diverse expressions of inclusive 
Islam and has contributed to religious freedom in Indonesia.
Masters in Peace and Conflict Resolution (MPRK) UGM
Since the beginning of the 2002/2003 academic year, Gadjah 
Mada University has offered a Masters Program in Peace and 
Conflict Resolution. This program is the first of its kind in Indo-
nesia, and even Southeast Asia. The program seeks to give new 
and strategic knowledge concerning resolution of social, political 
and economic conflicts on both a national and international level. 
As a result, this program offers a philosophical and theoretical 
understanding of peace and conflict resolution, as well as pro-
viding practical skills to manage conflict in society. The program 
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may be taken by anyone involved in decision making processes, 
from NGO activists to business people, government officers and 
citizens who wish to increase their knowledge about, and better 
their techniques for dealing with, peaceful conflict resolution. 
Indonesian Conference on Religion and Peace (ICRP)
ICRP is a non-sectarian, non-profit, non-government and inde-
pendent foundation. It promotes interfaith dialogue and coop-
eration. The organisation was established by leaders of different 
religious affiliations in Indonesia and was inaugurated on 12 
July 2000 by President Abdurrahman Wahid. ICRP promotes 
dialogue and development of religious life that is democratic, 
humane and pluralistic. Together with various institutes and in-
dividuals, ICRP also helps develop peace and conflict resolution 
studies, and struggles for civil rights and the right to freedom of 
religion and belief. 
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Authors’ Biographies 
Ihsan Ali-Fauzi is the Program Director of Paramadina Foun-
dation and a lecturer at Paramadina Graduate School, Jakarta. 
In addition to Syarif Hidayatullah UIN in Jakarta, he has also 
taught history and politics at Ohio University, Athens and The 
Ohio State University (OSU), Colombus, both in the United 
States of America. He has written articles for various newspa-
pers including Kompas, Koran Tempo, Media Indonesia, and Re-
publika. Working in collaboration with other researchers, he has 
published “Patterns of Religious Conflict in Indonesia: 1990-
2008” and “Reporting on Religious Freedom in 2008: Evaluation 
of the Reports by The Wahid Institute, the Setara Institute and 
CRCS-UGM.” He is also co-author of the book Gerakan Kebe-
basan Sipil (Civil Liberties Movements) (2009) with Saiful Mujani. 
Samsu Rizal Panggabean is a lecturer in International Rela-
tions and Masters of Peace and Conflict Resolution (MPRK) 
at Gadjah Mada University (UGM), yogyakarta. He studied 
at Walisongo and Gontor pesantrens in East Java, before study-
ing Interpretation of the Hadith at Sunan Kalijaga IAIN and 
at the Faculty of Political and Social Sciences at UGM, yogya-
karta. He obtained his Masters from the Institute for Conflict 
Analysis and Resolution (ICAR), George Mason University, 
USA. He has published “Creating Dataset in Information-
Poor Environments: Patterns of Collective violence in Indo-
nesia (1990-2003)” with Muhammad Zulvan Tadjoeddin and 
Ashutosh varshney. His books include Politik Syariat Islam (The 
Politics of Islamic Law) (2003) written with Taufik Adnan Amal. 
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Nathanael Gratias Sumaktoyo is a graduate of computer sci-
ence and statistics from Bina Nusantara University, Jakarta. 
After switching to social science, his focus and interest lies in 
the psychology of religion and politics. Together with Prof. Dr. 
Hamdi Muluk, a political psychologist from the University of 
Indonesia, he published an article in the international journal 
Archive for the Psychology of Religion on religious fundamental-
ism. Another of his articles on sacred violence was published in 
the Asian Journal of Social Psychology. In addition to religion and 
politics, he also has an interest in methodology, modelling and 
advanced statistical analysis. Nathanael won a 2011 Fulbright 
scholarship to study applied social psychology at Loyola Uni-
versity, Chicago. 
Anick H. Tohari is the Executive Director of the Indonesian 
Conference on Religion and Peace (ICRP). He is also the coor-
dinator for the National Alliance for Freedom of Religion and 
Belief (AKKBB). From 20 April to 6 May 2009, he participated in 
the International visitor Leadership Program, US Department 
of State, Washington DC-New york-Alabama-Seattle. He has 
published articles in various media outlets such as Koran Tempo, 
Jawa Pos, Indo Pos, Majalah Majemuk and Islamlib.com. 
Husni Mubarak is an assistant researcher at Paramadina Foun-
dation. After studying at Syarif Hidayatullah UIN in Jakarta, he 
worked at the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI) and the Centre 
for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) in Jakarta. He has 
been involved in a number of research projects at Paramadina 
including “Pola-pola Konflik Keagamaan di Indonesia, 1990-2008 
(Patterns of Religious Conflict in Indonesia).” He was one of 
the authors of the book All You Need is Love: Cak Nur di Mata 
Anak-anak Muda (All You Need is Love: Cak Nur in the Eyes of Chil-
dren) (2008). 
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Testriono is a researcher with the Centre for the Study of Islam 
and Society (PPIM) at UIN, Jakarta and is the assistant editor of 
the journal Studia Islamika, also published by the same institute. 
He was also one of the authors of Para Pembaharu: Pemikiran 
dan Gerakan Islam Asia Tenggara (The Reformers: Southeast Asian 
Islamic Thought and Movements) (SEAMUS for Freedom and 
Enlightenment, 2009) and Civic Values di Indonesia: Pengalaman 
Pemberdayaan Pesantren (Civic Values in Indonesia: An Experience 
in Empowering Pesantren) (PPIM 2010). He has co-edited several 
books, including: Pembaharuan Tanpa Apologia: Esai-esai tentang 
Ahmad Wahib (Unapologetic Renewal: Essays on Ahmad Wahib) 
(Paramadina 2010) and Arkeologi Islam Nusantara (The Archaeol-
ogy of Indonesian Islam) (KPG 2009). 
Siti Nurhayati is an assistant researcher at the Paramadina 
Foundation. While studying she worked as a field researcher 
for the Indonesian Survey Circle. After graduating she became 
an assistant lecturer in statistics on the sociology of religion at 
Syarif Hidayatullah UIN, Jakarta. She also previously worked as 
an assistant researcher at the Centre for the Study of Islam and 
Society (PPIM) and as a data analyst at the Women’s Studies 
Centre (PSW) of Syarif Hidayatullah UIN Jakarta.
Translator: Rebecca Lunnon is a Research Assistant at the Asian 
Law Centre, the University of Melbourne.
Editors: Tim Lindsey is Malcolm Smith Professor of Asian Law 
at the University of Melbourne, where he is the Director of the 
Asian Law Centre and the Centre for Islamic Law and Society. 
Melissa Crouch is a Research Fellow at the Melbourne Law 
School, the University of Melbourne, where she completed a PhD 
on legal disputes between Muslims and Christians in West Java. 

The Practice of Pluralism Series
This book is part of a series on ‘The Practice of Pluralism’ published by 
the Center for Religious and Cross-Cultural Studies (CRCS), Postgraduate 
School, Gadjah Mada University (UGM), yogyakarta. It is the product of 
research undertaken at CRCS since 2008.
The series includes several monographs on research undertaken by 
CRCS’s partners in different regions of Indonesia (Medan, Banjarmasin, 
Jakarta, yogyakarta, Bali, Makassar and Papua) on the practice of pluralism 
in society. In addition, CRCS has also published Pluralisme Kewargaan: 
Arah Baru Politik Keragaman di Indonesia (Civic Pluralism: a New Direc-
tion in the Politics of Diversity in Indonesia) (2011), which does not specifi-
cally focus on one locality but examines the practice of pluralism from a 
theoretical perspective.
CRCS (www.crcs.ugm.ac.id) is a postgraduate program at UGM that 
was established in 2000. Through academic activities, research and public 
education, CRCS aims to develop the study of religion and understand-
ings about the dynamics of religious life and social issues in the context of 
developing a plural society that is both democratic and just. 
The Pluralism Knowledge Programme (PKP) is an international collabo-
ration between academic institutes and civil society organisations in four 
countries, namely CRCS (yogyakarta, Indonesia); the Center for the Study 
of Culture and Society (Bangalore, India); the Cross-Cultural Foundation of 
Uganda (Kampala, Uganda); and the Kosmopolis Institute, University for 
Humanistics and Hivos (The Netherlands), which organises and supports 
it. PKP seeks to develop and distribute knowledge that strengthens under-
standings about pluralism throughout these four countries. PKP’s initiatives 
in Indonesia include publication of the Annual Report on Religious Life in 
Indonesia since 2009; facilitation of research undertaken collaboratively 
by academics and NGO activists on the local practice of pluralism; and 
the International Summer School on Pluralism and Development, which 
involves teachers and participants from each of the four countries. Further 
information is available at www.uvh.nl and www.crcs.ugm.ac.id. 
Healthy pluralism requires space for all religious adherents to worship and 
construct places of worship in accordance with their convictions. The state 
should protect this right as an essential matter. Despite this normative ideal, 
there is still much controversy surrounding the construction of places of 
worship in Indonesia. In the last few years, the planned construction of a 
number of places of worship has been disputed, although others have been 
able to overcome these problems by relying on different strategies.
This research seeks to examine the factors that play a role in initiating and 
resolving conflict over places of worship. Places of worship are specifically 
limited in this study to Catholic churches and Protestant churches that are 
members of the Communion of Churches in Indonesia (Persekutuan Gereja-
gereja di Indonesia, PGI). The methods used were participant observation 
and in-depth interviews of churches representing one of four categories: (1) 
undisputed churches; (2) disputed churches that have since resolved the 
dispute; (3) originally undisputed churches that have since become disputed; 
and (4) churches that have never been able to resolve the dispute.
Based on thirteen case studies, the research on which this report is 
based confirms the influential role of state regulation and social factors. The 
cases show that the obstacles some churches experience are generally 
related to weak government agencies due to political, social or ideological 
reasons. In terms of social factors, demographic factors were not found to 
have an influence. Resistance to churches was more often caused by a lack 
of communication, or provocation, or intimidation by specific groups. After 
describing and analysing the thirteen cases selected, this monograph closes 
with conclusions and recommendations.
The English edition of this book is published in cooperation with the Asian 
Law Centre and the Centre for Islamic Law and Society at the University 
of Melbourne, The Paramadina Foundation (Jakarta) and the Center for 
Religious and Cross-cultural Studies (CRCS), Postgraduate School, Gadjah 
Mada University (Yogyakarta).
